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Through formal innovation and experimentation—and through a renewed commitment to 
human subjectivity—many modernist writers consciously disrupted traditional modes of 
narration. In doing so, their writing simultaneously engaged ethical questions about 
responsibly representing the alterity of the other. With particular attention to narrative 
fragmentation, I claim that reading modernism in terms of responsibility yields an 
uncommon yet critical understanding of its practitioners as deeply invested in ethical 
problems related to representation. I argue that in the context of British modernism, 
particularly in the decade following the Great War, many writers developed narrative 
strategies that anticipated, welcomed, and responded to the irruption of “the new” into a 
world of repose, order, and complacency. This dissertation therefore explores the concept of 
ethical responsibility as it relates to representation and self-other relationships in the three 
British modernist novels: Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room (1922), D. H. Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod 
(1922), and E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India (1924). I draw on the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas and Jacques Derrida to show that while modernists mindfully broke with 
representational practices of the past, they also felt themselves beset by the terrible burden 
of “making it new.” I demonstrate that this burden, or anxiety, is experienced by modernist 
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        —— 
Modernism, Responsibility, and the Novel 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation claims that reading the British modernist novel in terms of ethical 
responsibility yields an uncommon yet critical understanding of its practitioners as deeply 
invested in questions about the ethics of narrative representation.1 In the Preface to What 
Maisie Knew (1897), for instance, Henry James broadly casts the responsibility of writing 
fiction in terms of responding to the tumultuousness of modern life. He writes, “[t]he effort 
really to see and really to represent is no idle business in face of the constant force that 
makes for muddlement. The great thing is indeed that the muddled state too is one of the 
very sharpest of the realities, that it also has colour and form and character, has often in fact 
a broad and rich comicality, many of the signs and values of the appreciable” (149). 
Attention to this “muddled state” for James—as well as for many of the next generation of 
writers who would both extend James’s theory of the novel and develop their own—would 
not only result in a wholesale revision of formal narrative techniques but also in a new 
thematic approach to life’s “colour and form and character.” The ethical approach to 
modernist writing undertaken in this project seeks to illuminate modernists’ response to the 
undeniable yet “hard-to-explain commitment to the new, to what [was] coming into being” 
in the early decades of the twentieth century (Attridge, “Innovation” 27). This “commitment 
to the new,” I claim, entailed more than a gesture of affirmation—it necessitated a creative 
response that ultimately disrupted conventional practices of representation as well as 
challenged many sociopolitical norms and values. For modernist writers, then, such response 
 
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, I restrict my analysis to narrative and the novel, though critical questions 




meant innovating existing structures of representation in addition to employing unfamiliar 
and radical formal techniques of storytelling. I argue that in the context of British 
modernism, particularly in the decade following the Great War, many writers developed 
narrative strategies that anticipated, welcomed, and responded to the irruption of “the new” 
into a world of repose, order, and complacency.2 And as Britain (and the European 
continent) experienced radical socio-political transformation, British writers found 
themselves consumed by a sense of urgency to articulate their immediate experiences 
inasmuch as they felt compelled to represent “what [was] coming into being.” 
In this study, I cast modernist responsibility in terms of a conscious disruption of 
traditional conventions of representation. At the same time, as I will demonstrate, 
modernists often seemed disquieted by the prospect of disrupting customary and established 
methods of representation. In other words, while modernists ostensibly reveled in a 
newfound sense of liberation from earlier conventions of fiction, they in fact expressed a 
profound uncertainty and anxiety about breaking with the past. What accounts for 
modernism’s well-known “crisis of representation” (Lewis xviii), I claim, results less from an 
exuberant expression of freedom than it does anxious indecision about developing radically 
new theories of representation and employing untried representational techniques. That 
critics have often conflated modernism with the practices of avant-garde—whose artists, 
“[b]y violating the accepted conventions and proprieties, not only of art but of social 
discourse, […] set out to create ever-new artistic forms and styles and to introduce hitherto 
neglected, and sometimes forbidden, subject matter” (Abrams 168)—only bespeaks its 
 
2 Perhaps one of the most remarkable novels to chart the widespread cultural changes in Britain from the late 





practitioners’ insistence upon “making it new,” to use Pound’s phrase.3 But what recent 
ethical critics of modernism have yet to discuss involves the anxieties and uncertainties 
inherent in the responsibility of abandoning traditional foundations of narrative 
representation—particularly as these anxieties and uncertainties register in the narrative 
forms of many modernist novels. This dissertation, therefore, explores how British 
modernists grappled with their sense of responsibility as expressed in their major fiction, 
critical essays, and theories of the novel. I show that modernist writers found themselves 
beset by a host of ethical questions related to narrative practices, that is, to the demands of 
“making” and representing new subject matter. Moreover, I assert that modernism’s 
deliberate attempt to intervene in matters of literary representation is responsible precisely 
because it engages ethical demands related to otherness and alterity demanding response. 
The response itself, I claim, is an act of responsibility as disruption. 
My approach joins a collection of recent scholarship that views modernism as a 
fundamentally ethical project. The prominent landmarks in this collection are Jil Larson’s 
Ethics and Narrative in the English Novel, 1880 – 1914, Martin Halliwell’s Transatlantic Modernism: 
Moral Dilemmas in Modernist Fiction, and Lee Oser’s The Ethics of Modernism: Moral Ideas in Yeats, 
Eliot, Joyce, Woolf, and Beckett. These studies have been paramount to opening a critical space 
for raising ethical questions about literary modernism, particularly in light of the many 
problems it addresses regarding human agency and identity, narrative representation and 
experimentation, and moral ideology and values. Other critics—such as Derek Attridge, 
 
3 It should be noted that both the Poundian injunction to “make it new” and modernism’s broader ethical 
commitment to “the new” relate to the Derridean notion of invention, which, Attridge explains, “may be a new 
device or program, but the action of invention is a mental feat that makes possible both the manufacture of the 
new entity and, perhaps more important, new instances of inventiveness” (“Innovation” 23). Responsibility as 
it connects to invention involves risk and answerability for something other than oneself, whether it be the 
creative act of invention or the created object (such as the text). It also extends to the “singular otherness of 




Stephen Ross, Dorothy J. Hale, and Melba Cuddy-Keane—have emphasized the connection 
between modernist aesthetic practices and contemporary ethics. Specifically, they have 
recruited the influential work of poststructural French philosophy in order to suggest that 
modernists’ insistence on developing radical formal narrative techniques and style partakes in 
an active, ethical recognition of otherness. Cuddy-Keane explains that “[e]thics […] is 
predicated on some notion of compulsion, some concept of obligation, some demand for 
response in the way we live” (“Ethics” 208). To this end, it might be said that modernism’s 
ethical response to “the way we live” disrupts the various narratives constituting our own 
lives and provokes a conscious awareness of what lies beyond them. Indeed, modernist 
ethics involves responding to life but to the life that resides outside or on the boundary 
limits of familiarity.  
 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 In this section, I shall provide preliminary definitions of ethics, responsibility, and 
undecidability. Together, these concepts will help to illuminate how modernist innovations 
of narrative representation can be read in terms of of ethical responsibility—and how 
responsibility itself, in the different ways I am using the term, always already involves 
undecidability. Additionally, I briefly discuss how these concepts also apply to the individual 
actions and experiences of narrators and characters in modernist novels. Finally, by attending 
to responsibility as an ethical concept, this project does not directly address issues related to 
politics, culture, gender, race, class, sexuality, or media. Indeed, I am focused on the problem 
of responsibility as something that animates these socio-historical categories—animates in 





In the context of this project, and at its most abstract, ethics involves respect for and 
openness to the absolute other.4 This conception of ethics comes from the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas—and it entails an implicit critique of the rational, self-determining, 
autonomous, moral subject who seeks to reduce the alterity of the other to the Same, to the 
familiar, to itself. As Simon Critchley writes: “ethics occurs as the putting into question of 
the ego, the knowing subject, self-consciousness” (Ethics 4). Neither a practice nor a method, 
ethics “happens” or begins when the other disturbs and disrupts the autonomy of the 
subject by placing on it an exorbitant and inescapable demand for justice. Further, as Levinas 
claims, this demand institutes the subject’s responsibility for the other to such an extent that 
“I am responsible for his very responsibility” (Ethics and Infinity 96). In this sense, ethical 
responsibility for the other does not begin in the subject’s freedom to act: instead, the 
other’s endless demand predisposes the subject to the welfare and protection of the other. 
To put it crudely, the subject’s identity begins in its subjection to the other, that is, in an 
asymmetrical relationship that binds the subject to the imperious claim of the other. More 
radically, the subject’s response to the urgency of the other’s demand cannot be prepared for 
ahead of their encounter. If ethics unfolds with the disruption, it simultaneously occurs with 
undecidability. For the subject can prepare only so much to make a decision; and when it is 
 
4 I follow Richard Kearney’s succinct definition of the other in Strangers, Gods, and Monsters as that who 
“surpasses all our categories of interpretation and representation” and yet who is “worthy of reverence and 
hospitality” (67). Kearney ultimately goes on to critique this notion of the other—developed by Levinas and 
Derrida—because it does not distinguish between a benign other (for instance, one who seeks political refuge 
from a totalitarian state) and a malevolent other (or one determined to cause harm or violence to a political 
adversary). It would seem that Kearney misses the point and reinscribes alterity in a binary opposition that both 
Levinas and Derrida would criticize. For both philosophers, one must be willing to sacrifice everything—even 
if it means violence, even if it results in one’s death—if there is to be justice. The very act of discerning 
between a “good” and “bad” other means a return to a metaphysics of presence. The point is that the other 





time to decide, the subject realizes that a responsible decision must be heterogeneous to 
knowledge and traditional morality. 
One of the central problems Levinas identifies in his ethical philosophy concerns the 
intelligibility of the other. In “Meaning and Sense,” for instance, he worries that artistic 
representation renders the other as “part of the ontological order itself” (82). Put another 
way, representation robs the other of its uniqueness (radical alterity) by fixing and 
transforming it into something recognizable, knowable. Even before the subject becomes 
aware of its responsibility for the other, it strives to transmute otherness into “the 
imperialism of the same” (“Trace” 347). For Levinas, Western philosophy bears the burden 
of having converted and appropriated the other as such: “[f]rom its infancy philosophy has 
been stuck with a horror of the other that remains other […]. It is for that reason that it is 
essentially a philosophy of being [sameness], that the comprehension of being is its last 
word, and the fundamental structure of man” (346). It might be said that Levinas’s critique 
of philosophy complicates the subject’s responsibility for the other—that is, by 
acknowledging the other in order to do justice, the subject must simultaneously refrain from 
saturating the other with meaning.  
 A final point must be made. Ethics in the context of Levinasian philosophy cannot 
be reduced to a set of moral precepts or foundations. Conceived in this way, ethics presents 
a challenge to traditional ideas about the study of morality and moral behavior. In other 
words, Levinas’s formulation of ethics does not ground ethical relationships or action in 
normative practices and commitments. Rather, Levinasian ethics occurs from a spontaneous, 
unexpected encounter with the other. The other’s disruption of “the knowing ego” involves 




manner that seems a/immoral and irresponsible from a normative viewpoint (Critchley, 
Ethics 6). 
 
Responsibility and Undecidability 
 
In light of Levinasian ethics, I define responsibility in this project in terms of 
maintaining a fidelity and openness to the other. This duty extends to modernist writers, 
who, conceiving of representational strategies that refrain from appropriating the other into 
the sphere of intelligibility, seek do justice by recognizing and giving voice to the other; to 
narrators who, charged with the task of telling and shaping stories, seek to also ensure that 
no representative violence will come to the other—particularly as readers attempt to ascribe 
meaning to the text; and to characters who, as they engage other characters (often 
marginalized or silent) in the text-world, seek to find ways to exist alongside those who 
threaten their autonomy and moral-political authority. I argue that each of these modernist 
entities—or, ethical subjects—find themselves burdened by an unconditional, inexorable 
“call” to responsibility that that often results in a double bind. This call to responsibility has 
no foundation other than the absolute other itself. In other words, the other’s demand for 
justice serves as the only source for the subject’s decisions and actions. Yet it might be said 
that these modernist ethical subjects find themselves distressed by uncertainty and indecision. 
Such undecidability originates in a double bind. For modernist writers and narrators, 
undecidability entails a “terrible experience” in that at some point “I [the ethical subject] 
have to take responsibility which is heterogeneous to knowledge” (Derrida, “Hospitality” 66). 
A decision how to represent the other, that is, “first of all has to go through a terrible 
process of undecidability, otherwise it would not be a decision” (66). For many modernist 




the absence of moral or epistemological certainty to guide their actions and decisions. 
Symptomatic of their undecidability are characters’ listless and aimless wanderings, their 
moral transgressions, their search for community and a common good, and their unstable if 
not neurotic personalities. Unlike modernist writers and narrators, these characters remain 
unaware of their call to responsibility, though as they encounter multiple others they often 
feel compelled to engage, know, aid them. Thus, many modernist characters—as ethical 
subjects of responsibility—experience undecidability because they feel torn between self-




Modernist responsibility involves what critics commonly describe as the 
fragmentation of form. Understood pejoratively, fragmentation connotes breakdown, 
exhaustion, crisis—even destruction. It signals an end of sorts, though perhaps not in terms 
of apocalypse but instead as a culmination of a particular historical epoch and way of life. In 
the more restricted literary sense, however, fragmentation suggests a “willed interference 
with the transparency in discourse […], allied to a new comprehension of the claims of 
otherness, of that which cannot be expressed in the discourse available to us” (Attridge, J. M. 
Coetzee 4). In other words, the modernist decision to fragment narrative form—through a 
variety of techniques aimed at blurring conventional discursive modes of representation—
can be read ethically. It might thus be said that modernist fragmentation, and its attendant 
strategies of disruption, constitutes an ethical (re)invention of literary form that is disposed 
to welcoming and responding to the absolute singularity of the other. This other, as I discuss 




representation. Part of my discussion in this project therefore involves a close analysis of the 
different ways modernists “fragment” narrative as a willed, conscious, and ethical act of 
responsibility. Virginia Woolf, one of modernism’s most prolific writers who contemplated 
ethical questions about formal experimentation, insisted that modernists ought to actively 
violate the many protocols and conventions of earlier fiction in order to represent that which 
had been traditionally excluded from serious literature. She, like James, probes life—that 
“muddled state”—in its variations and multiplicity. From her early experimental short stories 
such as “The Mark on the Wall” and “Kew Gardens” to her mature novels To the Lighthouse 
and The Waves, Woolf complicates, frustrates, and fragments narrative representation. Her 
continuous rethinking of narrative, exhibited not only by her fiction but also evidenced 
throughout her critical essays and book reviews, discloses a writer engaged with ethical 
problems surrounding narrative representation. More so, Woolf is emblematic of the 
concerns, the anxieties, the thinking, even the sense of failure that many modernist writers 
harbored about their own work. To read Woolf in this manner—that is, as a writer propelled 
by a self-imposed imperative to find new ways to represent otherness and beset by a desire 
to break with past conventions of representation—underscores her responsibility as a 
modernist writer. Her commitment to multiple modes of being prompted her to seek out 
and develop new means of representation, though not without some hesitation or misgiving. 
Thus Woolf’s novels, like many modernist texts, push the possibilities of representation to 
their discursive and formal limits that clear a space for the other. The chapters that follow 
address the ethics of modernist fragmentation, that is, with the view that fragmentation does 
not function in the same way across the spectrum of modernist narratives.  




moral, autonomous human subject. As I will discuss, modernists largely rejected the 
humanist moral subject in favor of the ethical subject who finds itself compelled and 
constrained by the demand of the other. This demand requires, as Attridge claims, a full 
response “to the singular otherness of the other person” which further necessitates 
“creatively refashion[ing] the norms whereby we understand persons as a category and in 
that refashioning […] to find a way of responding to his or her singularity” (“Innovation” 
24). I would argue that the responsibility of response applies to both modernist writers and 
their narrators: that is, through their narrators, writers of the early twentieth century 
struggled with imaginatively shaping a unique response to an often unknown and 
unidentifiable other. Their strategies of welcoming and representing the singularity of the 
other resulted in narrative fragmentation. As Cuddy-Keane argues, “the ethical modernist 
subject must take a step further [than the humanist subject] [by] actually preserving 
uncertainty and ambiguity in order to act in ethical ways” (210). In this way, a proper 
response to the other by modernist narrators, at least in Cuddy-Keane’s view, would mean a 
conscious resistance to narrative closure and an indefinite perpetuation of “metaphysical 
uncertainty” (210). For Cuddy-Keane, to do justice to the other means responsibly 
responding in a way that results in undecidability.5 Thus a contradiction becomes apparent 
with regard to modernist responsibility. On the one hand, according to the definition of 
writerly responsibility discussed above, modernists felt compelled to fully respond to the 
demand of the other through an act of creative representation. But, on the other hand, 
modernists also refused total representation of the other in order not to violate its singularity. 
 
5 Cuddy-Keane writes, “[a]nswerability requires ethical response, yet the questionableness of that response must 





The problem here—one that burdens many modernist writers—is knowing if and when 
representation has gone too far in appropriating the other into the order of familiarity. 
In contrast to the responsibility of modernist writers, modernist characters’ 
responsibility generally involves concern for themselves and their actions. In other words, 
whereas modernist writers self-consciously respond to the other’s demand through narrative 
fragmentation, their protagonists struggle to take responsibility for anyone outside their own 
immediate needs and interests. Indeed, their decisions and actions—their motivations and 
responses—emanate from a vague and barely conscious demand to engage, help, even 
respond to others.6 Their self-interest, rather than care for the other, informs their conduct. 
As a result, many modernist protagonists grope their way through their worlds and fail in 
their individual quests, which, as I will discuss throughout this project, is necessary to their 
ethical subjectivity. This experience of failure too becomes that of modernist narrators, who 
must be rigorously separated and understood apart from their creators as well as the 
characters they shape. Unlike narrators in the past, modernist narrators “replace” their 
authors—or, differently, these narrators intervene between an authorial agent and the 
created text. This intervention signals modernist writers’ attempts to disrupt narrative 
authority, that is, to “preserv[e] uncertainty and ambiguity” by undermining an absolute 
“ground” from which to derive and secure meaning. In this way, modernist writers might be 
regarded as behaving irresponsibly—for they neither employ omniscient, reliable narrators 
nor produce stable, transparent texts. I want to argue, however, that modernist responsibility 
can be viewed as a necessary act of irresponsibility in the sense that it confounds, challenges, 
 
6 Desire in this sense does not mean, however, psychosexual impulses of psychoanalytic study. Rather desire 





disrupts the familiar narrative structures through which “life” gets mediated and familiarized. 
In other words, modernists make visible the fact that narrative is a process of mediation, not 
transparent or inherently true. 
This project, therefore, sets out on a number of interrelated fronts: 1) to examine 
how modernist narratives—specifically the novel—formally as well as substantively 
conceptualize responsibility in a world without moral certitude; 2) to understand how 
modernists’ recasting of the humanist moral subject as an ethical subject reshapes our 
understanding of responsibility; 3); to think how a new conceptualizing of the modernism as 
an ethical project affects older conceptions it as primarily an aesthetico-political reaction to 
radical changes in European culture; and 4) to question how modernist writers developed an 
ethics of responsibility that anticipated, if not influenced, current developments in ethics. 
Reading the modernist novel in these ways enhances our critical understanding of early 
twentieth-century literature as engaging similar problems to those raised in contemporary 
literary theory related to ethical subjectivity and moral conduct. In this way, I am positioning 
myself alongside Stephen Ross when he states, in his Introduction to Modernism and Theory 
(2009), “[m]odernist writing thinks theoretically and theory writes modernistically; they are 
not simply interestingly coincidental phenomena, but mutually sustaining aspect of the same 
project” and “[t]heory continues modernism’s concerns, aesthetics, and critical energies” (2).7 
In fact, it might be cautiously asserted that present-day ethical theory was borne in part from 
modernism’s commitments and practices. This includes how critics and philosophers have 
gone about discussing ethics. They have seen it primarily as a willful disruption of the “truths 
 
7 Similar claims have been made by critics before the ethical “turn” in literature. David Parker, for instance, 
states, “[t]heory, in short, needs imaginative literature, at the very least as much as literature needs theory, and 




which we have forgotten are illusions” (Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies” 455). 
• 
One of the difficulties that arises from an ethical reading of British modernism is 
that modernists themselves did not explicitly muse on ethics as such. Perhaps Woolf comes 
closest when she briefly discusses “the duties and responsibilities” of modern writers at the 
end of “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” (211). As we will see in the subsequent chapter, 
Woolf insists that modernist writers must not only invent new means of representation but 
must also reestablish trust between themselves and readers. In my view, an understanding of 
modernist responsibility can only be ascertained by closely examining modernist 
representational practices as well as situating modernism within the temporal coordinates of 
its historical “moment.”  Today, it seems almost commonplace to regard modernism “as a 
reaction to the carnage and disillusionment of the First World War and a search for a new 
mode of art that would rescue civilization from its state of crisis after the war” (Lewis 109). 
Indeed, many modernists seemed preoccupied by the War’s moral, social, and historical 
fallout. But, in fact, the “search for a new mode of art” had begun much earlier during the 
later decades of the nineteenth century when writers, artists, and philosophers sought order 
and structure in response to a world increasingly different from the past. As Susan Stanford 
Friedman observes, “[t]he starting point of modernism is the crisis of belief that pervades 
twentieth-century western culture: loss of faith, experience of fragmentation and 
disintegration, and shattering of cultural symbols. At the center of this crisis were the new 
technologies and methodologies of science, the epistemology of logical positivism, and the 
relativism of functionalist thought” (97). It might be said, then, that the war only intensified 




“traditional religious and artistic symbols” waned while advances in technology progressed 
and the spread of materialism began to dominate. Therefore, the moral ambiguity—what 
might be broadly characterized as the domain of ethics—in the postwar period induced a 
sweeping reassessment of the existing values in the modern world.  
With this reassessment came scrutiny of individual responsibility as such. For 
example, in D. H. Lawrence’s Kangaroo (1923), readers encounter an impassioned yet brutal 
assessment of the Great War’s impact on British society. Lawrence writes: “Once the human 
consciousness really sinks and is swamped under the tide of events—as the best English 
consciousness was swamped, pacifist and patriotic alike—then the adventure is doomed. 
The English soul went under in the war, and, as a conscious, proud, adventurous, self-
responsible soul, it was lost. We all lost the war: perhaps Germany least” (246). This short 
passage not only points to the sense of despair that many modernists and intellectuals felt in 
the War’s immediate aftermath but it also proclaims the sense that individual responsibility 
had been lost. Lawrence’s narrator expresses the fear that the moral order of the past—the 
metaphysical certainty that authorized “the self-responsible soul”—had been swept away as a 
result of the conflict. The War’s impact also registered with other thinkers and writers across 
the Europe. In “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915), Sigmund Freud would 
record his own sense of disillusionment during the early acts of the war, positing that all of 
civilization itself was at stake: “[i]t tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way, as 
though there were no future and no peace among men after it is over” (159). And, nearly 
twenty years hence, Walter Benjamin would offer his assessment of the Great War’s impact 
on the modern world: “our image not only of the external world but also of the moral world 




Wasn’t it noticeable at the end of the war that men who returned from the battlefield had 
grown silent—not richer but poorer in communicable experience?” (“The Storyteller” 143 – 
44). Benjamin’s complaint, not unlike Lawrence’s, registers a loss of individual’s capacity to 
share his innermost experiences. For the private “moral world” of the individual, Benjamin 
suggests, has been just as divested of meaning as has the “external world” of history. That 
those who came home from war could not communicate their individual experiences 
additionally suggests the loss of a responsibility by the individual: to connect with others 
through the art of storytelling. Thus, modernists took it as their responsibility to tell stories 
even when others could not tell them (such as returning soldiers from war). But, as I will 
suggest, this responsibility beset modernists with anxiety and uncertainty about 
representation itself. 
Together, the observations of Lawrence, Freud, and Benjamin register the moral 
vacuum felt by modernist writers in the wake of war. However, as already noted, this felt 
sense that “the moral world” was in the process of collapsing had been already glimpsed in 
the late nineteenth century. In an oft-cited fable from The Gay Science (1882), for instance, 
Friedrich Nietzsche seems concerned that without a stable metaphysics—made uncertain by 
the interrelated processes of the social secularization and the scientization of knowledge—
human action would no longer have a basis in moral responsibility. Nietzsche’s fable depicts 
a madman who suddenly appears in a crowded marketplace and proceeds to berate his 
onlookers, described by the narrator as atheists, for failing to realize the “death” of God. 
More so, he accuses them of neglecting to recognize their complicity in the act, that is, that 
they themselves have killed God. Of the various rhetorical questions the madman spews at 




“What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun?” (95). This question not only 
suggests that humanity, without a metaphysical certainty on which to ground morality, is 
condemned to freedom. It also asserts that humanity has not been sufficiently prepared to 
take responsibility for its actions—most important of them, God’s murder. The answer to 
the madman’s question never comes, and he falls into a state of bewilderment as he roams 
among churches and sings a hymn commemorating the death of God. The crowd’s non-
response to the madman’s provocation only bolsters the problems Nietzsche attempts to 
highlight in this story. Namely, the absence of a metaphysics renders individual moral action 
inert and hints at a broader cultural paralysis. In many modernist novels, responsibility 
devolves from a character’s active engagement in the world—that is, when one “takes” 
responsibility for his decisions and actions—to a solipsistic self-obsession that abdicates 
engaging and communicating with others.  
Modernists’ response to the cultural transformations and moral paralysis of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe echoes in many ways the philosophy of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. It might be said, on the one hand, that modernists fashioned 
themselves in the mode of the madman. Their works bear witness to the collapse of meaning 
in modern culture—what some have gone so far as to describe as nihilism.8 On the other 
hand, modernists did not simply hold up a mirror to their felt sense of meaninglessness and 
despair in the world. Instead, in a spirit akin to the philosophical task pursued by Nietzsche, 
many modernist writers and artists actively resisted nihilism by developing an aesthetics that 
 
8 According to Simon Critchley, “[n]ihilism is the breakdown of the order of meaning, where all that we 
previously imagined as a divine, transcendent basis for moral valuation has become meaningless. Nihilism is 
this declaration of meaninglessness, a sense of indifference, directionlessness or, at its worst, despair that can 
flood into all areas of life” (Infinitely Demanding 2). Perhaps one of the best expressions of modernism’s 





“meets the question of how to live in a questionable world with a paradoxical conjunction of 
metaphysical uncertainty and individual answerability” (Cuddy-Keane 210). To “meet” this 
question, however, would require not only a wholesale rethinking of literature’s aims and 
strategies but a serious commitment to reexamining the values constituting modern life (as 
noted above). In other words, it would mean intensive self-scrutiny, including a new, honest 
assessment of experience as it relates to ethical decision-making. In this way, modernist 
writing can be regarded as a stage wherein ethics is performed—and where we can see 
questions of responsibility being played out. Responsibility, as I conceive it, requires a 
temporary and necessary refusal of total knowledge that would allow a traditionally moral 
subject to make a decisive judgment either about the meaning of a text (in the case readers) 
or his experience in the world (in the case of characters). I will thus suggest that modernist 
responsibility in the context of ethics depends upon suspending judgment about the 
decidability of a text as coherent whole. As a consequence, the self-reflexivity of the 
modernist text—often read in terms of an emotional and/or cultural paralysis—is analogous 
to that of the ethical experience of readers and of characters. In other words, it speaks to the 
experience of undecidability at the core of ethical responsibility. At this juncture, therefore, a 
more robust account of contemporary ethical theory needs to be made before further 
exploring modernism and responsibility. 
 
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MODERNIST ETHICS  
Until recently, ethical readings of modernist fiction have taken a backseat to cultural, 
historical, and political approaches. Indeed, it is only in the past two decades that a renewed 




all in contemporary critical discourse (Davis and Womack ix).9 The so-called ethical “turn” 
in criticism is concerned with a host of problems ranging from “the close reading of the text 
itself […] to the ethical questions that the story raises in the reader’s own life beyond the 
margins of the text” (x).10 This description of ethical considerations in literature should not, 
however, be viewed as two mutually exclusive investigations. Critics engaged in ethical 
analysis concentrate on the formal and stylistic features of the text inasmuch as they examine 
how readers react to narrative plot. Put another way, ethical criticism explores the 
relationship between narrative form, thematic content, and the reader’s response to the 
“performance” and determination of textual meaning. For, as Daniel R. Schwarz claims, 
“[t]exts demand ethical responses from their readers in part because saying always has an 
ethical dimension and because we are our values, and we never take a moral holiday from our 
values. We can no more ignore the ethical implications of what we read than we can ignore 
the ethical implications of life” (“Humanistic” 5). This critical connection between art and 
life assumes that “[l]iterature provides surrogate [ethical] experiences for the reader” (5). 
Critics thus investigate how and in what ways the reader subscribes to or resists the ethical 
implications of narratives, despite begin vaguely aware of these implications. Specifically, 
literary critics explore how stories simultaneously reaffirm, disrupt, and overturn individual 
and cultural values. They particularly aim to understand how various narrative structures 
 
9 The editors of The Turn to Ethics correctly observe that “[t]here was a time […] when ‘ethics’ was regarded in 
the realm of literary study as a ‘master discourse’ that presumed a universal humanism and an ideal, 
autonomous, and sovereign subject. To critics working in the domains of feminism, deconstruction, 
psychoanalysis, semiotics, and Marxism, this discourse became the target of critique: the critique of humanism 
was the exposé of ethics” (viii). 
 
10 Davis and Womack additionally explain that some critics remain wary of ethical considerations of literature 
for fear that it will lead “to return to a dogmatically prescriptive or doctrinaire form of reading” (x). However, 
they appear optimistic that ethical criticism “appears to be moving, in all its various forms, toward a descriptive 




produce truth and reality—and, further, how these affect consciousness and identity. 
Part of the difficulty of understanding ethical approaches to literature for critics 
derives from competing definitions of the term “ethics.”11 In some quarters of contemporary 
theoretical practice, it has come to connote an alternative mode of action at variance with 
the strictures of moral law. Gilles Deleuze, for instance, elaborating on Michel Foucault’s 
distinction between morality and ethics, explains: “[t]he difference is that morality presents 
us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by 
considering them in relation to transcendent values (this is good, that’s bad…); ethics is a set 
of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing 
involved” (Negotiations 100). The contrast seems simple enough: morality means an inflexible 
conformity to universal law; ethics, as a “set of optional rules,” signifies openness to 
possibility, which can result in deviation from or subversion of morality. In another way, it 
might be said that morality exists as a set of formal procedures that originate and operate in 
the objective world—that is, they are produced, deployed, and reified by ideological 
structures (government, schools, museums, family, marriage, science, and so forth). By 
contrast, ethics can be understood as a subjective set of practices that disrupt, counter, challenge, 
interrogate, subvert not just moral law but the dissimulating effects of ideology as such. 
Crucial to this conception of ethics is its relationship to “the ways of existing,” to the 
 
11 Etymologically, “ethics” comes from the Greek word ethike and is related to the term ethos, which means 
“[t]he characteristic spirit of a people, community, culture, or era as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations; 
the prevailing character of an institution or system” (“Ethos”). In its second sense, ethos refers to the 
representation of “character”—and its attendant values, such virtue, morality, righteousness—in an art work. 
In the strictest sense, then, ethics means the science or study of morals, which often results in the conflation of 
the two terms. In this way, to behave ethically in the proper sense of the word denotes adherence to, 
conformity with, and practice of the dominant moral ideology within a particular culture. To understand 
morality “objectively”—that is, from a kind of outside perspective—would mean engaging ethics, a field of 





procedures of living produced in and by ideology. Here, Deleuze seems to mean a priori 
modes of the “movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social 
practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth” (Foucault, “What Is 
Critique?” 194). Morality and ethics, I am therefore suggesting, might not be simply regarded 
as oppositional terms but instead might be considered dialectically: whereas morality seeks to 
objectify behavior and decision-making, ethics challenges morality on the grounds of 
possibility, of difference, of alterity. To say it differently, ethics produces an aporia in relation 
to the “mechanisms of power”—an aporia that threatens the “constructed” world of 
ideology and attempts to liberate the subject from subjugation.12 
 In Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature (1980), Julia Kristeva makes 
similar claims about ethics. However, as the passage below suggests, she appears to associate 
ethics with a project similar to deconstruction rather than with the materialist critiques of 
Deleuze and Foucault: 
Ethics [or, morality, in the sense that I am using it] used to be a coercive, 
customary manner of ensuring the cohesiveness of a particular group 
through the repetition of a code—a more or less accepted apologue. Now, 
however, the issue of ethics crops up wherever a code (mores, social 
contract) must be shattered in order to give way to the free play of negativity, 
need, desire, pleasure, jouissance, before being put together again, although 
temporarily and with full knowledge of what is involved. (23) 
In Kristeva’s view, contemporary ethical practice “shatters” and upends sedimented codes, 
 
12 As I will suggest in the following paragraph, the materialist critique should not be conflated with 
deconstruction, though here we can see such affinities between Foucault’s project of emancipation and 





or social mores, as a matter of possibility for “free play.” Located somewhere between “law 
and its transgression (23), in other words, this new ethics disrupts accepted social codes in an 
effort to provisionally break free from them, to open them up to critique, to re-envision 
their possibility. Kristeva points to Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the progenitors of “the 
outbreak of something quite new within Western society and discourse” in the nineteenth 
century, noting that “their primary goal has been to reformulate ethics” (23). Building on 
their work, Kristeva positions her conception of ethics in the context of poststructural 
theory and deconstruction, which Derrida succinctly describes as “a strategy of rupture” 
(“Force of Law” 28). Thus ethics, as Kristeva conceives it, acts to decode or denaturalize 
what appears as truth and morality in the socio-political world. Shuttling between the severe 
limitations of law and the radical openness of transgression, ethics upends commonplace 
standards of conduct and everyday belief. To this end, I would argue that the social codes 
Kristeva refers to here can also be read at the level of narrative—both structurally and 
substantively.13 For narratives too achieve “cohesiveness” and acceptance through strategic 
repetition (of codes, of language, of symbols, of formal elements), institutional learning, and 
cultural immersion. In this way, narratives become familiar, all-too-familiar to a general 
public—specifically an astute, educated reading audience—the same way social codes do.  
My analysis of modernist writing practices and techniques focuses on the various set 
of strategies that modernist developed to purposefully disrupt traditional narrative form and 
codes.14 Yet to view modernists as solely agents of disruption—that is, as engaging 
 
13 This claim echoes William J. Scheick’s assertion that “[s]tructure provides certain codes enabling the ideal 
implied reader to discover/dis-cover the implications (ethical or otherwise) of the content” (xvi). 
 
14 I am not arguing, however, that modernism and deconstruction are necessarily the same projects, or that 
deconstruction is the later “realization” of modernism. No doubt, the difference between the two lies in their 




disruption for its own sake—would diminish the ethical imperatives or obligations 
necessitated by the demands of otherness. If ethical practices by modernists prevent 
“ontological closure […] [by] disrupting the text’s claims to comprehensive unity and self-
understanding,” they do so in order to respond to an unknown, unidentifiable demand 
“beyond” the contours of the familiar and the established (Critchley, Ethics 30). In other 
words, I claim that modernist ethical practices break up the decidability, in this case, of 
textual cohesiveness to make way for other possibilities of representation. In Derridean 
terms, modernists engendered a formal and discursive response to otherness grounded in an 
openness to that “which is heterogeneous to knowledge” (“Hospitality” 66). The 
consequences, however, for an ethical reading of modernism reinforce a widely held critical 
viewpoint that sees modernist writing practices as undermining if not destabilizing definitive 
meaning. However, I maintain that modernist disruption of meaning is consonant with 
modernist responsibility. For, as Derrida argues, “there would be no decision […] in ethics 
[…], and thus no responsibility, without the experience of some undecidability” (66). Thus, 
in my view, modernist writing techniques deliberately cause or produce textual 
undecidability, which, instead of rendering a text meaningless, enacts “what much current 
ethical theory urges in theory: a dwelling in between questionableness and answerability, 
between the uncertain and the ‘ought’” (Cuddy-Keane 217).  In this sense, I claim that 
modernist responsibility can be regarded as an ethical practice that denies formal unity, 
closure, comprehensiveness in order to make way for otherness. 
 
modernism, for instance, challenges realist claims, while deconstruction, on the other hand, disputes ontology 
as “first philosophy.” Further, the historical exigencies to which both responded and the specific socio-political 
milieu in which both were conceived suggest enough of a temporal break that we cannot simply appropriate 
deconstruction for a better understanding of modernism in hindsight. Yet, it would be just as problematic to 
maintain a rigorous separation between the two. I will make the case throughout this dissertation that 






THE NEW ETHICS AND THE MODERNIST NOVEL 
Dorothy J. Hale has recently weighed in on the emergence of new ethical theory in 
literary study. She claims “that the return to moral reflection in contemporary literary theory 
is in fact a double return: the renewed pursuit of ethics has been accompanied by a new 
celebration of literature, and it is in the imbrication of these endeavors […] that literary 
theory and moral philosophy find common ground in the twenty-first century” (“Aesthetics” 
896). Indeed, the ethical “turn” in the discipline, though by no means universally embraced, 
has resulted in a renewed effort to read literary texts in terms of their engagement and 
enactment of ethical problems related to subjectivity and alterity. Hale’s preoccupation, 
however, appears less to do with justifying the new ethics than it does with analyzing its 
consequences for the reader’s engagement with the modern novel. After a lengthy 
introductory genealogy wading through the developments of contemporary novel theory, 
Hale arrives at the premise that “reading does not yield a portable list of rules or tips to 
guide conduct. For the new ethicist, literature does not technically teach us anything at all, 
unless we understand learning as the overthrow of epistemology by experience, the troubling 
of certainty by an apprehension that comes through surprised feeling” (903). She goes on to 
state: “[e]thical knowledge is the experience of irresistible encounter with what one does not 
try to know, what one cannot but know. It is knowledge that is beyond reason, that is of 
emotions, and that is so intuitive as to seem a bodily knowing” (903). Here, Hale echoes the 
notion that ethics is a force of disruption. And for her, the “experience” of ethics 
“overthrows” the reader’s sense of a cohesive and stable world through an unavoidable 




her current knowledge is confounded” by confrontation with the text (903). In other words, 
she describes the reader’s experience of acquiring ethical knowledge through reading as an 
oscillating process between acquisition and loss, surety and ambivalence, renewal and failure. 
Thus, the “experience of irresistible encounter” for Hale becomes not only a necessary 
engagement with alterity—an engagement constitutive of the new ethical theory—but an 
inescapable affair that simultaneously denudes the reader of epistemological certainty. I 
would add that the reader’s “ethical experience of alterity” (903) directly corresponds to the 
ethical modernist subject’s responsibility of “preserving uncertainty and ambiguity in order 
to act in ethical ways,” to recall Cuddy-Keane.15  
Hale credits the development of this “novelistic aesthetics of alterity” to the work of 
Henry James (899).16 Both the modern techniques he helped to develop and the novel theory 
he wrote, she argues, “provide a foundational aesthetics for the novel that underlies […] the 
new ethical philosophy that has emerged” (899). Significantly, she explains that ethical 
theorists have failed to recognize “the achievement of alterity as the novel’s distinctive 
generic purpose” and that the encounter with the other can “be accomplished through 
novelistic form” (900). In Hale’s view, the modern novel envisioned by James formally 
enacts and embodies alterity that, once confronted in the experience of reading, disrupts the 
reader’s onto-epistemological “ground.” That is to say, reading becomes more than a passive 
act of consumption, or even something other than an intellectual exercise that produces 
meaning. In addition to these, it is the experience when “we are self-consciously [made] 
 
15 This subject, as I discuss in the subsequent chapter, is embodied in the modernist narrator whose 
detachment from the author complicates the issue of authorial intention and responsibility. 
 
16 Here and throughout this project, I follow Hale’s idea that “alterity can only be registered positively by our 





aware that our certainty is all hypothetical” if only because “the other […] surprises us in its 
intractability, its refusal to conform to what we know” (900). The key word here is “refusal.” 
For modern novels, by and large, additionally practice an aesthetics that shifts the burden of 
responsibility—of judgment, choice, and knowing through reading—from the writer to the 
reader. This burden, in turn, “surprises” or shocks the reader into self-awareness because he 
passively anticipates “the clarifying authorial judgment we expect and desire,” a judgment 
that the modern novel denies (900). Hale, citing Judith Butler, describes the consequences of 
the reader’s responsibility as being “put in a position to ‘understand the limits of judgment 
and to cease judging, paradoxically, in the name of the ethics, to cease judging in a way that 
assumes we know in advance what there is to be known’” (900). In this way, the reader 
“surrenders” to the alterity constitutive of the novel form in order to “know” or be bound 
to that alterity—to have an ethical experience.17 
While Hale speaks largely in terms of the modern novel and its readers, the 
implications of her work also speak to the ethical experience of undecidability specifically 
related to modernist fiction and its practitioners.18 As noted before, with regard to the novel, 
modernist writing has been read as a radical “break” from the past. Yet the impulse by 
 
17 Hale goes on to argue that the “ethical lesson [inherent to novel reading] cannot be learned once and for all. 
Our capacity for undergoing is dependent on our continuing to judge […]. Our avowal of our epistemological 
limits is something that must be freshly performed, undergone again and again” (901). 
 
18 Hale’s discussion of “modern” novel includes modernist writing but also extends to the novel’s development 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As noted, she attributes modern novel writing and theory 
to Henry James, whose work influenced a generation of British and American modernist writers. The scale of 
James’s influence can be gleaned from the following observation by Childs: “James’s reliance on ambiguity, on 
careful revelation and on neither third-person omniscient narration nor first-person pseudo-autobiographical 
forms but on centres of consciousness, suggested alternative ways of writing fiction and implied that the novel 
was less a device for unraveling a story to a reader-as-consumer than a vehicle for conveying mental images to 
an active intelligence” (83). Hale recognizes this same “reliance on ambiguity” in James, though she reads it in 
terms of producing an ethical experience in the reader. She argues that through this experience, as has already 
been elaborated, the reader comes to realize his or her own limits of knowing. But the experience itself would 
also open the reader up to difference and possibility so that “we might change for the better, that we might 





modernists to turn away from traditional forms of representation can additionally be seen as 
tempered by ambivalence, hesitation, uncertainty, and, in the most extreme cases, by the 
“terrible experience” of undecidability. In other words, modernists appear not to have fully 
abandoned tradition, as some critics maintain. Instead, it seems they cautiously augmented 
and consciously improved upon familiar methods of representation in the novel with the 
view to being more open and welcoming of otherness. In this way, the modernist novel can 
be seen as a deeply responsible response to what Martha Nussbaum describes as “the 
world’s surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect 
beauty” (3). Though Nussbaum’s comment is made about the novel in general, it seems 
especially relevant in the context of modernism. As many critics have argued, the structure 
of the modernist novel is porous, fragmented, self-reflexive, nonlinear, dialogic, 
encyclopedic. As such, it might be said that modernists’ search for new modes of 
representation—that is, for new strategies of representation open to and respectful of the 
world’s variety, complexity, and imperfection—discloses their responsibility. For if, as 
Nussbaum claims, “[s]tyle itself makes its claims, expresses its own sense of what matters” 
(3), then the various styles and formal techniques employed by modernists in the novel 
reveal a commitment to alterity—a commitment that simultaneously labors not to violate the 
other’s singularity. In this way, it might be said that modernists’ refusal to fully appropriate 
otherness and difference into familiar narrative forms consequently produced an uneasiness 
not only about past strategies of representation but about their own as well. To be clear, I 




but rather sought innovative ways to responsibly represent it without doing violence.19 This 
search for responsible techniques of representation required constant experimentation—that 
is, permanent revolution in form and style—that simultaneously caused modernist writers 
themselves to experience undecidability. 
I would argue that the reader experiences something similar, which raises critical 
questions about another kind of responsibility. If the writer deliberately refuses to provide 
interpretive certainty of a text, then the reader is left to decide its meaning. Put another way, 
modernist responsibility in this case occurs as a deliberate act of deferring understanding—
that is, of being held accountable for a text’s total interpretation. In this way, through the act 
of reading, the reader shares the responsibility for the meaning of a text. As Sartre has noted, 
“reading is a pact of generosity between author and reader” (60). The reader is morally 
“bound” to the text, that is, the reader finds himself inescapably beholden to an 
interpretative demand: “the subject is […] essential because it is required not only to disclose 
the object […] but also so that this object might exist absolutely” (Sartre 52). However, 
modernist novels often exacerbate—in different ways—the impossibility of ever fulfilling 
this demand. Their style, form, and disruptive strategies of representation work to frustrate 
the reader’s attempt “to disclose” the text’s decidability. In effect, the modernist novels 
evade interpretative certainty in order to protect the singularity of the other. In this way, 
modernist novels divest the reader of “epistemological comfort,” as discussed above, 
 
19 Such violence does not simply involve misrepresentation, which, in certain cases, might be preferable to 
realist mimetic practices that strive to grasp and transform difference and alterity into recognizable, knowable 
forms. Rather, representational violence of the other occurs whenever the “procedure of art” attempts to 
conceptualize the other (Levinas, “Reality and Its Shadow” 3). Whether in language or by image, any effort to 
think the other does violence to the other’s uniqueness and singularity. I am arguing that modernists were well-
aware of the possibility of violence inherent to representation. Thus, their radical, on-going engagement with 
new strategies of representation both reflects a responsible attempt to do justice to the other as well as reveals 





inasmuch as they call into question the reader’s “autonomous, self-sufficient, and arelational 
individual[it]y” (Thiem 10). Thus, the reader becomes an ethical subject who “does not have 
a secure status or position” that would allow him to naturalize the text that already defies, 
eludes, disrupts naturalization (Thiem 11).20  
By contrast, modernist writers often elude or sidestop taking responsibility for their 
work by employing narrators in their stead. Though by no means a new instrument of 
storytelling, modernist narrators bear little resemblance to their fictional predecessors. The 
latter, according to Stephen Kern, “assumed command by telling their story with broad 
vision, a singular authoritative voice, and seemingly unlimited knowledge” (The Modernist 
Novel 179). Put another way, the “interpretive stability” produced by earlier narrators 
establishes a sense of credibility that in turn bolsters the reader’s trust of the (implied) author 
and her story (179). Not so with modernist narrators. Neither reliable nor omniscient nor 
assured, they find themselves disconnected from their creators, as it were, and charged with 
providing “a new understanding of what can and cannot be seen, articulated, and known” 
(179). Their anxiety thus originates in the responsibility of having been assigned the duty of 
telling stories without an authorial foundation upon which to ground them. This sense of 
detachment, combined with the added responsibility of narrative decision-making, works to 
compound not only the narrators’ terrible experience of undecidability but the reader’s as 
well. So too, then, do modernist narrators assume the role of ethical subjects dispossessed of 
agency. For storytelling requires invention, that is, “[i]nvention of the other in the same” 
(Derrida, “Psyche” 11). And this other—“neither subject nor object, neither a self nor a 
consciousness nor an unconsciousness” (39)—demands commitment (representation) 
 





without the violent betrayal of its singularity. To clarify: as ethical voices intervening between 
the writer and the text, many modernist narrators undergo a crisis in the sense that they bear 
the burden of responsible representation that must both respond to the other in an act of 
invention while simultaneously refraining from appropriative violence.  
 A similar crisis also registers in modernist characters. As a central problem for 
modernist writers and their narrators, characters find themselves beset by questions of 
identity resulting from their own troubled encounter with alterity. Unlike their counterparts 
in the past, many modernist characters become “conspicuous absences” (Kern 23). In other 
words, they lack the vitality and fullness that otherwise typify characters in earlier novels. In 
part, this absence can be explained by the general observation that “[s]tructure and 
characterization appear to vie for dominance in fiction” (Scheick 19). The “underlying 
tension” produced by this struggle is especially acute in modernist fiction since so many 
modernists privileged formal experimentation over character development (Schieck 22). 
Compounding this problem of character, modernist narrators—assuming the responsibility 
of representation, as discussed above—must choose between depicting life’s plenitude, 
heeding the other’s demand, and shaping characters’ lives. In effect, I would suggest that 
narrative undecidability leads to a disarticulation of characters’ identities. It is as if modernist 
narrators “throw” their characters into the worlds of their stories who then bear their own 
burdens of responsibility as they navigate the shared and dynamic world of the text.21 Thus, 
though largely unaware of themselves as ethical subjects, modernist characters exemplify 
much of the same anxiety and uncertainty as their narrators. For they too seek order in 
 
21 This idea of “thrownness,” developed by Heidegger, “is the simple awareness that we always find ourselves 
somewhere, namely delivered over to a world with which we are fascinated, a world we share with others” 









 The subsequent chapters in this project focus on three novels published in the early 
1920s, a period commonly regarded as “high” modernism. Chosen for their distinct 
responses to the various socio-political, aesthetic, and ethical crises of their time, Virginia 
Woolf’s Jacob’s Room (1922), D. H. Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod (1922) and E. M. Forster’s A 
Passage to India (1924) rethink the role of the novel as medium for exploring ethics and 
responsibility. Though the modernisms these writers practiced vary in each of the novels 
under consideration, the centrality of responsibility to their respective aesthetic choices 
demonstrates an underlying ethics that responds to otherness. In the next chapter, I examine 
Woolf’s conception of responsibility in relation to the unnamed narrator of the novel. 
Particularly, the analysis of Jacob’s Room focuses on the interminable yet necessary experience 
of undecidability that overwhelms the narrator in her effort to responsibly represent Jacob 
Flanders. The fragmentation of the narrative structure, I argue, testifies to the impossibility 
of total representation of the other, that is, of a unique singularity “beyond” the 
consciousness of the subject. The novel’s form, in other words, seems to be both a reflection 
of the narrator’s anxiety as she responds to the unendurable demands of representation as 
well as a deliberate strategy she uses to avoid betraying the singularity of the other. This 
 
22 As Annika Thiem argues, the “self-conscious subject […] is constitutively and irrecoverably traversed and 
troubled by the encounter with the other”  (98). Whether this self-conscious subject pertains to modernist 
narrators or their protagonists (or both), the responsibility implied in the encounter with the absolute other 
always already disrupts, or “troubles,” the assurance of an unfettered, autonomous self. In a certain sense, it 





discussion thus yields questions about modernist conceptions of subjectivity—specifically in 
light of criticism that has charged modernists for retreating inward away from the world in 
order to focus on problems of selfhood. I make the case that the modernist subject, beset by 
a primordial demand to respond, finds him- or herself always already constituted by an 
ethical obligation. In this way, the so-called modernist inward “turn” can only ever be partial, 
delusional, or result in failure. Modernist responsibility, therefore, problematizes the 
subject’s desire to abandon the call to duty by the other: he or she learns that escape from it 
cannot be achieved.  
The third chapter continues this line of inquiry but shifts to problems related to 
ethics and modernist characters. Particularly, I investigate the experience of responsibility 
through the eponymous protagonist of Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod. Unlike the narrator in Jacob’s 
Room—whose anxiety stems from the experience of undecidability in the act of 
representation—Aaron Sisson seeks to free himself from the constraints of responsibility. 
He recklessly abandons his family, gives up his career, and leaves his country in an effort to 
transcend the many domestic obligations he senses as obstructions to the realization of an 
unfettered “self.” However, I show that Aaron’s desire to escape the confines of domesticity 
has its origins in a kind of primordial call to responsibility that ultimately results in his 
breaking with traditional notions of morality. In other words, Aaron’s response to this 
ethical call—though he remains largely unconscious of the call as such—requires acts of 
irresponsibility that disrupt programmatic, dogmatic morality. To act responsibly in this 
sense means exceeding moral knowledge but also rejecting the various institutions of 
modern life: family, work, nation. Moreover, I argue that modernist responsibility, insofar as 




struggle seems to originate in his attempt to escape the constraints of his domestic life in 
search of an authentic “self,” his anxiety really involves the recognition that the self cannot 
exist apart from others. In fact, except for a very few brief scenes in the novel, Aaron never 
finds himself alone—that is, he almost always finds himself in the company of others.  
My analysis of Aaron’s Rod therefore builds on many of the problems explored in 
Jacob’s Room but it also forecasts the central conundrum explored in the last chapter of this 
project, namely, modernist paralysis and responsibility. I show that Forster’s admixture of 
modernist and traditional techniques of representation in A Passage to India pushes 
undecidability to its extreme limits. To complement this, I examine both the role of the 
narrator and the fragmentation of character in the novel—in other words, I look at how 
Forster’s responsibility “works” in both his narrator and characters.. To this end, I 
foreground the chapter with Derrida’s notion of the aporia, or total undecidability, and 
demonstrate that the novel refuses ultimate comprehension through various narrative 
strategies of deflection. This problem also occurs at the level of plot in which the central 
episode—the excursion to the Marabar Caves—results in Aziz’s alleged rape of Adela 
Quested. That the conspicuously absent narrator refuses to provide either the characters or 
the reader with the necessary information to reach a conclusion about what happened in the 
Caves reinforces modernist’s strategy of disrupting and suspending meaning. In this chapter, 
I particularly focus on the reader’s experience to responsibly make a decision even as it 






Modernist (Ir)Responsibility in Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room 
 
Often when I have been writing one of my so-called novels I 
have been baffled by this same problem; that is, how to describe 
what I call in my private shorthand—“non-being.” Everyday 
includes much more non-being than being. 
—Virginia Woolf, “A Sketch of the Past” (1940) 
 
The understanding of the other is thus a hermeneutics and an 
exegesis. 
— Emmanuel Levinas, “Meaning and Sense” (1972) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study of responsibility and the modernist novel begins with Virginia Woolf’s 
Jacob’s Room (1922).1 In recent years, Woolf’s writing has been at the forefront of critical and 
theoretical debates grappling with questions of ethics in modernist literature.2 Her work has 
been used by critics to investigate such (inter)related ethical matters as gender and alterity, 
trauma and mourning, and sympathy and intimacy. Woolf today remains a central figure in 
modernism and literary history.3 For, she not only consciously “reinvented” the nineteenth-
century novel—and “so strongly shaped traditions of feminist literary criticism” (Katz 
169)—but she also mounted various challenges to modernity that would reverberate with 
 
1 Virginia Woolf, Jacob’s Room, ed. Suzanne Riatt (New York: Norton 2007) 3 – 143. I will cite by page number 
throughout the chapter. 
 
2 It is worth noting that comparative studies on ethics and modernist literature often include Woolf as the lone 
representative, English writer (notwithstanding Joseph Conrad, whose ambiguous status as an Englishman 
complicates such matters). See Lewis, Religious; Oser.  
  
3 Hermione Lee suggests otherwise, claiming that “[n]one of [Woolf’s] novels has the stature or scope of Proust 
or Conrad, of Joyce’s Ulysses or of Lawrence’s The Rainbow. She is, like Forster, in the second rank of twentieth-
century novelists” (14). However, Lee praises Woolf for recognizing her role in the modernist “movement,” 
and for her astute elaborations on the modern novel. Yet, I would hope that thirty years since Lee’s The Novels 
of Virginia Woolf (1977) has meant a revaluation of Woolf as a first-tier writer whose influence and stature only 





later twentieth-century literary concerns and philosophical inquiries.4 Moreover, her work 
has been especially significant to contemporary critics exploring questions about (absolute) 
otherness. Indeed, Woolf’s enduring legacy as a modernist writer might be pinned on her 
commitment to what Dorothy J. Hale has termed “an aesthetics of alterity,” that is, to a set 
of textual practices “aim[ing] to present a ‘vision of life’ that is a particular kind of self-
reflection: that gives a view of what is outside and beyond the self (other to the self) through 
the lens of subjective perspective” (13). Woolf’s work has thus been additionally crucial in 
asking critical questions about ethical subjectivity—and about the ethical subject’s necessary 
yet tentative connections to both writing and to the “other to the self.” Jacob’s Room certainly 
cannot be exempted from such questions. Woolf’s “biography of fragments” radically 
interrogates both the subject of writing and the subject in writing as much as it intentionally 
refashions the novel in order to problematize writing itself (Lee 72).5 In doing so, I want to 
suggest, Woolf’s first experimental novel elicits further questions about the responsibility of 
representation. Specifically, in relation to an ethics of bearing witness and affirmation, I will 
show that narrative responsibility can be thought of in terms of the novel’s “undecidability” 
produced by its formal features and reinforced by its thematic concerns with (the 
representation of) subjectivity. Because Jacob’s Room breaks with the traditional conventions 
of narrative representation, I argue, Woolf must not only reimagine the representation of 
subjectivity but she must also rethink the responsibility of such representation.  
 
4 By “modernity,” I mean to suggest the broad developments in the arts, humanities, and sciences since the 
early sixteenth century that reached their apotheosis in the late eighteenth century in the Enlightenment. For 
Woolf and many feminists alike, modernity is synonymous with patriarchy, war, imperialism, colonialism. 
 
5 By “problematize writing,” I mean a rigorous, self-reflexive process of calling into question various textual 





Many of Woolf’s literary essays call attention to the practice of writing and 
representation, often resulting in critics of modernism to focus on the formal qualities of her 
novels. Yet, these same critics frequently overlook “the duties and responsibilities” Woolf 
herself insisted are necessary to “finding a way of telling the truth” (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. 
Brown” 211). A central claim in this chapter is that Woolf’s modernism is not only 
thematically concerned with “life itself” but is intensely preoccupied with the representing 
life responsibly. Such a claim, however, might seem to contradict many prevailing notions 
about both modernism and Woolf’s own textual practices as radical, as experimental, as 
revolutionary. As a central modernist figure who champions a rejection of nineteenth-
century realism and its early twentieth-century “materialist” progeny (the Edwardians), 
Woolf undoubtedly experiments with unconventional forms of representation “in order to 
express more fully the qualities and intensity of conscious experience” (Parsons 1). 
Experimentation, though, does not come without its consequences. For Woolf, if not for 
modernist writers more generally, the cost of re-forming the novel meant a potential, 
wholesale reinvention of literary conventions if not an outright abandonment of past 
methods and modes of representation. In this way, then, experimentation suggests a risk into 
the unknown—a “leap of faith” into uncertainty and precariousness—as much as it does a 
kind of Nietzschean revaluation of the novel. Even Woolf understood the risks inherent in 
breaking with past conventions and methods, observing that in the attempt to truthfully 
represent life, “the truth itself is bound to reach us in rather an exhausted and chaotic 
condition” (“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown”  211). Yet in spite of her own revaluations of the 
novel, Woolf insists that writers (herself included) maintain what she deems an “attitude 




or responsible conduct. Even while Woolf exhorts writers to “spring those sleek, smooth 
novels, those portentous and ridiculous biographies” of the past from their grip, she also 
urges those same writers to “come down off their plinths and pedestals” in order to conduct 
themselves responsibly in their texts (and before their reading audiences) (“Mr. Bennett and 
Mrs. Brown” 212). 
In her diary dated Monday, January 26, 1920, Woolf reports that “this afternoon [she 
had] arrived at some idea of a new form for a new novel” and goes on to state that “the 
approach will be entirely different this time: no scaffolding; scarcely a brick to be seen; all 
crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, humour, everything as bright as fire in the mist” (The 
Diary of Virginia Woolf, vol. 2 13 – 14). Many critics have used this and similar statements by 
Woolf to launch their analyses of Jacob’s Room. Kathleen Wall, for instance, reads the novel in 
terms of Woolf searching “to find a ‘significant form’ for her elegy for her brother and for 
the young generation of men who died in the war” (303). Indeed, thirty years earlier, in The 
Novels of Virginia Woolf, Hermione Lee suggests that “[t]he form of Jacob’s Room is the subject: 
an alternative to false reality of the biography of fact” (72; Lee’s italics). And critics writing 
about Jacob’s Room in the interim between Lee and Wall have certainly focused their attention 
on the novel’s “crepuscular” form too, often in conjunction with an exploration of Woolf’s 
socio-political agenda in the novel. Judy Little forcefully argues that Jacob’s Room “is not an 
effort to extend the Bildungsroman; it is, among other things, an attack on this form. It attacks 
that a conventionalised fictional ‘summing up’ can fit a real life, or that a young 
Englishman’s socialisation is anything but a burlesque of his real stumblings toward self-
discovery” (109). Little’s analysis is consonant with feminist critiques exploring sexual 




central feature of the Bildungsroman is the sexual education of its hero. However, observes 
Harris, the novel’s narrative voice “is spectacularly reticent when it comes to actually 
recording [Jacob’s] progress” (420). But, rather than reading this narrative reticence as 
subversively “remov[ing] sexuality from the novel” (420), Harris argues that the narrator acts 
as a censor who polices sexuality in order to control it at the narrative level. Ultimately, the 
narrative voice for Harris is comprised of “multitudinous voices whose dialogue constructs 
the cultural edifice within which Jacob moves” (422). Finally, Kate Flint’s “Virginia Woolf, 
Women, and Language”—following the work of Charles G. Hoffmann, E. L. Bishop and 
Alex Zwerdling—examines Woolf’s revisions of Jacob’s Room and the way Woolf “came to 
organize her text around a more generalized perception of difference between the sexes” 
(362).6 According to Flint, the narrative strategy of “distancing” Jacob simultaneously enacts 
a critique of patriarchy and brings women’s voices to the foreground of the narrative. My 
point in reviewing these select criticisms of Jacob’s Room is not that their understanding of the 
novel’s form is somehow unfounded or unjustified—or even incompatible with the 
possibilities Woolf herself notes about her then unwritten novel. Rather, criticism tends to 
ignore the question of responsibility as it relates to representation, that is, as Woolf “grope[s] 
& experiment[s]” (Diary, vol. 2 14) with the form of the novel.7  
In “The Narrow Bridge of Art” (1927), Woolf asserts that “[n]obody can read much 
modern literature without being aware that some dissatisfaction, some difficulty, is lying in 
 
6 Focusing on the textual history of Jacob’s Room, Flint wants to remind critics that Woolf’s own project “of 
finding a woman’s sentence, of employing a language not made by men for their own uses” must be 
understood in the social context in which Woolf produced Jacob’s Room as opposed to reading the novel as 
prefiguring post-1968 French feminism (379). 
 
7 Writing to a more general audience in her introduction to the Oxford edition of Jacob’s Room, Flint comes 
close when she observes that “Woolf’s style allows her to pose the question of what the fictional presentation 




our way. On all sides writers are attempting what they cannot achieve, are forcing the form 
they use to contain a meaning which is strange to it” (904). The incommensurability between 
form and meaning Woolf identifies here as characteristic of modern literature applies to 
poetry, and what she goes on to discuss is pertinent to the development of the modernist 
novel. She observes that different ages have required different generic forms of expression 
and representation—the Elizabethans, drama; the Romantics, the lyric; the Victorians, the 
novel—and that modern writers of fiction have yet to find a suitable form capable of 
registering “an age clearly when we are not fast anchored where we are; things are moving 
around us; we are moving ourselves” (903 – 04). Like many of her other well-known literary 
manifestos, “The Narrow Bridge of Art” probes the possibilities of the modernist novel to 
assume the “duties and responsibilities” once achieved by past literary genres. In fact, Woolf 
seems reticent to even associate modern writing with the novel, aware as she is of the novel’s 
traditional modes of representation inasmuch as what she perceives as its limitations in 
representing the “queer conglomeration of incongruous things—the modern mind” (908). 
She goes so far as to suggest that “[w]e shall be forced to invent new names for the different 
books which masquerade under this one heading” (907; my italics). Though “The Narrow 
Bridge of Art” was written several years after the publication of Jacob’s Room, it clues us into 
Woolf’s commitment to finding new means of expression, of “inventing new names” in an 
age of transition and turbulence, of discovery and crisis. Her remarks on modern literature 
here and in many of her critical essays reveal a writer deeply concerned with balancing the 
myriad complexities of modern life with the demands of (re)inventing new modes of 
representation. Woolf suggests that the novel form—once freed of “carrying loads of details, 




and idiosyncrasies of human character in daily life” (909). In Jacob’s Room, however, Woolf’s 
narrator reflects on the “harsher necessity” involved in this process of “freeing” the novel 
from—and, in effect, buoying the subject above—the surface of details and facts (53).  
As I will argue here and throughout this chapter, modernist responsibility, as 
exemplified by Woolf, can be understood with the help of the Derridean notion of 
undecidability. An ethical concept closely aligned with deconstruction, undecidability simply 
means an experience through which an ethical subject must go when confronted with a 
problem or dilemma that demands action. To truly decide, to consciously make a choice is 
“something terrible”, argues Derrida, because it means breaking with conventional 
knowledge and morality (“Hospitality” 67). He claims, “[a] decision, of course, must be 
prepared as far as possible by knowledge, by information, by infinite analysis. At some point, 
however, for a decision to be made you have to go beyond knowledge, to do something that 
you don’t know, something which does not belong to, or is beyond, the sphere of 
knowledge” (66). In this way, responsibility means being irresponsible in the view of 
established conventions and laws—specifically, in the way I am appropriating it, those that 
govern the novel. Such (ir)responsibility, then, concerns the disruption and destabilization of 
accepted forms of novelistic representation and modes of narration.8 Thus, in my view, 
undecidability also functions as a formal strategy of modernist resistance to narrative closure 
largely indicative of the conventional strategies of narrative representation. My discussion 
begins with an examination of Woolf’s anonymous narrator in Jacob’s Room. For, she not only 
reveals an overwhelming anxiety with regard to the ethical demand of having to make 
 
8 I will use the form “(ir)responsibility” to denote modernist responsibility as heterogeneous to conventional 
responsibility and representation. Whenever “responsibility” or “irresponsibility” are used, I am thus thinking 





narrative decisions—the fragmented form of her narrative reinforces the “terrible 
experience” of undecidability, that is, the burden of responsibility as it relates to 
representation. My analysis turns on Woolf’s interposition of the narrator between herself 
and the text, a move that exacerbates the novel’s undecidability and, I claim, muddles any 
possibility of directly ascribing responsibility to Woolf, the narrator, or text. Woolf’s evasive, 
(ir)responsible tactics participate in the broader modernist project of strategically 
undermining epistemological and ontological certainty.9 Her “absence” is suggestive of the 
consequences necessarily raised when, in the well-known words of Nietzsche, “God is 
dead.” Whereas certain authorial guarantees by a traditioanl author-narrator (God) make it 
possible to discern a moral center (or lesson) in the novel, the disassociation of the 
modernist author from his or her narrator antagonizes an already volatile situation, namely 
the incapacity to attribute responsibility to a reliable, omniscient narrative agent. In Jacob’s 
Room, I claim, Woolf devolves the burden of responsibility to an all too human agent who, as 
a result, finds herself subjected to the ethical demand of representing the novel’s eponymous 
character even when, as she observes, “[i]t seems that a profound, impartial, and absolutely 
just opinion of our fellow creatures is utterly unknown” (56). I argue that this 
contradiction—between the narrator’s responsibility and her observation that representation 
ultimately ends in failure—epitomizes modernist (ir)responsibility and its “crisis of 
representation.”10  
 
9 As Pericles Lewis claims, “[t]he modernists generally saw the world as devoid of inherent significance. For 
them, the task of the artist was not to discover a preexistent meaning, but to create a new meaning out of the 
chaos and anarchy of actual modern life” (8). In light of this view, then, modernists had to act (ir)responsibly so 
as to shake the foundations of established truths and systems in order find new approaches to creating “new 
meaning.”  
 
10 In this way, while Jacob’s Room might be regarded as a series of failed attempts to objectively represent its 




My subsequent reading of Jacob’s Room will show that the narrator’s (ir)responsibility 
has significant repercussions for subjectivity and the representation thereof. Indeed, 
subjectivity is a fundamental concern of many modernist novels and continues to be one of 
the critical mainstays of modernist studies. As I asserted in the preceding paragraph, Woolf’s 
narrator is the subject of an ethical demand. What does this mean? My answer to this 
question is informed by the structure of ethical experience sketched out in Simon Critchley’s 
Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance. In Critchley’s view, ethical 
experience is a “virtuously circular” situation that “begins with the approval of a demand, a 
demand that demands approval” (39). This “approval” can be thought as affirmation, or 
even understood as a response to a calling by an other—someone in excess of the subject 
who demands an ethical subject’s infinite responsibility. That said, the source or origin of an 
ethical demand cannot necessarily be known: it might emanate from “God, the abyssal void 
at the heart of being, the fairies at the bottom of my garden, or some other occult source” 
(Critchley 55). The point is not to get embroiled in questions of priority, that is, whether a 
demand comes before an approval or vice versa. Rather, the structure of ethical experience 
necessitates both a demand by an absolute, unknowable other and a response by a subject. 
Most importantly, Critchley shows, an ethical subject “shapes itself in relation to a demand 
that it can never meet, which divides and sunders the subject” (40). This “shaping” means 
that an ethical subject’s subjectivity is made possible by an other’s unfulfillable, exorbitant 
demand, rendering the relationship between a subject and an other asymmetrical. In other 
words, any response to or approval of a demand calls into question a subject’s autonomy, as 
it is split between a duty to self and to an other. Critchley’s theorization of subjectivity—




approach the question of modernist (ir)responsibility, representation, and subjectivity in 
Jacob’s Room. To put it plainly, representation is a demand demanded of the novel’s narrator. 
And her response to this demand is precisely that which “divides and sunders” her, resulting 
in and reflected by the novel’s (ir)responsible, fragmented, and undecidable narrative. More 
importantly, such a demand leads to the narrator’s realization that justice can never be 
attained. That is, responsible representation—defined in the context of traditional forms of 
representation—is impossible. For, the impossibility of justly representing and affirming 
“our fellow creatures,” as the narrator makes clear, lies in the fact that individual, subjective 
consciousness is always already in relation to a demand that both shapes and is shaped by it.  
Finally, it might be helpful at this time to once again clarify what I mean by 
“representation” and “fragmentation” if only because I have and will often use them 
interchangeably rather than treat them as opposing terms. Fragmentation, as I understand it, 
already implies representation and is one of many formal strategies employed by modernists 
to imitate “the modern mind.” Anne Fernihough has deftly and succinctly explored the 
philosophical underpinnings of modernist form as it relates to consciousness, citing the twin 
influences of French philosopher Henri Bergson and American psychologist William James 
on the works of Woolf, James Joyce, May Sinclair, and Dorothy Richardson. Through her 
analysis, Fernihough illuminates what seems an obvious but regularly unacknowledged point 
about the form of modernist narratives. Namely, the differences in the representation of 
subjectivity are routinely homogenized by critics of modernism under the well-known 
banner of stream-of-consciousness. However, as Fernihough makes clear, differences do in 
fact exist. For instance, whereas the form of Jacob’s Room represents a “swarm of sense data 




end of Joyce’s Ulysses is constituted by an “unbroken flow of words on the page [that] 
embodies an undiscriminating and unstoppable consciousness in which there is no editing 
out or hierarchy of thought” (67). Both forms of representation attempt to imitate 
consciousness though in ways that are generally described as fragmentary. It is 
commonplace, that is, to subsume experimental modernist narrative under “fragmentation” 
despite the different forms fragmentation assumes. Often used pejoratively, fragmentation is 
a term cast wide by critics in order to rein in and smooth over modernism’s formal 
heterogeneity. However, in light of my discussion about ethical subjectivity and 
representation above, it might be said that the heterogeneity of fragmentation emblematic of 
modernist texts points to varying if not vying ethical demands demanding representation. 
Herein lies the exemplarity and singularity of Jacob’s Room, namely its unique and 
straightforward response to a demand among a multiplicity of demands. 
 
LIFE ITSELF: REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Before turning to a discussion of the formal qualities of Jacob’s Room, I would like to 
extend my discussion of representation in the context of Woolf’s non-fiction. This section 
will enable a deeper understanding of Woolf’s literary project which will in turn have the 
effect of illuminating both the formal structure of Jacob’s Room as well as the novel’s 
treatment of subjectivity. In literary studies, representation has been traditionally defined as 
“the use of one thing to stand for another through some signifying medium. A 
representation of an event is not the event itself but rather a statement about or rendition of 
that event. An artistic representation is an image or likeness of something achieved through a 




implies but does not state outright is that representation traditionally tends toward totality, 
that is, full meaning or presence. In other words, traditional aesthetic representation aims at 
a direct, objective, one-to-one correspondence of the reality it purports to reflect. More 
technically, the signifying system—language or writing, in this instance—attempts to 
correspond without interruption to a signified object, to a “thing in itself.” With that said, in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, artists and writers from all backgrounds 
began to pose many challenges to mimetic representation, disrupting the means by which 
“life” was generally mediated and thus experienced. As noted in the previous section, 
philosophers also started asking critical questions about subjective perception and 
consciousness, resulting in further questions not only about what a subject could know 
(epistemology) but also about a subject’s subjecthood, or being (ontology). The 
consequences of both the challenges posed to traditional representation and the revaluations 
of philosophical assumptions about human perception and knowledge precipitated a full-
scale reassessment of modernity’s faith in human autonomy. Specifically, writers and 
philosophers were engaged in problems regarding experience, that is, what constitutes 
experience and how experience could be represented given “life’s” finitude. What interests 
me in this chapter is Woolf’s theoretical elaboration of writing fiction as much as her 
execution of that theory in Jacob’s Room. To my mind, and I am not alone in this assessment, 
Woolf’s fiction and non-fiction assemble one of the most full-fledged attempts to break with 
traditional literary conventions than any other modernist writer.  
As a way of understanding what Woolf argues is an “obstacle and impediment” to 
modern literary representation, let us first examine George Eliot’s defense of realist 




much for the sake of setting up realists to fail, as it were. Instead, I want to indicate a shift or 
“turn” in the ways modernists conceived of their methods and responsibilities as writers—
and for the novel. In the second book of Adam Bede (1859), Eliot “pauses” to advance one 
of the clearer expressions of realism against what she perceives as a propensity to “create a 
world so much better than this” (178). She begins by lamenting her own lack of cleverness 
and creativity as a storyteller—otherwise, she states, “my characters would be entirely of my 
own choosing” (177). As a result, Eliot professes “to creep servilely after nature and fact” 
(177) rather than fabricate or embellish the details of her “simple story” (178). She notes that 
“I have no lofty vocation”(177) other than representing truth, later claiming that 
“[f]alsehood is so easy, truth so difficult” (178) and that “it is a very hard thing to say the 
exact truth, even about your own immediate feelings” (178 – 79). Even while Eliot readily 
admits to the difficulty in rendering a “faithful account of men and things” (177), she also 
defends her method against critics who would have her fashion characters into types so that 
“[t]hen we shall see whom we are to condemn, and whom we are to approve’” (178). Eliot 
rejects such representation on the basis of its naivety and simplicity, that is, as overlooking 
the complexity of human character and a world brimming with material detail. Moreover, in 
fashioning herself as someone who “creeps” after such details, Eliot in effect “removes” 
herself, as it were, from the world to become an objective observer of its parts and motion. 
Only from this vantage point—one committed to truth as mimesis—can an “objective” 
rendering of the material world be delivered. 
In this brief detour from her narrative, Eliot thus lays out the terms by which she 





[…] I aspire to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as 
they have mirrored themselves in my mind. The mirror is doubtless 
defective; the outlines will sometimes be disturbed; the reflection faint or 
confused; but I feel as much bound to tell you, as precisely as I can, what that 
reflection is, as if I were in the witness-box narrating my experience on oath. 
(177; my emphasis) 
The metaphor of being on trial will certainly become significant in the course of this 
dissertation, as it might be said each of the modernists who I have selected to examine are in 
one way or another “on trial.” For now, however, I want to emphasize Eliot’s self-
proclaimed duty to “precisely” reflect that which has been “mirrored” in her mind. The 
mirror as such might indeed be muddled—by what, she does not say—but Eliot seems 
confident that her duty to precision, if not duty itself, will aid her in depicting an accurately 
mimetic representation of “men and things.” The details constituting objective reality—“all 
those cheap common things which are the precious necessaries of life” (179)—she argues 
have the potential to foster human sympathy. For, the “representation of commonplace 
things” aid to illuminate and remind readers of the real, working-class conditions of the 
world (180). She claims that more often than not “religion and philosophy,” inasmuch as 
literature, exclude “common, coarse people” and thus posit theories about the world based 
solely on a good/bad binarism (180). It would seem that Eliot and Woolf are not in 
disagreement insofar as their mutual commitment to representing reality is concerned. Both 
emphasize the mind as the instrument or register of reality. And both explore in their 
respective fiction the real, material conditions of people’s lives. The difference between the 




mind as mirror, or perception, can accurately record the details of the world. Eliot’s 
scrupulous, slavish attention to “the precious necessaries of life” from Woolf’s perspective 
betray realism’s commitment to “life” as it is actually lived and felt—or, in a word, 
experienced. In a diary entry from November 1928, Woolf reveals that she does not seek a 
complete expulsion of the exteriority of the outer world from experience—“I mean to 
eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity” since these result from “the inclusion of things 
that don’t belong to the moment; this appalling business of the realists: getting on from 
lunch to dinner is false, unreal, merely conventional” (Diary, vol. III 209). Indeed, “the 
moment” will become an important concept in Woolf’s literary philosophy (as I discuss 
below) and it constitutes one of the major differences between Woolf’s modernism and 
Eliot’s realism.  
Like many modernists, Woolf composed critical essays that simultaneously reflect a 
searching for and an elaboration of new methods of literary representation. These essays set 
out to justify Woolf’s break with the conventions of Victorian realism—carried into the 
twentieth century with Edwardian materialism—inasmuch as they explore new possibilities 
for the novel. Additionally, her personal writing sheds light on a writer struggling to break 
through what she calls “the cotton wool of daily life,” that is, the world obscured by 
materialist facticity. In the memoir “A Sketch of the Past” (1940), which recounts the death 
of her mother, Woolf explains that “behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I 
mean all human beings—are connected with this” (72). It is from this human 
interconnectivity that Woolf derives her belief that “by writing I am doing what is far more 




simply reflecting or relating the minutiae of everyday life.11 Rather, representation is a 
demand or call to responsibility as “a revelation of some order” (72). This “order,” claims 
Woolf, is constituted by “separate moments of being […] embedded in many more 
moments of non-being” (70). Non-being, she says, is the “cotton wool,” the non-events that 
constitute and seemingly overwhelm our daily lives—the stuff of realism: “[a] great part of 
every day is not lived consciously. One walks, eats, sees things, deals with what has to be 
done; the broken vacuum cleaner; ordering dinner; writing orders to Mabel; washing; 
cooking dinner; bookbinding” (70). Being, by contrast, is precipitated by “shocks” or 
“exceptional moments” of awareness and passivity (71). For instance, she recalls a fight from 
her childhood with her younger brother Thoby when, suddenly, “I dropped my hand 
instantly, and stood there, and let him beat me” (71). In this moment, Woolf explains, she 
was rendered hopeless and powerless—she recognized the futility of violence as she 
wondered to herself, “why hurt another person?” (71). While this episode from her 
childhood left Woolf in a state of despair, other moments—such as when she saw the 
organic wholeness of a flower bed—enabled her to later explore such “exceptional 
moments” in writing.  
In Woolf’s view, the exceptional heightens a writer’s sensibility to “life”—it is “what 
makes me a writer” (72). Yet “life,” for Woolf, is less a matter of mimetic representation 
than a kind of assemblage of disparate moments or events. She states, “people write what 
they call ‘lives’ of other people; that is they collect a number of events, and leave the person 
to whom it happened unknown” (69). Woolf later makes a similar observation with regard to 
her mother: “But if I turn to my mother, how difficult it is to single her out as she really was; 
 
11 See Liesl Olson’s Modernism and the Ordinary, specifically her chapter Woolf, for an acute and provocative 




to imagine what she was thinking, to put a single sentence into her mouth! I dream; I make 
up pictures of a summer’s afternoon” (87). Both citations demonstrate Woolf’s belief that a 
direct and total representation of “life” cannot be achieved, that expression always already 
involves artistic creation, that is, imposition. She further claims, “one’s life is not confined to 
one’s body and what one says and does; one is living all the time in relation to certain 
background rods or conceptions” (73; my emphasis). Herein lie the ethics of Woolf’s 
responsibility as a writer: to disclose “life” not as a stable state or truth—but rather as 
something in the “background” order that cannot be fixed or comprehended in its totality. 
In part, what interests Woolf is “life’s” dynamism, that is, the ever-changing relation between 
“the cotton wool” of non-being and the “real thing” that a writer such as Woolf occasionally 
glimpses (72). Disclosure as an act of ethical expression would involve a movement outside 
of oneself toward what is other, toward understanding an other however much that 
understanding fails to grasp or comprehend an other in its full presence.   
In “Modern Fiction” (1919/1925), Woolf faults traditional methods of 
representation for failing to disclose “life itself.” She wonders, “[i]s it due to the method that 
inhibits the creative power? Is it due to the method that we feel neither jovial or 
magnanimous, but centred in a self which, in spite of its tremor of susceptibility, never 
embraces or creates what is outside itself and beyond?” (“Modern Fiction” 289; my emphases). 
This “tremor of susceptibility”—like those “moments of being” discussed above—has the 
potential to open a centered self onto “what is outside itself and beyond” (this will have 
significant consequences for subjectivity, as I discuss below). It also has the potential to 
upend narrative conventions and shatter artistic presuppositions: “[i]s it not the task of the 




aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as 
possible?” (288). Woolf here seems to caution against an aesthetic that would artificially 
shape and give coherence to “life,” that is, to “this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit.” 
The “task,” or responsibility, of a novelist is to convey “life”—not to impose meaning upon 
it. By contrast, conventional strategies of representation foreclose “life” such that they begin 
with questions about “the proper stuff of fiction”—meaning, morality, propriety—instead of 
“record[ing] the atoms [of life] as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall […] 
however disconnected and incoherent in appearance” (288). It seems important to point out 
that Woolf does not mean to suggest abandoning representational methods altogether. 
Rather, she wants to radicalize the means by which “life” might be conveyed and 
understood, however (im)possible that might be. Crucially, at the end of “Modern Fiction,” 
she asserts that “no ‘method,’ no experiment, even the wildest—is forbidden, but only falsity 
and pretence. ‘The proper stuff of fiction’ does not exist; everything is the proper stuff of 
fiction, every feeling, every thought” (291). From the perspective of conventional 
representation, Woolf’s irreverence for “the proper stuff of fiction” can be construed as 
irresponsibility—what, from perspective of modernism, is responsibility. Yet this 
(ir)responsibility—as I have formulated the term—hits upon a radical tension fundamental 
to ethics itself. On the one hand, as I have shown above, Woolf recognizes that “life” must 
be represented—in fact, she claims that her sensibility to it is the reason she became a writer 
in the first place. Yet, on the other hand, she also realizes that “life” exceeds conventional 
representation, that the “proper stuff of fiction” cannot adequately represent or reflect 
“life’s” dynamism. This tension at the core of modernist representation, at least as reflected 




view, the consequences for literature concern questions about what constitutes, properly, the 
“literary.” If “everything is the proper stuff of fiction,” then the border between literature 
and “life” becomes so porous that one cannot seemingly be distinguished from the other. In 
this sense, then, Oscar Wilde’s quip that “life imitates art far more than art imitates life” 
seems an appropriate precursor to Woolf’s own literary theory. 
“Life is always and inevitably much richer than we who try to express it.” So says 
Woolf in the conclusion of “The Narrow Bridge of Art,” suggesting that “the need of fresh 
developments is being felt” by writers attempting to escape “a bondage which has become 
irksome to them” (909). As I have intimated, what Woolf means by “life” she never does 
clearly define—either in “The Narrow Bridge of Art” or in any of her literary manifestos—
but it seems to be something in excess of the life represented by nineteenth-century and 
early twentieth-century realism. She says, for instance, “[w]hether we call it life or spirit, truth 
or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any 
longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide” (“Modern Fiction” 287). Again, in Woolf’s 
view, the conventions of realism—which she also likens to “some powerful and 
unscrupulous tyrant” (287)—have obscured and stifled rather than inspirited “life.” In other 
words, the constraining methods of traditional forms representation, wherein “if all [the 
realists’] figures were to come to life they would find themselves dressed down to the last 
button of their coats in the fashion of the hour” (287), conceal life’s dynamism, 
mysteriousness, and richness. Yet in spite of these conventions’ tyranny over literary 
representation, Woolf asserts that “a spasm of rebellion” (287) has in fact emerged critical of 
the novel and its stilted representation of “life.” As if to fan the flames of this rebellion, she 




thought big” (288)—and to consider “an ordinary mind on an ordinary day [, for] [t]he mind 
receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness 
of steel” (287). “Life,” it seems for Woolf, lies not in a presupposed stable exterior world—
the world of traditional representation—but rather is filtered and illuminated by the mind, by 
consciousness. In this sense, it might be said that consciousness produces “life,” though not 
entirely in isolation from the exterior world.12 Any adequate or “real” representation of the 
world, then, necessarily results in narrative fragmentation because “life itself” exceeds the 
“myriad impressions” the mind can receive. The totality of the world overwhelms, as it were, 
any singular consciousness attempting to absorb and narrate the vast number of details and 
events that come and go at any given moment.  
Discussions about representation and consciousness in Woolf’s fiction inevitably 
lead to critical questions about subjectivity. Before addressing this topic, however, I would 
now like to discuss Jacob’s Room in light of my overview of Woolf’s critique of realist 
representation. In the subsequent section, I consider the formal structural of Jacob’s Room in 
order to understand its ethical consequences for modernist (ir)responsibility. My analysis 
below requires a basic familiarity with the novel’s “crepuscular” form (though not necessarily 
its thematic content) if only because I will be making both specific and general claims based 
upon its spatial arrangements. Only after a thorough elaboration of Woolf’s formal 
experimentalism in Jacob’s Room will my discussion be prepared to “descend” into the 
particulars of the narrative. In part, my goal has been, and continues to be, to demonstrate 
how Woolf’s modernism can be understood as an enactment of ethical responsibility. 
 
12 As Liesl Olson claims, “[Woolf’s] work is not split between representations of ‘inner’ versus ‘outer’ or 
‘personal’ versus ‘political.’ Rather, her representation of ordinary experience reconciles two sides of a 





NARRATIVE FRAGMENTATION AND MODERNIST (IR)RESPONSIBILITY 
 Widely recognized as Woolf’s first foray into experimentation with the novel, Jacob’s 
Room concerns the life and development of its titular character, Jacob Flanders. Divided into 
fourteen chapters, the novel opens in prewar England, in Cornwall, and follows Jacob to his 
“rooms” in Cambridge, London, and Greece as he develops from a young boy to a man in 
his mid-twenties. It ends with his mother Betty Flanders, a central character in the novel, 
holding a pair of Jacob’s shoes as the anticlimactic revelation of his death in the Great 
War—his death being the literal culmination of his metaphorical absence since the very 
beginning of the book. Much of what we do learn about Jacob, however, comes from the 
filtered impressions of an anonymous narrator and fragmented dialogue by myriad characters 
inhabiting the novel, primarily women. The main events constituting Jacob’s life—ranging 
from his intellectual training to his failed amorous relationships with women to his travels 
abroad to his daydreams in Hyde Park—reflect a rather mundane, though privileged middle-
class male existence that is unexpectedly and abruptly extinguished by the War. At the end of 
the novel, through the perspective of Jacob’s friend Bonamy, the narrator reports: “‘He left 
everything just at it was’ […]. ‘Nothing arranged. All his letters strewn about for any one to 
read. What did he expect? Did he think he would come back?’ he mused, standing in the 
middle of Jacob’s room” (143). The novel’s somber tone coupled with images of death and 
loss reinforce Jacob’s Room’s elegiac dimension, as it laments the disappearance of a 
generation and the end of a certain way of life.13 
 
13 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, for example, argue that “the experience of violence in the 
1914 – 18 war gave contemporaries the impression that, throughout Europe and in all nations, the apparent 
‘dynamic of the West’ has been snuffed out. And this radical and radically new violence was not only massively 
accepted by the belligerent societies but also implemented by millions of men over for and a half years. Even 
more troubling, the about turn—from a social state where violence had become very controlled, repressed and 




While the summary above manages to provide a basic overview of the plot of Jacob’s 
Room, it does not address what has long been considered the real subject of the novel: its 
form. In fact, while conceiving the novel, Woolf herself admitted that “[w]hat the unity shall 
be I have yet to discover: the theme is a blank to me; but I see immense possibilities in the 
form I hit upon more or less by chance 2 weeks ago” (Diary 14). Prior to writing Jacob’s Room, 
Woolf had written three short stories—“The Mark on the Wall” (1917), “Kew Gardens” 
(1919), and “An Unwritten Novel” (1920)—from which she began to formulate her ideas 
about the scope of and possibilities for the  modern novel. In each of these stories, Woolf 
experiments with aesthetic representations of consciousness and perception. Though unalike 
from one another thematically, these stories collectively inaugurate, as it were, Woolf’s 
literary break from realism’s “unselfconscious practice of mimetic representation” (Jameson 
38). To take a singular example, Woolf’s “The Mark on the Wall” features a narrator 
distracted by “a small round mark, black upon the white wall, about six or seven inches 
above the mantelpiece” (83). It is not until the last line of this story that the narrator realizes, 
“Ah, the mark on the wall! It was a snail” (89). Between her initial perception of the “small 
round mark” on the wall and her comprehension of it appears the narrator’s sporadic, 
fleeting thoughts and feelings on a random assortment of topics. Most notable in “The Mark 
on the Wall” is the narrator’s haunting sense that “[n]o, no, nothing is proved, nothing is 
known” (87). In other words, throughout the short story questions of epistemology beset the 
narrator as she repeatedly attempts to focalize on the dark spot. From an ethical perspective, 
 
matter of days and with hardly any transition between the two, Europeans who had benefited from the 
‘civilizing process’ left their work, their families and their sophisticated, cultivated social life to accept extreme 
violence” (33); Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker’s italics). In the last scene of Jacob’s Room, Betty Flanders exclaims, 
“‘[s]uch confusion everywhere!’” (143), no doubt referring to Jacob’s disorderly room and, more broadly, 





it might be said that the narrator desires to affirm the mark—not just to know it empirically 
but instead to uphold it as an irreducible, singular entity among others. The anxiety she 
experiences as a result of the mark’s unintelligibility seems to emanate not from not from 
anything identifiable but the mark itself. She observes, “to my relief the sight of the mark 
interrupted the fancy, for it is an old fancy, an automatic fancy, made as a child perhaps” 
(83). Though the narrator initially feels a sense of relief, she soon expresses distress caused 
by the mark’s interruption: “I want to think quietly, calmly, spaciously, never to be 
interrupted, never to have risen from my chair, to slip easily from one thing to another, 
without any hostility, or obstacle” (85). It is precisely this interruption that both awakens the 
narrator from a kind of ethical slumber—“never [wanting] to be interrupted”—and situates 
her in a position of responsibility. Told from a first-person perspective, “The Mark on the 
Wall” deliberates on ethical, epistemological, and narrative problems that are later explored 
more fully in Jacob’s Room both at the formal and thematic levels.  
In this section, I will show that the priority given to form in Jacob’s Room provides a 
critical context for understanding ethical responsibility. By form, I mean a structure of 
representation in literary texts, specifically novels (their plots, events, and characters). This 
structure of representation is none other than writing itself—a topic on which Woolf spent a 
tremendous amount of energy and ink throughout her career. As its “subject,” the form of 
Jacob’s Room has undoubtedly mobilized many critics to examine Woolf’s textual practices 
and techniques in the broader context of modernism’s “crisis of representation.” Makiko 
Minow-Pinkney, for instance, writes that “the novel’s major concern is a sign which remains 
elusive and enigmatic. The impossibility of reaching a final truth precipitates a suspicion of 




realism” (26). Minow-Pinkney’s comment articulates not only a familiar critical refrain that 
observes modernism’s break with realist conventions. It also implies that the “impossibility 
of reaching a final truth” is a problem—something of a “crisis” for traditional representation. 
In my view, Jacob’s Room explores this “crisis” as always already inherent in representation. 
Woolf creates a narrator whose anxiety and reticence result from “the duties and 
responsibilities” associated with a demand for representation. While I agree with Minow-
Pinkney that “the novel suggests that a distance has opened between Woolf’s aspirations to 
totality and what the text actually shows” (30), I also read this “distance” as part of Woolf’s 
strategy to engage a thinking about responsibility as it relates to representation. As Levinas 
would write much later, “[a]rt is not a blissful wandering of man who sets out to make 
something beautiful. Culture and artistic creation are part of the ontological order itself. 
They are ontological par excellence: they make the understanding of being possible” 
(“Meaning and Sense” 82). Levinas is suspicious of artistic creation, or representation, in that 
it “assembles being” (82) at the expense of what is otherwise (the absolute other excluded by 
traditional philosophy). It might seem that Woolf, in light of my discussion above about 
“life” and “moments of being,” participates in “assembling” this “ontological order.” 
However, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, Woolf treads a fine line between onto-
epistemological determinacy, on the one hand, and ethical undecidability at the narrative 
level, on the other hand. The “distance” Minow-Pinkney registers is what I understand as an 
ethical space, that is, a space opened up by narrative undecidability.  
Just at the surface level of Jacob’s Room, Woolf’s ubiquitous use of white space enacts 
a metaphoric shattering of the traditional “practice of mimetic representation,” resulting in 




narrative, then, comprise and “frame,” however contingently, the ostensible story of Jacob. 
According to Francesca Kazan, the novel’s “white bordered fragments constitute the 
primary level of framing, one that is literally, albeit negatively, visible” (703). She reads the 
primary frame of the novel, or general text, as simultaneously seeking fixity as well as 
producing “the possibility for a radical site of exchange” (703) between art and life. The 
general text of the novel, in other words, might be thought of as a great container in which 
the “descriptive exteriors” (703) or narrative fragments “play,” causing the very frame of the 
general text to contract, expand, and even at times dissolve into the general text itself. In 
turn, the white spaces act as gaps that interrupt or silence “the incessant murmur of voices” 
(703) that dominate the primary frame of the novel. Kazan’s description of Jacob’s Room’s 
form thus raises problems in line with modernism’s deep-rooted suspicion of the “very 
categories of experience and events themselves” (Jameson 38). First, it asks to what end 
experience can be represented at all—let alone by the novel. Second, and perhaps more 
pragmatically, it poses questions about what it means to record events—or “moments of 
being”—intelligibly and reliably. Much of Jacob’s Room’s unintelligibility appears to be result 
of a tension caused by the narrator’s self-reflexive thinking about representation. Early in the 
novel, for instance, as she is describing Jacob, the narrator says that “of all the futile 
occupations this of cataloguing features is the worst. One word is sufficient. But if one 
cannot find it?” (JR 55). To catalogue means to participate in realism’s movement toward 
totality, or closure, through the collection and shaping of minutiae into narrative coherence. 
It is, to be sure, an encyclopedic act in that it strives for epistemological comprehensiveness 
and universality.  




the responsibility of representation to its “Author-God.” First, Woolf interposes an 
anonymous narrator between herself and the text (and its readers); second, this same 
narrator fragments—and is thus made responsible for—the form of the novel’s narrative. In 
other words, Woolf elides her own authorial presence, thereby evading any personal 
responsibility for the novel, i.e., the structure it takes or the values it promulgates.14 In doing 
so, she effectively deflects or shifts the burden of responsibility to the narrator (and the 
readers) of Jacob’s Room. In Rich and Strange: Gender, History Modernism, Marianne DeKoven 
observes that modernist writers and their narrators—such as those found in the fiction of 
Joseph Conrad and Kate Chopin—stand in “a relation of irresolvable and continuous 
oscillation between identification and distance, approval and disapproval, endorsement and 
repudiation” (25). DeKoven reads this “irresolvable” relational structure as part of a more 
general strategy by modernists seeking to intentionally produce and sustain irreducible 
tensions in their texts.15 Such a strategy is integral to modernism’s repudiation of realism, 
which aims to reduce reality and history to a set of observable, objective facts that can then 
be transparently represented in art and literature. By contrast, DeKoven claims, modernism 
exposes “the impossibility, the ludicrousness, and the danger of attempting to convert the 
facticity of history into harmless (or transcendent) art” (23). The modernist strategy of 
disjunction between a writer and a narrator, in other words, does not deny history or reality 
so much as it refuses “epistemological determinacy” (22). A modernist narrator does not act, 
 
14 In Bad Modernisms, Rebecca Walkowitz addresses “Woolf’s evasion” as socio-political resistance to 
modernity’s enduring legacies and institutions, especially as they relate to individualism, war, sexuality, and 
marriage. 
 
15 DeKoven notes that her reading of modernism “depends on the claim that modernist writing, at the level of 
form, is characterized most saliently by sous-rature (self-cancellation, unresolved contradiction, unsynthesized 
dialectic” (22). She appropriates the notion of sous-rature from Derrida. Similarly to my own project, then, 




therefore, as a conduit for a writer seeking to determine an objective truth about reality. 
Rather, he or she functions as an autonomous agent whose own reality, whose own point of 
view within that reality, shapes and establishes a subjective truth about it. Epistemological 
indeterminacy thus stems from an uncertainty about textual authority—produced by a 
disjunction between the writer and narrator—inasmuch as it does from the subjective point 
of view of an autonomous narrator. The question of responsible representation, therefore, 
becomes quite difficult to address when both the epistemological and ontological “grounds” 
of authority are strategically undermined. 
To intensify the problems of responsibility and representation in Jacob’s Room, Woolf 
has her narrator replicate the strategy of disjunction between herself and Jacob Flanders. 
However, as is always the case with replication—or repetition—there is a difference. Woolf’s 
narrator takes disjunction a step further by positing multiple characters in her narrative 
through whom readers learn about Jacob. This move not only disjoints an already unstable 
narrative structure, it also strains and diffuses authorial reliability. This diffusion of authority 
does not mean, though, that it has been eliminated or suppressed. Rather, it has been 
relegated to other “nodes,” or characters, within the framework (or network) constituting 
the text. In effect, Woolf via the narrator via her characters “horizontalizes” the structures of 
power and authority in Jacob’s Room, breaking from the narrative practices of the past which 
in most instances invest in reliable and omniscient narrators (and who are often synonymous 
with the Author-Gods of their respective novels). The point I am making, then, is that Jacob’s 
Room operates on at least two primary planes: first, in the frame of narrator’s 
consciousness—itself a representation by Woolf the “Author-God” of the novel; and, 




Jacob through the impressions of other characters—themselves fragmented representations 
of the narrator. These planes, or layers, of representation exacerbate the epistemological 
indeterminacy of Jacob’s Room, both formally and thematically, and further frustrate attempts 
to “locate” a moral center in the novel. Indeed, the narrator seems quite cognizant of the 
need or demand for a decidable meaning to her narrative, though she only ever remains at 
the threshold of making her story determinate: “But no—we must choose. Never was there 
a harsher necessity! Or one which entails greater pain, more certain disaster; for wherever I 
seat myself, I die in exile” (53). The threshold at which the narrator remains—the threshold 
she realizes she cannot cross—suggests an “undecidability” at the core of ethical 
responsibility. On the one hand, the narrator “must” choose, that is, she must make 
authorial decisions that will determine the shape and scope of her story about Jacob. On the 
other hand, if she “sits” or finds herself victim to “some powerful and scrupulous tyrant” of 
convention—that is, engages in decision-making—she will “die in exile.” In other words, a 
writer’s responsibility is to represent “life itself”—which, according to Woolf, requires 
liberating the novel from the constraints of convention. As a result, he or she must embrace 
writing as an open, on-going process of affirmation rather than as an act aimed at closure, or 
“death.” 
The spatial metaphors I have used to describe the formal structure of Jacob’s Room—
e.g., diffusion, distribution, planes, frame, center, threshold, surface level—bolster claims 
that distance is one of the constitutive features of the novel’s fragmented narrative structure. 
While I am not particularly invested in spatial theory in this project, I do recognize that 




the twentieth century.16 In the arts, reconceptualizations of space meant a decisive shift in 
perception and experience. No longer regarded by artists as linear and empty, space “was a 
multitude of creations of the seeing eye that varied dramatically with the most minute shifts 
in point of view” (Kern, Culture 142). Objective or “transcendent” points of view that had 
dominated the arts since the early modern period—refined and perfected by literary realism 
in the early nineteenth century—lost their hold over artists seeking to innovate form and 
technique, specifically in painting. The introduction of “a multiplicity of spaces from 
multiple perspectives” (143) onto the artist’s canvas in the modernist period had the 
disrupting effect of shattering the harmony and symmetry characteristic of past 
representations of reality. What is more, the formal conventions used to depict a landscape, a 
person, or an everyday object underwent transformation: the rules and techniques of the past 
no longer seemed to apply to new innovations being sought by artists interested in 
manipulating perspective and distance in their works. As Pericles Lewis explains, 
experiments in the visual arts “emphasized the extent to which the individual viewer 
mentally constructs the viewed object out of the primary data of colors, lights, and darkness. 
While fidelity to visual experience was one aspect of the [artists’] work, another involved a 
movement […] away from the represented world and toward a focus on how the work of art 
itself orders experience, toward form” (51). That Woolf would have been cognizant of these 
dramatic developments in the visual arts is not in dispute—nor do I wish to explore them 
more fully now.17 What continues to interest me here are the effects that Woolf’s own formal 
experimentation with space and distance—appropriated from aesthetics—have on the 
 
16 For an historical genealogy of the developments in spatial theory, see Kern, Culture 131 – 80. 
 




structure of and representation in Jacob’s Room.  
In The Modes of Modern Writing, David Lodge acutely observes that the novel’s 
“experimentalism is all performed on the chain of combination—the chain of contiguous 
events that is Jacob’s life—and consists mainly in cutting away huge sections of this chain 
and viewing the remainder from odd angles and perspectives. As readers we are rushed from 
one brief, fragmentary scene to the next […] without explanation or preparation” (183). By 
and large, critics have advanced similar descriptions of the novel’s form, suggesting that the 
gaps in the narrative are both reflective and constitutive of subjective experience. Edward L. 
Bishop argues that “gaps are essential, and if they are to be truly productive in engaging the 
audience they must be more than merely visual clues like paragraph indents” (“Mind the 
Gap: The Spaces in Jacob’s Room” 305). In Bishop’s view, the visual gaps trigger an awareness 
of the “chasms in everyday life” (314), that is to say, of the breaks and lacuna in 
consciousness. In a project similar to my own, Rachel Hollander, in “Novel Ethics: Alterity 
and Form in Jacob’s Room,” posits that “the text itself is itself haunted by the many stories it 
does not tell, as we are reminded of the limited and partial nature of representation as well as 
consciousness, novels as well as lives, and of the ethical responsibility to acknowledge these 
others even as both a reader and writers ‘keep straight on’” (54). She claims that Jacob’s Room 
“highlights the necessity of reading [the] gaps as the very encounter with otherness that 
defines the ethics of modernism” (41). Approaching the novel from the moral philosophy of 
Levinas, Hollander ultimately wants to reassess the importance of Jacob’s Room to “the 
disorientations” (42) of postwar England, especially as the novel raises questions about the 
“ultimate knowability of the other” (42). It would thus seem that critics have undoubtedly 




gaps, or spatial arrangements, suggest a rendering of consciousness (the narrator’s) cognizant 
not only of its own limitations but also of its (ir)responsibility as it relates to the 
representation of “life itself.” 
Hollander’s analysis relies on a particular reading of Levinas that resonates with past 
criticism of the novel—especially with regard to the ultimate inscrutability of its eponymous 
character. Yet I am inclined to read the novel in terms of an ethical demand demanded of 
the narrator. In my view, the spatial configurations of the novel’s form necessitate a 
discussion about Woolfian subjectivity (and the representation thereof) inasmuch as it does a 
reading of the gaps for/as “encounter[s] with otherness.” As Hollander rightly suggests, “the 
attempt to understand the other in terms of the self only produces more ignorance and 
confusion” (42)—presumably for the reader as well as for the self. What eludes Hollander’s 
article, as if she takes it for granted, is a discussion that Jacob’s Room is a representation of the 
narrator’s consciousness. To read the novel on “this side” of subjectivity, that is, to 
recognize the written narrative as an expression of the narrator’s consciousness means a 
radical rethinking of modernist ethical responsibility. Indeed, it is important to recognize that 
such a reading continues to depend on writing for its analysis. In this way, then, the narrator 
can be understood as a “writing subject,” or what Sarah Gendron describes in another but 
related context, as a “self [who] is capable of producing text, but it is in turn subject to being 
produced by text, even, in the end, reduced to nothing more than text itself” (47).18 The 
narrator’s textual embodiment, as it were, means she is both an effect and an agent of her 
 
18 I have appropriated the phrase “writing subject” from Leon S. Roudiez’s introduction to Revolution in Poetic 





narrative.19 Yet her ambiguous status with regard to the text of her story cannot rightly be 
characterized as occupying a position inside or outside it.20 As I suggested above, the 
narrator is structurally posited in between Woolf the Author-God and the textual object that 
is the novel. Thus, like Lawrence’s Lou Witt, the narrator does not “quite belong.” Yet it 
would be a mistake to read the narrator’s “dislocation” in terms of a pure disarticulation of 
her subjectivity. In other words, as a writing subject, the narrator is in the act of 
simultaneously constituting and disarticulating her “self” at the same time as she is 




Critics have not been remiss in addressing the topic of subjectivity as it relates to 
writing in Woolf’s fiction. For example, as Tony E. Jackson claims, Woolf “recognizes that 
the essential problem for the writer lies not simply in failing to get the right words to 
represent what has been ‘mirrored’ in the mind, but rather in being compelled to use words 
to begin with […]. In other words, Woolf’s conception of the problem of narrative desire 
recognizes the ontological problem of linguistic being” (120). Appropriating Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to inform her discussion, Jackson argues that writing is a strategy employed 
 
19 As Edward L. Bishop has observed, “[t]he narrator flaunt[s] her power, flaunt[s] her status not as a mimetic 
character but as a textual construct so that the book is less about the possibility of knowing another person […] 
than it is about the making of a person in art. Jacob’s Room is self-conscious not just in its construction of Jacob 
but also in its construction of the narrator” (“The Subject in Jacob’s Room” 163). “Flaunting” might be 
overstating it, given the narrative form’s crepuscularity and fragmentation—its undecidability.  
 
20 Wall has made the same observation: Woolf “creates a narrator who is inside and outside the text; who 
possesses omniscience, but whose efforts to understand the world are troubled by her limited perspective; and 
whose shift form narrator- to character-focalizer reveals the arbitrariness of the world which has destroyed 




by a subject to overcome what she rightly understands as a fundamental aporia at the core of 
subjectivity. This aporia, she suggests, is created by the necessary albeit violent division 
between “life” and the instruments of representation used to represent it. To employ these 
“instruments of violence” (120), as Jackson terms them, serves to temporarily resolve the 
effects of this violence that constitutes subjectivity. That is, writing “sutures” the gap 
between a subject and the “life” from which he or she has been violently torn by the 
Symbolic order. Yet, ironically, it is the very same set of “instruments” that “always tears 
apart the metaphoric closure it sews up” (120). Put another way, while writing promises to 
fulfill a writing subject’s desire to achieve a kind of non-metaphorized, fully realized identity, 
it can only do so through metaphoric and metonymic devices. The writing subject, therefore, 
finds him- or herself in perpetual cycle of dissolution and constitution ad infinitum. Likewise, 
in “Waves and Fragments: Linguistic Construction as Subject Formation in Virginia Woolf,” 
Julie Vandivere writes, “Woolf’s investigation of subject construction manifests itself 
primarily in linguistic terms, leading her to use constructs of language to critique traditional 
assumptions about unified selves and patriarchal systems” (221). Interested in the ways 
Woolf seeks to subvert traditional notions of the self through language games, Vandivere 
explores The Waves (1931) and Between the Acts (1941) for their complex grammatical and 
syntactical constructions. Finally, Ruth Porritt asserts that Woolf’s work moves “beyond” 
the dislocated, ontolinguistic subject in poststructural philosophy. She argues, contrary to 
Derrida, that there is no necessary, logical correspondence between the linguistic sign and 
the reality it represents—“between the word ‘I’ and a real ‘self’” (334). Instead, she advances 
a Wittgensteinian account of language in which one “shift[s] one’s focus toward studying the 




language’” (334). In this way, she claims, “[m]eaning is no longer simply the function of a 
linguistic system, nor a structure grounded on a metaphysical foundation, nor a test of logical 
truth conditions, nor an epistemological description of how the mind links up with the 
world” (334). As a result, questions and problems with regard to meaning—“shared 
meaning”—are effectively reoriented toward a pluralist “We,” replete with competing ethical 
and political claims, and away from a hegemonic “I.” In other words, for Porritt, Woolf’s 
fiction exemplifies a dialogical multiplicity of voices—that is, voices from the exterior world 
of the other internalized by a subject—constituting subjectivity. And, in this way, Woolf’s 
conception of subjectivity “surpasses” Derrida’s presumption of a unitary, Cartesian subject 
in need of deconstruction. The Woolfian subject, therefore, in Porritt’s view, enables a 
critique of subjectivity not on the basis of “the unitary presence of self-identity” (335) but 
rather on an internal difference of otherness, on the interplay of other voices. 
The narrator of Jacob’s Room, as a writing subject, might rightly be regarded in anyone 
of the critical registers discussed above. Certainly, she fits the profile of Jackson’s “divided” 
subject inasmuch as she is the interpolated source and reservoir of the narrative’s multiple 
voices. In my view, the narrator’s subjectivity is constituted by her responsibility to affirm 
the life of Jacob Flanders, however difficult or impossible this responsibility proves to be. As 
Christopher Reed explains, “[w]e are left at the end of Jacob’s Room unable to know or 
comprehend its central figure—and it is significant that both terms carry a double sense of 
intellectual understanding and physical possession or inclusion, a dynamic underlined in the 
narrative […]” (28). In response to Reed, I would only add that Jacob’s inscrutability as both 
a lack of “intellectual understanding and physical possession” accounts for the main source 




Jacob’s “evasion” from the narrator’s gaze attests to an aesthetic (writing) that resonates with 
Levinasian responsibility. In his essay “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas argues that all 
expression, that is, representation is animated by “the fundamental movement” (94) toward 
an other who does not belong to the order of Being. He writes: 
[…] expression, before being a celebration of being, is a relationship with 
him to whom I express the expression, and whose presence is already 
required for my cultural gesture of expression to be produced. The other 
who faces me is not included in the totality of being expressed. He arises 
behind every assembling of being as he to whom I express what I express. I 
find myself again facing another. He is neither a cultural signification nor a 
simple given. He is sense primordially, for he gives sense to expression itself, 
for it is only by him that a phenomenon as a meaning is, of itself, introduced 
to being” (95).21  
It has been said that for Levinas “Western thinking is a representational thinking” (96 note 66). 
In other words, representation renders present that which is absent or lacks signification. Put 
another way, representation imposes or confers meaning—on an object, on a situation, on a 
person—when perception fails, as it always and necessarily must. In conferring meaning, 
representation “betrays” an other by a process of integrating an other into the order of the 
Same, which is to say into the world of cognition and understanding. While Levinas is thus 
critical of representation itself, he readily admits it cannot be avoided. In fact, he states that 
 
21 From this perspective, in his study of narrative ethics, Adam Zachary Newton has asserted that 
“[s]ubjectivity arrives, so to speak, in the form of a responsibility toward an Other which no one else can 
undertake; if, from this perspective, selfhood always remains in some way incomplete, it is because ethical 
responsibility continually outstrips one’s capacity to assume it” (12). Echoing Newton, Melba Cuddy-Keane 
states, in the volume Modernism and Theory, that ethics “is predicated on some notion of compulsion, some 





the “I before the other is infinitely responsible” (97), which means that the conscious subject 
cannot escape his or her duty to an other. For, an other “calls” and puts a subject into 
question. Responsibility, as Levinas defines it, “is to be sure neither blind, nor amnesiac; but 
across all the movements of thought in which it extends it is borne by an extreme urgency, or more 
exactly, coincides with it” (98; my emphasis).  
It is as if the narrator of Jacob’s Room seeks, through her narrative, to satisfy an 
“irrecusable” demand of an other without its betrayal to the order of representation. Thus, 
unlike many other modernist narrators, Woolf’s writing subject is responding to a demand 
whose source cannot be textually identified. Joseph Conrad’s Marlow in Lord Jim (1900), for 
instance, attests to the extraordinary events resulting from the unnecessary abandonment of 
the Patna. And Jenny, in Rebecca West’s The Return of the Soldier (1918), recounts the story of 
Chris Baldry’s unexpected arrival from the Western Front: “[d]isregarding the national 
interest and everything except the keen prehensile gesture of our hearts towards him, I 
wanted to snatch my cousin Christopher from the wars and seal him in this green 
pleasantness his wife and I now looked upon” (5). Yet what motivates the narrator of Jacob’s 
Room to relate the life of Jacob Flanders remains a highly speculative enterprise. Nowhere in 
the novel does she explicitly foreground or announce her narrative purpose. And yet, the 
“extreme urgency” of her responsibility coincides with occasion of her narrative. It might be 
that the narrator wants to refrain from the same kind of moralizing that many modernists 
found symptomatic of Victorian and Edwardian literature. Indeed, the closest the reader 
comes to an understanding of the narrator’s motives occurs in Chapter IX when she 
facetiously explains that “[t]he flesh and blood of the future depends entirely upon six young 




turned his page […]” (85). Such hyperbole seems to be an effect of exasperation more than a 
critique of Jacob himself. In the opening pages of the novel, the narrator explains that 
“Jacob is such a handful; so obstinate already” (6). It is this obstinacy—of locating and 
representing Jacob—that disrupts the narrator, that is, “calls” her into question as she is the 
subject of a demand to represent the novel’s eponymous character. 
 
MODERNIST ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
To read Jacob’s Room, then, on “this side” of subjectivity does not mean or imply a 
final surrender to the exigencies of onto-epistemological understanding. What I have labored 
to demonstrate is the “terrible experience”—exemplified by the structural qualities of the 
novel—involved with modernist narrative decision-making. The narrator as an interpolated 
formal device allows Woolf to deflect and diffuse any “ground” upon which one might 
attribute narrative responsibility as it relates to an ultimate moral vision of reality. In other 
words, Woolf’s obfuscation of responsibility is deliberate in that such obfuscation disrupts 
realism’s claim to a pure mimetic representation of reality. In effect, Woolf neutralizes the 
allegorical dimensions of the realist novel and thus undermines authorial omniscience. 
Woolf’s radical experimentation with the form of the novel further exemplifies an 
abandonment of past, realist narrative techniques that strove for coherence and totality. 
Indeed, Jacob’s Room reminds us that all narratives, especially those like biographies and 
history, are “the proper stuff of fiction.” That is to say, narrative is ultimately human, all too 
human, to coin a phrase. In a remarkable set of early passages in Jacob’s Room, the narrator—




narrative’s coherence. Recognizing that no pure articulation of Jacob is possible, that each 
person has a different perspective and social position, she states: 
It seems that men and women are equally at fault. It seems that 
profound, impartial, and absolutely just opinion of our fellow-creatures is 
utterly unknown. Either we are men, or we are women. Either we are cold, 
or we are sentimental. Either we are young, or growing old. In any case life is 
but a procession of shadows, and God knows why it is that we embrace 
them so eagerly, and see them depart with such anguish, being shadows. And 
why, if this an much more than this is true, why are we just surprised in the 
window corner by a sudden vision that the young man in the chair is of all 
things in the world the most real, the most solid, the best known to us—why 
indeed? For the moment after we know nothing about him. 
Such is the manner of our seeing. Such is the conditions of our love. 
(55 – 56) 
“God knows” precisely because God does not “think” categorically the way “men and 
women” do. Division, classification, combination, separation—these are realist acts of 
understanding and narration. For, however much we seek illumination as a pure articulation 
of something or someone, “the moment after we know nothing about him.” Only God, says 
Levinas, is “capable of an unlimited perception, [as] there would be no meaning distinct 
from the reality perceived; understanding would be equivalent to perceiving” (“Meaning and 
Sense” 75). But observe that the narrator does not abdicate her responsibility given the 
finitude and partiality of her human perception. As if an addendum to her thought, she 




that it must necessarily “betray” that who seems to be “the most real, the most solid, the 
best known to us.” She says that “the manner of our seeing” and “the conditions of our 
love” are shaped by the very limitations of perception that also enable our knowledge of an 
other. It might be said, then, that representation is a double-bind that instigates ethical 
decision-making. 
Yet however much we may heed the narrator’s call to decide, to engage in the act of 
making meaning à la representation, we cannot finally do so with certainty. With neither the 
Author-God nor the narrator on which to rely, an irresolvable lacuna opens up between us 
and the novel. For instance, the scene at the Opera House, in which the narrator endeavors 
to describe “two thousand hearts in the semi-darkness” (52), results in exasperation and, 
ultimately, failure. Overwhelmed by an imperative, by a responsibility to account for the 
singularity of each of the attendees of Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde, the narrator stutters—
“and…and…” (53)—before relenting on such a task. Next, in an act of self-reflexivity, the 
narrator comes to fully recognize the impossibility but also the necessity in making decisions. 
She says, 
In short, the observer is choked with observations. Only to prevent 
us from being submerged by chaos, nature and society between them have 
arranged a system of classification which is simplicity itself; stall, boxes, 
amphitheatre, gallery. The moulds are filled nightly. There is no need to 
distinguish details. But the difficulty remains—one has to choose. (53) 
Perhaps initially unbeknownst to the narrator, such a “system of classification” does not 
necessarily reduce difficulty in choosing, it only amplifies the “terrible experience” of such 




formal technique of mise en abyme. From stall to box to amphitheatre to gallery, the observer 
(narrator, reader, operagoer) finds him- or herself contained and delimited by reduplicating 
images and structures that ultimately defer the observer’s ability to locate meaning in ever-
expanding limits. The apparent promise of such “systems,” so to speak, is “simplicity itself,” 
that is, the possibility of transparent decision-making. Yet, as the narrator divulges, the 
capacity to decide—“to distinguish details”—becomes ever more difficult as she employs 
the very “arrangement” both “nature and society” have colluded in producing. Indeed, it 
might be that the very intelligibility of the world is guaranteed by epistemological structures 
(systems) that both produce it and disclose it to consciousness. Interesting, it seems, then, 
that the narrator stops short of the world in her list of “moulds,” as though she is aware that 
the world somehow exceeds the structures upon which “we” rely to make choices. Put 
another way, “difficulty remains” in making choices precisely because choices themselves 
result in certain structural configurations, or ways of knowing, that foreclose other 
epistemological possibilities and, as it were, access to the world itself in its totality. Thus, the 
narrator’s difficulty in faithfully attesting to Jacob’s life and his world becomes increasingly 
agonizing and impossible. The aforementioned stuttering by the narrator is not, therefore, an 
abdication of her responsibility but precisely the moment whereby the “life itself” is divided 
into disparate “moments of being.” In other words, “and…and…” reveals both the ethical 
necessity of and futility in attempting to account for “everything.” No doubt, that the 
narrator “chokes” suspends her narration, renders it inert, as much as it bespeaks the 
exigency of narrative itself: “one has to choose.” Alternatively, then, choking can also be 
thought as a sort of deliberate refusal to choose in spite of the imperative to do so. Put 




that the singular is not appropriated by the narrator’s consciousness and thus transformed 
into one of realism’s universal types. 
The sudden narrative shift from pure description of the audience in the Opera 
House to thoughts on the act of observation itself might be considered a kind of textual gag 
reflex such that the narrator goes through the “terrible experience” of undecidability. The 
narrator repeats her injunction to choose and follows up with a description of the 
consequences of doing so, “But no—we must choose. Never was there a harsher necessity! 
or one which entails greater pain, more certain disaster; for wherever I seat myself, I die in 
exile” (53). The consequences of the narrator’s reflections here must not be overlooked. At 
stake is not only narration itself—as a responsible act of attestation resulting from a 
demand—but also the source of narration, the writing subject. For, embedded in the “harsh 
necessity” of choosing is “life itself,” that is, without decision (“wherever I seat myself”) the 
narrator herself would “die.” However, only a subject constituted by a “system of 
différance,” that is, by writing could experience such a death. For, what keeps the narrator 
“alive” is precisely the dialectical “play” of differences that result from decision-making—in 
this case, in choosing the very words of her narrative. Thus, the narrator imagines the 
possibilities her story could take—“Whittaker in his lodging-house; Lady Charles at the 
Manor” (53)—before resuming with Jacob and Richard Bonamy, the “young man with a 
Wellington nose, who had occupied a seven-and-sixpenny seat” (53), at the opera. Curiously, 
a break of white space separates the narrator’s musings on her narrative’s possibilities and 
then her continuation with the story of Jacob. Whereas I had previously suggested the 
novel’s white space functions to produce textual uncertainty, here it seems to represent both 




radically, the textual break appears to function metonymically as the absence of a subject 
without the “play” of différance, that is, without writing. Much like the opening scene of the 
novel, when Mrs. Flanders momentarily suspends her letter to Barfoot, the narrator’s 
deferral opens up an interval or a gap that means not only the “death” of the narrator but 
also, as result, of “life itself.”  
This space between life and death—between articulation and disarticulation—
propels the writing subject to continually search and represent “life.” She asks, “[e]very face, 
every shop, bedroom window, public-house, and dark square is a picture feverishly turned—
in search of what? It is the same with books. What do we seek through millions of pages? 
Still hopefully turning the pages—oh, here is Jacob’s room” (77). The answer to the 
narrator’s question, though not readily available or obvious to her, seems to be some sense 
of “self”—a “self” in spite of being divided and sundered by the enormity of “life,” by the 
ethical demand demanded of her as a writing subject. Jacob Flanders, for the narrator, is the 
focal point—her “centre” and “magnet” (75)—that, without any real explanation, locates 
and gives direction to her narrative. As Peter Brooks argues, “with the advent of Modernism 
came an era of suspicion toward plot, engendered perhaps by an overelaboration of and 
overdependence on plot in the nineteenth century. If we cannot do without plots, we 
nonetheless feel uneasy about them, and feel obliged to show up their arbitrariness, to 
parody their mechanisms while admitting our dependence on them” (7). The narrator’s 
uneasiness in representing Jacob is not so much a political protest against or parodic 
mocking of the “logic of narrative discourse [as] the organizing dynamic of a specific mode 
of human understanding” (7). It is rather the narrator’s ethical experience of affirming Jacob 




she might be impelled by convention to render a total, comprehensive, and exhaustive 
biography of Jacob, she resists for the sake of justice which she knows cannot be attained.  
At the end of Chapter III, for instance, she explains that whatever cannot be known 
about an other, even as familiar as he or she might be, remains “mostly a matter of guess 
work”: 
But though all this [the date of the Durrants’ party] may very well be 
true—so Jacob thought and spoke—so he crossed his legs—filled his pipe—
sipped his whisky, and once looked at his pocket book, rumpling his hair as 
he did so, there remains over something which can never be conveyed to a 
second person save Jacob himself. Moreover, part of this is not Jacob but 
Richard Bonamy—the room; the market carts; the hour; the very moment of 
history. Then consider the effect of sex—how between man and woman it 
hangs wavy, tremulous, so that here’s a valley, there’s a peak, when in truth, 
perhaps, all’s as flat as my hand. Even the exact words get the wrong accent 
on them. But something is always impelling one to hum vibrating, like the 
hawk moth, at the mouth of the cavern of mystery, endowing Jacob Flanders 
with all sorts of qualities he had not at all—for, though, certainly he sat 
talking to Bonamy, half of what he said was too dull to repeat; much 
unintelligible (about unknown people and Parliament); what remains is 
mostly a matter of guesswork. Yet over him we hang vibrating. (JR 56 – 57) 
The narrator, describing Jacob’s actions, recognizes the necessary limitations of 
representation imposed upon her by nothing other than the fact that she is not Jacob (or 




with her responsibility, her obligation to represent Jacob as a fully-rounded character. In 
other words, realist convention would dictate that she furnish Jacob with “all sorts of 
qualities he had not all.” In short, resistance to such convention would mean, at the very 
least, “preserving uncertainty and ambiguity in order to act in ethical ways” (Cuddy-Keane 
210). At worst, it might lead to the “death” of narrative—that is, to the end of “one of the 
largest categories or systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality” 





“Ach, the horror of responsibility!”: 
Proximity and Ethical Subjectivity in D. H. Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod 
 
“In proximity is heard a command come as though 
from an immemorial past, which was never present, 
began in no freedom.” 
—Levinas, Otherwise than Being 
INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, D. H. Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod (1922) seems to run counter to the 
exploration of otherness and narrative representation in the previous chapter.1 The novel’s 
mixed messages about ethics in the wake of the Great War—particularly its emphasis on 
individuality as a mode of ethical being—appear to undercut modernist efforts at 
decentering the moral humanist subject. And, despite its oft-acknowledged “disconnected 
and aimless structure,” the novel strikes the reader as an example of nineteenth-century 
realism rather than a radical modernist experiment in narrative form (Chalk 63). For not only 
does Lawrence deploy a stable, omniscient narrator “with broad vision, a singular 
authoritative voice, and seemingly unlimited knowledge” to take command of the story  
(Kern, Culture 179). He also eschews first-person narration in favor of objective 
representation; and he employs several mimetic devices to both represent and drive forward 
the events of the novel. However, notwithstanding Lawrence’s use of realist conventions or 
the novel’s ethical undecidability (or, precisely because of their conjunction in the book), 
Aaron’s Rod affords a distinct and productive examination of modernist ethics.2 It does so by 
 
1 D. H. Lawrence, Aaron’s Rod (New York: Penguin, 1995) 3 – 299. I cite the novel by page number 
parenthetically throughout the chapter. 
 
2 To recall, Cuddy-Keane claims that “modernist ethics meets the question of how to live ethically in a 






explicitly investigating the difficulty of self-responsibility in a world shattered by war and 
transformed by socio-political upheaval. In this way, the novel manifests many concerns 
about “a world dominated by technology, standardization, the decay of community, mass 
society, and vulgarization” (Taylor 456). And it jointly expresses uncertainty about the 
human subject’s ability to liberate itself from the confines and routinization of domestic life. 
Additionally, the novel stages a series of disruptive encounters between its eponymous 
protagonist and multiple others who interfere with his desire to recover his authentic self. 
Aaron vigorously endeavors to break free from the immediate social forces comprising his 
identity. Yet he dismayingly comes to realize that such forces have only been reconstituted 
by and through his relationships with Lilly Rawdon, Josephine Ford, the Bricknells, the 
Franks, and the Marchesa. 
Since the “ethical turn” in literary studies over a decade ago, Lawrence’s writing has 
become increasingly significant to humanities scholars and cultural theorists investigating 
difference and otherness. Indeed, Lawrence’s extensive literary, critical, and autobiographical 
works have experienced a revitalization after a long period of tepid reception and marked 
decline in the academy.3 Though conventionally read as attempting to fashion an egoistic 
subjectivity à la Nietzsche and Heidegger, I argue that Lawrence’s writing engages in 
upending the unified subject and, in turn, posits a subject attuned to the alterity of the other. 
Although many of Lawrence’s novels have already been productively paired with and 
interpreted through postmodern ethical theories, critics have largely ignored Aaron’s Rod 
because of its aloof and self-interested protagonist in addition to its weak plot.4 With the 
 
3 Such decline is undoubtedly related to Lawrence’s “strident and ugly” treatment of women (Pinkney 111). 
 




exception of Margret Gunnarsdottir-Campion’s recent article on St. Mawr, however, a 
noticeable paucity of criticism on the issue of responsibility exists within Lawrence studies. 
The discussion in the following pages centers around the experience of responsibility at the 
level of character. Articulated by Aaron not only in terms of a burden but as “horror,” 
responsibility in the novel I argue evokes undecidability—that is, as an ethical mode of 
responding to and relating with others. On the one hand, Aaron seeks to affirm his 
singularity apart from the world’s “debased sociality” of the world (Vine xxiii). On the other 
hand, as Stephen Vine has suggested, “Lawrence’s novel overturns the ties of the world in an 
attempt to make them over again” (xxiii). In the context of the novel, I will show that 
“horror” resonates less with a general fear of the unknown than it does with a profound 
anxiety caused by the call to responsibility. 
• 
My reading of Aaron’s Rod draws upon the work of Emmanuel Levinas, particularly 
his account of proximity. Levinas’s writing on ethics and responsibility has had a profound 
impact on contemporary ethical approaches to modernist fiction. Specifically, his radical 
theory of alterity has caused literary critics to reexamine the representation of subjectivity in 
the novel. For Levinas identifies the human subject as irreversibly and primordially 
responsible for the other—even if it means being accused of and persecuted for the other’s 
actions. Moreover, he goes so far as to claim that the constitution and identity of the subject 
originates in the other’s quiddity, or its givenness. In other words, the subject “exists” only 
as a result of the other’s call to responsibility—a responsibility that precedes and determines 
the subject as such. More so, this call cannot be ignored; nor can the subject escape its duty 




vulnerable, and predisposed to the other in a way that fundamentally disrupts the subject’s 
faith in its unfettered and autonomous self. In Otherwise than Being, for instance, Levinas 
asserts that “[t]he more I return to myself, the more I divest myself, under the traumatic 
effect of persecution, of my freedom as a constituted, willful, imperialist subject, the more I 
discover myself to be responsible; the more just I am, the more guilty I am. I am ‘in myself’ 
through others” (112). As a “hostage” of the other, the subject thus emerges as an ethical 
agent—one who must be prepared to even give up its life for the other. “The other demands 
everything of the ‘I,’” explains Annika Thiem in her analysis of Levinas. She continues: “on 
the level of this dyadic encounter [between the subject and the other], there is no room for 
negotiation, for one’s own plans, for the inconvenience of the other’s call, not even for 
taking interest in one’s own survival” (109). Fundamentally dispossessed of autonomy and 
originarity, the ethical subject becomes overwhelmed by its responsibility for the other to the 
degree that it has no time to reflect on its bounded relationship to the other. Such “extreme 
passivity” does not render the subject inert but rather susceptible to the other’s call (119). 
The subject’s very condition of possibility thus involves in the ineluctable encounter 
with the other. This encounter presupposes approach and contact—what Levinas describes 
as proximity. However, Levinas argues that proximity cannot lead to or result in an 
intelligibility of the other: for the other must remain absolutely and wholly other if the 
subject’s responsiveness can be exacted responsibly. The impossibility of this task, that is, 
the subject’s responsibility of responding without possessing knowledge of the other 
becomes the foundation of Levinasian ethics. In other words, an asymmetrical and non-
reciprocal relationship (proximity) between the subject and the absolute other forms the 




than the abstractness of nature. Nor is it fusion; it is contact with the other. To be in contact 
is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, nor to suppress myself in the other. In 
contact itself the touching and the touched separate, as though the touched moved off, was 
always already other, did not have anything in common with me” (Otherwise 86). The 
disunity, the broken contact, between the subject and the other causes the subject to suffer; 
and it awakens in the subject an understanding that it has arrived too late to respond. As a 
result, in the subject’s realization of its belatedness, “the core of what is identity” dissolves 
and waylays the subject so much so that it becomes obsessed with the other (89). This 
obsession—a “constant pressure of the Other on me and in me” (Haar 99)—traumatizes the 
subject because it “both internally and externally is directly exposed to an evil that [it] can, 
must, or wants to suffer from the Other” (100). 
While the conceptions of alterity and subjectivity in Aaron’s Rod do not appear in 
such radical terms as those formulated by Levinas, the novel does cultivate a similar ethics 
that upends the protagonist’s claims to autonomy and self-mastery. Indeed, Aaron’s self-
interested actions throughout the novel are countered by several unintended (if not 
unavoidable) meetings with unknown others. This chapter demonstrates that Aaron steadily 
undergoes a transformation in consciousness whereby he no longer acts from an illusory 
position of freedom but instead realizes that he must respond to the unequivocal demands 
made by the other.5 By considering Aaron’s Rod alongside Levinas, I thus seek to reverse a 
longstanding critical commonplace that regards the novel as advocating a return to self-
 
5 The “other” in this instance and throughout this chapter signifies both a singular other as well as a multiplicity 
of others. As Michel Haar has shown, “Levinas’s ‘concept’ of Other, in its own way, tries to force into a strange 
kind of sameness several different and apparently contradictory senses of otherness” (95). Thus, the other can 
be “the other human being taken as universal” inasmuch as it can refer to an abstraction such as “the idea of 
the Infinite in me” or “the Face […], also double—both absolutely singular and close; overwhelmingly high 
and far, near and unreachable” (96). In Aaron’s Rod, the other is realized primarily as “the concrete presence of 




mastery. My analysis shows that the ethical conflict subtending the novel stems from Aaron’s 
inner turmoil to decide between reconstituting his self-identity and responding to others. 
These competing demands, present from the beginning of the novel, reflect “[t]he structure 
of the experience of alterity” in that Aaron cannot escape the immediacy of the other (Lingis 
xxv). In other words, the proximity of the other—“[t]his closeness without distance” 
(xxv)—disrupts the Aaron’s self-rule so much so that he finds himself divested of 
authenticity. As a result, the very concept of responsibility itself changes as the novel 
unfolds: it shifts from a self-serving egocentricism to a solicitude for the other. Thus by the 
end of the novel, Aaron’s quest to find himself—that is, his attempt to extricate himself 
from all contact with others and their demands—results in failure in the sense that he comes 
to terms with the idea that community with and love for others must form the basis of a new 
mode of life. 
• 
 Aaron’s Rod has often been read as “a paradigmatic quest narrative” that sketches the 
life of a dissatisfied working-class man in search of a way of life beyond his immediate social, 
political, and historical milieu (Papayanis 102). Abandoning his family and home at the 
story’s beginning on Christmas Eve 1918, Aaron lights out for London from Beldover, a 
fictional mining town in the industrial East Midlands, and eventually travels to different 
locales throughout Italy. The plot focuses on Aaron’s various encounters with others to 
whom he forms no enduring attachment—perhaps with the exception his of acquaintance-
turned-friend Rawdon Lilly. To this end, Aaron breaks off two romantic relationships he has 
with Josephine Ford and the Marchesa, respectively, because they threaten to obstruct his 




dispossessed wanderer in search of renewal and emotional vitality. However, his desire for 
complete and unfettered freedom—what he perceives as necessary for his spiritual 
revitalization—is continually undercut by the many chance meetings he has with other 
characters during his travels. By the conclusion of the novel, despite his unbending 
persistence to achieve the single life, Aaron has learned that if freedom can be realized it 
cannot be sustained in any lasting way. Moreover, he realizes that he cannot escape his duties 
and obligations to others, that is, whether those commitments pertain to his family or others 
in general. In the end, Aaron comes to recognize that he must confront the burden of 
responsibility from which he has so endeavored to abdicate himself. 
The ethical ambiguity at the core of the novel, therefore, does not originate in the 
narrator so much as emanates from Aaron’s ambivalence about his responsibility. Indeed, 
the story of Aaron’s Rod is refracted through a narrative voice that does not waver in or 
reveal anxiety about its objective representation of the events constituting the novel. 
However, the narrator does not go to great lengths to explain Aaron’s motivations for 
leaving his family: Aaron’s disappearance simply happens without build up, background, or 
elucidation. More so, Aaron behaves and makes decisions throughout the novel that, on the 
surface, appear to be irresponsible in the context of traditional morality. His abandonment 
of home and career fly in the face bourgeois ideology. And his accomplishments mean 
nothing to him save a normative, routinized life that has sapped him of his emotional vitality 
and spiritual wholeness. In fact, Lawrence himself sensed that Aaron’s Rod would be 
unpopular because Aaron’s irresponsibility challenges various value systems comprising the 
modern world. As he explains in a letter a friend in 1921, “I am finishing Aaron. And you 




misbehaving and putting ten fingers to his nose at everything. Damn heaven. Damn 
holiness. Damn Nirvana. Damn it all” (Letters 206). This description of Aaron gives perhaps 
too much credit to his roguishness, but it does imply that Aaron’s engagement with 
responsibility involves a break with traditional morality. For it might be suggested that 
Aaron’s “misbehaving” represents at the level of plot a renunciation of certain socio-
historical modes of existence—particularly, marriage, romantic love, and national identity—
disposed to alienating the singular self. In fact, “breaking” is a dominant leitmotif in the 
novel: a Christmas tree ornament from Aaron’s childhood breaks in the novel’s first chapter; 
Aaron breaks off his marriage and then later his aforementioned romantic encounters; and 
his flute, the symbol of his desired singleness, breaks in the book’s penultimate chapter, 
“The Broken Rod.” Additionally, Aaron’s expatriation from England early in the novel can 
be described as a breaking away, and the setting of the novel in the postwar years can be 
thought of as a break from the past.  
These examples of “breaking,” however, evoke only negative connotations. It could 
be argued that “breaking” also carries with it the possibility of renewal achieved in part 
through the attainment of a “new and responsible consciousness” based on sympathy and 
love for the other (151). But to attain a new way of thinking and sympathetic caring requires 
more than simply wishing or even realizing it in some epiphanic, life-altering moment. 
Hence Aaron’s ethical ambiguity: beset by difficult choices that affect both himself and the 
people he meets, Aaron experiences undecidability on multiple occasions. His crisis of being, 
in other words, results from an uncertainty surrounding his singularity in the novel. In other 
words, as Vine has argued, Aaron’s undecidability about whether to pursue the “life single” 




“the circumambient universe,” to borrow a phrase from Lawrence’s “Morality and the 
Novel” (1925), disrupts Aaron’s commitment to a life unaffected by others and their own 
individual exploits (173). Indeed, individualism seems to be under indictment in the novel as 
the root of the modern’s world’s “debased sociality” inasmuch as the cause of the death and 
destruction of war. However, ethical disengagement does not seem to be a viable solution to 
remaking the world. Nor does returning to “a merely egoistic fulfillment of our needs” (Haar 
102). Aaron’s naiveté at the beginning of the novel inheres in his belief that not only can the 
“life single” be achieved but that it also might be the grounds of a new social order. His 
initial escape from home has the inadvertent consequence of thrusting him into a new set of 
relations that trigger in him the sense that “we are directly and primordially affected by the 
Other” (102). To be affected by the other means to be “undone” by the other (Butler 19).  
And this undoing, this dispossession of self, signals the possibility of a “collective 
responsibility” for those who have been marginalized, silenced, even expunged by violence 
(23). To put it plainly: Aaron’s sense of self must be broken, as it were, in order for a new 
ethical mode of life to come into place. 
 
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN AARON’S ROD  
The structure of Aaron’s Rod provides an understanding of the ethical ambiguity at 
work in the novel. For despite its use of many nineteenth-century narrative conventions, 
Aaron’s Rod incorporates multiple genres into its narrative structure. What has thus been the 
source of critical rebuke—the novel’s formal undecidability—can be reexamined in light of 
questions related to the ethics of representation. Indeed, past critics have read Aaron’s Rod as 




meandering plotline. This common critical refrain is echoed by Marguerite Beede-Howe, in 
The Art of the Self in D. H. Lawrence, who asserts that the text is a formless medley that 
“jumble[s] essay, novel, diary and travelogue” (79). Lawrence’s “denial of form” in Aaron’s 
Rod, she infers, plays into the novel’s “general tenor of rejection and withdrawal” (80). 
However, it might argued that the novel’s apparent formlessness suggests yet another 
intentional break—this time with conventional standards of narrative representation. In fact, 
many of  Lawrence’s essays written around the same time as Aaron’s Rod probe the 
possibility of representation to go beyond the adherence to rigid formal techniques. For 
example, in the simply titled “The Novel” (1925), Lawrence contends that “[t]he novel is the 
highest form of human expression so far attained. Why? Because it is so incapable of the 
absolute” (179). This comment hardly seems compatible with “rejection and withdrawal” but 
instead signals a search for a new means of novelistic expression. Indeed, while Lawrence 
reflects an uneasiness with “the absolute,” he certainly does not reject the significance of 
form as necessary medium to a story’s meaning. For a closer inspection of Aaron’s Rod 
reveals its organization according to a series of spatio-geographic paradigms. Comprised of 
twenty-one separate chapters, the novel can be unevenly divided into four sections. The first 
section of the novel (chapters I – IV) takes place in the fictional town Beldover and 
concerns Aaron’s exodus from home. The next seven chapters (V – XI) constitute the 
second and longest section of Aaron’s Rod, primarily taking place in London and concluding 
with Aaron’s final and failed return to his family. The remaining ten chapters are split 
between Aaron’s time in Novara (chapters XII – XV) and then Florence (XVI – XXI). It is 
helpful to read these sections strategies of de-familiarization devised to chart Aaron’s 




Through de-familiarization, or the transformative process of self-dispossession, the subject 
(Aaron) turns away from the comfort of its surroundings in order to answer the call to 
responsibility for the other. Aaron’s trajectory in the novel, from the familiarity of home in 
the first chapter to Florence—where, in the final chapter, he dreams that “he was in a 
country with which he was not acquainted” (286)—maps directly onto his shift from the 
insularity of the self to the exteriority of the other. 
 Additionally, the mode of narration in Aaron’s Rod relies much less on a detached and 
unreliable narrator than does Jacob’s Room. In fact, save for once, Lawrence’s narrator remains 
an impalpable and inconspicuous entity in the novel. However, it is worth pointing out that 
the narrator of Aaron’s Rod does contrast himself with the novel’s protagonist. In a 
significant chapter of the book, “Wie es Ihnen Gefällt” (“As You Like It”), the narrator asserts 
that his rendering of Aaron is “but a translation of the man. He would speak in music. I 
speak with words” (AR 164). This narrative intrusion is not nearly as pronounced as the 
narrator’s overt contemplation of responsible representation in Jacob’s Room. Yet, it does 
bespeak a self-reflexivity that is worth bearing in mind as we turn to the events of Aaron’s 
Rod. For even at the level of narrative representation, it might said that the narrator is 
seeking a method of novelistic expression compatible with an ethics that both recognizes 
and respects the other without making the other intelligible. For instance, when the narrator 
states that “[i]f I, as a word-user, must translate [Aaron’s] deep conscious vibrations into 
finite words, that is my business,” he is implicitly admitting to his own search for responsible 
representation—much like Woolf’s narrator. This is why the narrator insists that “[t]hese 
words are my own affair” (164). He wants to take responsibility for the text, that is, for the 




order to focus the reader’s emphasis on the events of the novel so as to engage questions of 
responsibility at the level of plot. This strategy deflects the reader’s attention away from 
problems related to aesthetics in order to address the painful experience of responsibility 
itself. 
 
THE CALL TO RESPONSIBILITY 
Not only does the structure of Aaron’s Rod exhibit ethical ambiguity, but so too does 
Aaron’s motivations for his quest. His desire for absolute freedom precipitates his flight 
from home into the broader, turbulent world. And yet he soon discovers after deserting his 
family that he cannot fully disentangle himself from relations with others. In this way, 
Aaron’s search for total autonomy results in failure. In other words, his decision to abandon 
his home, family, and nation only resituates him in the company of others. As a result, Aaron 
comes to gradually realize and accept that he cannot escape his responsibility: he recognizes 
that only through human solidarity, understood in terms of proximity to the other, can he 
affirm his self. Aaron’s journey from rural England to London and then to Italy thus 
represents a transformation in ethical consciousness. For he is continuously besieged and 
bombarded by encounters with others who effectively disallow him to be by himself. In fact, 
as the subsequent discussion shows, one of the three times Aaron is depicted as completely 
alone for an extended period ironically proves to be the low point of his quest—when he 
falls ill from a flu epidemic. Only through Lilly’s treatment and care—arguably one of the 
central moments in the novel—does Aaron recover. That is, on the verge of death, Aaron’s 




conversion is depicted as a painful and difficult process—one that involves not only failure 
but also an acceptance that the unfettered, free self exists only as an illusion or dream. 
Aaron’s transformation begins in the space of the normative home. The novel opens 
with a basic description of Aaron’s life and household. He has an established job in the 
mining industry, a committed wife and two loving daughters, and a house he himself had 
built in 1906. On the surface, Aaron’s life appears conventional if not successful for a 
working-class man. Yet the “unspeakably familiar” dynamic of his home life fuels his near 
indifference to everything around him (11), including his family and the “scrupulously clean 
and perfect” house (7). Added to his general disinterest is an acute weariness with his 
marriage, which has all but collapsed into antagonism and bickering. His wife, for instance, 
scolds Aaron for returning home late from work on Christmas Eve and for giving more time 
and attention to “a lot of ignorant colliers” than to his family (8). She claims that “[i]f you 
care for your wife and children half of what you care about your Union, you’d be a lot better 
pleased in the end” (8). Here and elsewhere throughout the opening chapter of the novel, 
Aaron’s wife prods at his commitment to work, charging him with being too self-involved 
and with playing politics. She states, “‘what I should like to see is a man that has though for 
others, and isn’t all self and politics’” (8).6 Despite Lottie’s well-intentioned criticism of 
Aaron’s behavior the general tenor of the normative household has become intolerable for 
Aaron.7 It has turned into a suffocating space of domestic obligation and traditional 
 
6 Lottie’s rebuke, which Aaron disregards with “a blank look” (8), serves to inscribe him in a hackneyed 
situation—one which characterizes women as tyrannically critical of men for their shortcomings as well as their 
self-interestedness. But her criticism also ironically becomes the argument of the novel: that care for the other 
(ethics) must supersede the interests of the self (ontology). 
 
7 A few chapters later, Lottie sheds greater light about her marriage with Aaron: “‘I’m sure it was death to live 
with him, he seemed to kill everything off inside you. He was a man you couldn’t quarrel with, and get it over. 




responsibility. As a result, he feels both alienated and trapped by his roles as husband and 
father.  
The felt sense of change and liberation in the immediate postwar period also 
contributes to Aaron’s dual experience of alienation and entrapment. The novel opens to the 
following information: “the War was over, and there was a sense of relief that was almost a 
new menace. A man felt the violence of the nightmare released now into the general air” (5). 
The “new menace” facing postwar Britain in the novel involves resuming life in the wake of 
widespread death and mass destruction. However, returning to a state of normalcy—“the 
changeless pleasantness of it all”—seems inconceivable to Aaron (12). This problem is 
clearly illustrated when Aaron’s daughters discover and accidentally break a Christmas tree 
ornament, the titular “blue ball” of the first chapter, from Aaron’s boyhood. Examining a 
broken piece, Aaron realizes that this formerly indestructible “little globe of hardened glass” 
is in fact something quite susceptible to change and demise (10). The narrator states, “[i]t 
was fine and thin and hard, lined with pure silver, brilliant. He looked at it closely. So—this 
was what it was. And this was the end of it. He felt the curious soft explosion of its breaking 
still in his ears. He threw the pieces in the fire” (11). Aaron’s indifference to the broken 
ornament, a symbol of the past, registers his inability to cope with the unthinkable 
possibilities and problems already confronting Britain nearly a month after the war’s end. On 
the one hand, the end of the war would mean the reintegration of men from the front and 
thus renewed contact with whose who had survived. On the other hand, it would cause great 
disruption because the past, like the ornament, had been shattered and could no longer be 
 
is. Killing! You don’t know what he was’” (43). Given her perspective, it seems their unsettled marriage had 





reclaimed. Indeed, “[t]he war was over, nothing was changed. Yet everything was changed” 
(11). Combined, the lack of historical continuity and the uncertainty of the future produce in 
Aaron an anxiety that not only add to his decision to desert his home. They also occasion his 
attempt to cut off all ties with others. 
It may seem counterintuitive to claim, however, that Aaron’s desertion and search 
for solitude are acts of responsibility. Except two times early and briefly in the novel, Aaron 
never returns home, and his refusal to do so—or even to provide a satisfactory explanation 
of why he abandons his family—poses challenges to an understanding of his motivations.8 I 
contend that though deplorable, such a decision to escape from home is necessary to 
realizing what the narrator later describes as Aaron’s “new responsibility”—a responsibility 
to which he is called by the other (151). For if the home initially is a space of convention and 
routine, it seems to undergo a conceptual transformation from a hermetically sealed space to 
a site opened up to the exterior world. The narrator renders this change as a warping, or 
break, in the home’s foundation: “[t]he doors were shut close, but there was a draught, 
because of the settling of the mines under the house made the doors not fit” (7). What 
presumably should be a delimited space closed off to the exterior world cannot fully 
 
8 The same criticism might be leveled at the narrator of Aaron’s Rod. For unlike his nineteenth-century 
predecessors, he does not offer much in the way of helping the reader’s understanding of Aaron’s decisions. 
Lawrence’s narrator simply presents Aaron as a stubborn and selfish figure. What is more, the narrator does 
not undergo moments of crisis similar to Woolf’s narrator when depicting Aaron. Later in the novel, other 
characters who Aaron encounters interrogate him about his rejection of home, though they never quite receive 
sufficient answers to their questions—that is, answers that make sense in the context of traditional morality. It 
might thus be worth considering why neither Lawrence nor his narrator embraces his responsibility when 
representing the events of the novel. This displacement of responsibility seems to be a particular problem for 
modernists in general who, like the writers under consideration in this dissertation, sought new modes of 
representation while also wrestling with ethical questions about identity and the other. In other words, their 
ambivalence about responsible representation—about how to represent the self while also giving voice to 
otherness—produced myriad formal strategies that have often been described by critics as ambiguous and 
vague. To what end vagueness contributes to or can be read as part of the ethical project of the modernism, 
even in a text like Aaron’s Rod that shares many affinities with nineteenth-century novels, demonstrates the 




extricate itself—just like Aaron cannot totally withdraw or turn away from his responsibility 
to others. The narrator reinforces this point when he registers Aaron’s apprehension of 
diverse noises outside the home. The narrator states, “[a]s [Aaron] sat he was physically 
aware of the sounds of the night: the bubbling of water in the boiler, the faint sound of the 
gas, the sudden crying of the baby in the next room, then noises outside, distant boys 
shouting, distant rags of carols, fragments of voice of men. The whole country was roused 
and excited” (12). This description, pivoting on “then,” leads Aaron’s consciousness from 
the familiarity of the home to the unknown exteriority of the teeming, exciting, dangerous 
world beyond. Twice repeated is “distant,” suggesting in its repetition Aaron’s mind pausing 
to consider a strange and foreign, perhaps even unknowable, community—the fragments of 
which register both its remote distance and its proximity. 
To this end, the proximity of the other both inaugurates Aaron’s calling to 
responsibility as well as causes his inner conflict and anxiety. The “noisiness” of the opening 
scene inside the home—the voices of his daughters, the shattering of the boyhood 
ornament, the scolding by Lottie—is amplified by similar disruptive sounds (the carolers’ 
singing) from the outside. Together, these voices seem to Aaron inescapable. And they 
disrupt the potential of a unitary self that the privacy, security, and tranquility of the home 
ought to guarantee. In this way, it might be said that without any real knowledge or 
experience of the world outside his mining community, Aaron is being provoked or called by 
someone or something to responsibility. Here, the ethical language of Levinas helps to better 
clarify this provocation. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas claims that responsibility is “a 
response to a non-thematizable provocation and thus a non-vocation, a trauma” (12). In 




other beyond or outside any available systems of representation. In fact, as Levinas claims, 
“the first movement of responsibility could not consist in awaiting nor even in welcoming 
the other […], but consists in obeying this order [to respond] before it is formulated” (13). 
What engenders Aaron’s call to responsibility originates from the outside, that is, from a 
“non-thematizable” place or source other than Aaron himself. The multiplicity of voices, 
inside and outside the home, wrest Aaron not only from the “unspeakably familiar” but also 
arouse him from a state of non-thinking that such familiarity and routine cause.  
For instance, as Aaron begins to shave, “[h]e held his soapy brush suspended for a 
minute. They [the carolers outside] called this singing! His mind flitted back to early carol 
music. Then again he heard the vocal violence” (11). In this brief scene, Aaron is temporarily 
provoked and “awakened” through the disruptive singing of the carolers. At the narrative 
level, the narrator uses free indirect speech (“They called this singing!”) to indicate the 
disruption of Aaron’s shaving routine. Of particular note, the passage moves from objective 
third-person narration to the indirect account of Aaron’s thought then to the source of 
disruption (the “vocal violence” outside). Although a minor event in the context of the 
chapter, this incident disrupts of Aaron’s consciousness and achieves something of a mental 
contact with the other. Alone in the home’s scullery, Aaron becomes momentarily conscious 
of that which exists beyond himself. Though such consciousness of the other does not in 
itself constitute responsibility, his momentary acknowledgement does signal a faint 
beckoning to break free from the conditions of domestic familiarity that prevent Aaron from 
consciously answering the call to responsibility. Indeed, as he decamps from home, he 
appears to have no clear-cut itinerary, only surrendering to a remote and perilous world. The 




echoed like a shell with shouts and calls and excited voices. Restlessness and nervous excitement, 
nervous hilarity were in the air. There was a sense of electric surcharge everywhere, 
frictional, a neurasthenic haste for excitement” (15; my emphasis). This description hints not 
only at the possibility of contact with but also at the danger of encountering the other. For 
the first line ambiguously renders the remoteness of the terrain as a structure without 
substance—a hopeful symbol of openness and possibility. In literal terms, then, “shell” 
probably refers to the outer housing of a crustacean that bends and redirects sounds applied 
to it. In this way, the “re-echoed” voices suggest proximity, care, and responsibility: it 
reciprocates the utterance of the speaking subject. However, “shell” also may connote the 
casing of an artillery projectile or bomb—not an unlikely case given the postwar setting of 
the novel. In this scenario, the “shouts can calls and excited voices” resonate with fear and 
intensity of trench warfare. Thus, the narrator registers the “dark hollow countryside” as 
both a mixed site of contact and perilousness, suggesting that responsibility cannot be taken 
without the risk of one’s life.  
If Aaron does experience any real danger in the novel, it occurs once he has left his 
family and escaped the confines of England. Initially, the threat to Aaron’s self takes the 
form of affective and physical paralysis. In the wake of his departure from home, for 
instance, Aaron encounters others who effectively leave him in a state of emotional 
exhaustion. His first meeting takes place at “Royal Oak,” a local pub outside Beldover where 
he intensely engages questions about the common good, the relationship between education 
and money, and Indian self-governance. This early scene in the novel presages Aaron’s 
ethical transformation and newfound responsibility for the other. For Aaron’s dialogue with 




and defend positions on social and political issues that in turn require him to think. In effect, 
Aaron has stumbled into a dynamic, cosmopolitan space that aggravates his quest for 
autonomy, that is, for freedom from having to think, care, or debate about anyone but 
himself. The narrator points to Aaron’s ambivalence about being in the company of these 
strangers as a “terrible obstinacy” (23). On the one hand, the tavern’s proprietress attempts 
to seduce him, to which Aaron initially takes an interest: “[h]e loved so to luxuriate, like a 
cat, in the presence of a violent woman” (22). Though laced with sexual undertones, the 
landlady’s affection toward Aaron can be read symbolically as her attempt to connect with 
him—to establish an intersubjective relationship beyond psycho-sexual terms. The intimacy 
she offers him even through physical contact has the potential to undermine the ontological 
distinctions between self and other. On the other hand, despite his “luxuriating,” Aaron 
revolts against her advances. He not only becomes enraged by her “great fierce warmth of 
her presence,” animated in part by her intoxicated state (22). But he also feels uneasy by the 
fact that he cannot reconcile himself to solidarity with her and the others in the bar. 
Aaron’s subsequent encounter occurs when he happens upon a small circle of well-
off bohemians located at Shottle House, “a pleasant square house, rather old, with 
shrubberies and lawns” located at the other end of the lane from the tavern (26). This scene, 
which occupies the entirety of the novel’s third chapter, extends Aaron’s emotional decline. 
It begins with an extended introduction of Jim Bricknell, Robert Cunningham, his wife Julia 
(sister to Jim), Josephine Ford, and Cyril Scott. The chapter opens with a warning to readers 
not to overlook the significance of these characters to Aaron’s development, such that “[i]t is 
remarkable how many odd or extraordinary people there are in England” (26). In fact, the 




characters within the context of their own separate existence. In other words, unlike the 
diverse yet collectively engaged patrons of Royal Oak, the narrator represents these 
characters in their own individual state of emotional entropy. Huddled together in the 
house’s drawing-room, they self-consciously engage in conversation about how to pass the 
time. Indeed, their all-too human characterization underscores not their extraordinariness 
but rather what the narrator echoes as the “continual complaints of the stodgy dullness of 
the English” (26). In this way, the narrator recasts the unspeakable familiarity of Aaron’s 
home as an entropic space of ennui and self-conscious inaction at Shottle House. At the 
same time, the narrator sets up a simple division between the dynamism of the tavern and 
the degeneracy of the bourgeois home. Like a proverbial fork-in-the-road, the choice for 
Aaron seems clear—either he can return to the routine of the domestic sphere or he can 
seek out new possibilities with unknown others. At this early stage of the novel, however, he 
seems unprepared to make such a monumental decision—he lacks the emotional strength to 
commit either way. Indeed, his decision to abandon his home and England takes a few 
chapters to develop, as Aaron vacillates between his responsibility to his family and his need 
to establish a new existence. 
Aaron’s undecidability, however, contributes greatly to his ethical transformation. 
His absence in the first half of “Shottle House” effectively reverses the perspective from 
which the reader, through the Bricknells’ viewpoint, sees him. For instance, when Aaron 
does reenter the story, the narrator describes him twelve times as “the stranger” (36 – 38). 
The significance of this early designation cannot be overlooked, for it results in his 
“othering,” that is, he himself experiences what it means to be an outsider. Aaron’s escape 




but it also signals his unconscious willingness to be undone by the other. More so, this 
experience has the added effect of disrupting the existing state of affairs wherever Aaron 
goes because he constantly struggles against conventional standards and morals. In other 
words, as a potential ethical subject, he often upends the harmony and tranquility of the 
home: this is true not only of his own home and Shottle House but also later when he 
disembarks for Novara and visits the Franks. It thus seems that despite Aaron’s own 
determination to attain “perfected singleness,” he can neither help being an outsider nor 
avoid coming into contact with others (128). His immersion into the world effectively 
dissolves his claims to selfhood, rendering him uncertain about how to proceed. In other 
words, he struggles to comes to terms with the fact that can neither return home nor 
complete his quest to produce a new, authentic self beyond the jurisdiction of the other.  
Adding to Aaron’s emotional exhaustion, the narrator renders Aaron’s struggle in 
terms of physical displacement and marginalization. When Aaron is first espied by 
Josephine, for example, he is standing “on the edge of the light, smilingly staring at the 
scene, like a boy out of place, but stubbornly keeping his ground” (34). The narrator’s 
depiction of Aaron on “the edge” and “out of place” is then compounded by the fact that, 
after entering Shottle House, “[h]e did not wish to be with these people, and yet, 
mechanically, he stayed” (35). It would seem that Aaron’s immobility in this moment reflects 
a brief attainment of solitude wherein he makes contact with others but remains at bay—that 
is, until the Bricknells invite him into their home for a glass of whiskey. Here the narrator 
reintegrates his protagonist into a domestic space where, like at home, he becomes the object 
of scrutiny and scorn. For the group morally condemns Aaron for deserting his wife and 




“‘You’re wrong’” (37). While Aaron’s refusal to return home elicits such outrage, it also 
signals his break with conventional morality, that is, with prescribed duties associated with 
domestic responsibility. Thus, Aaron’s physical displacement coincides with his metaphorical 
status as an immoral outsider—as an other. This stage of Aaron’s ethical transformation in 
exacerbates the ambiguity of the novel. To what end Aaron’s self can finally be attained 
seems possible yet also appears undermined by the various encounters he has with the likes 
of the Royal Oak patrons and the Bricknells.  
If the reader at times seems uncertain about Aaron’s motivations, so too do they 
evade even Aaron’s understanding. His incapacity to disclose to other characters in the novel 
why he has left his family and career contributes to the novel’s general ambiguity. In other 
words, at the narrative level, Aaron himself does not recognize or acknowledge his calling to 
responsibility. Thus, his inner conflict becomes for him a source of frustration and 
emotional torment, which only fuels his paralysis. This problem plays out when he 
reencounters the group of bohemians in Bloomsbury. Here, Aaron still refuses to provide a 
coherent or satisfactory reason for leaving home. In “The Dark Square Garden” chapter, for 
instance, Josephine once again raises the issue while at dinner with Aaron, who explains that 
he left his family “[f]or no particular reason” and that “I don’t know what I wanted” (66). 
These reasons do not suffice for Josephine and she raises perhaps the central rebuttal in the 
novel to Aaron’s decision: “‘[b]ut we must know: especially when other people will be hurt” 
(66; my italics). Josephine’s youth and naiveté are exposed in the next moment as she 
mishears Aaron’s desire “to loose myself” as wanting to find love (66). As John Worthen 
explains it, “Josephine, because it is her nature, assumes that the answer must be to do with 




in her desire “‘to get married and feel sure of something’”—help her to rationalize Aaron’s 
actions (67). Yet Aaron repeatedly deflects and dodges Josephine’s queries, fueling her desire 
“to pierce this amiable aloofness of his” (Aaron’s Rod 66). Her own insistence that “‘I must 
think and feel’” (67) counteracts Aaron’s more indifferent “‘I don’t want to care, when care 
isn’t in me. And I’m not going to be forced into it’” (66). Not fully understanding his calling 
to responsibility at that point, Aaron can only explain to himself and to others his actions 
through the register of apathy. 
Yet Josephine’s criticism of Aaron takes on a certain irony, and it provides Aaron 
with a momentary glimpse of his ethical calling. For when Aaron later asks her whether she 
really would welcome “‘a bloody revolution,’” she responds: “‘[y]es, indeed I would. I would 
give everything to be in it. I’d give heaven and earth for a great big upheaval—and then 
darkness’” (68). Yet it would seem that Josephine does not quite understand that 
revolution—political, social, and moral—would really mean “‘[p]ulling the house down’” 
(60). In other words, Aaron has revolted against bourgeois life by leaving his family and 
career. He acknowledges, however briefly, that his decisions do have significance beyond the 
immediate act of selfishness. By contrast, Josephine’s idealized notion of “a great big 
upheaval” in which “‘[y]ou’d feel you were doing something’” only seems to reinforce an 
ideology that might be upended in the wake of such an upheaval (60). Moreover, her own 
conviction that revolution necessarily means action also implies an ethical transformation in 
consciousness if not a radical reconfiguration of human relationships. In other words, If 




talk, that is, without moral grounds or theoretical justification.9 In this exchange between 
Aaron and the younger Josephine, the profundity of Aaron’s ongoing transformation comes 
to light. Likened to a revolution, his call to responsibility signals a radically new ethics—an 
ethics that disrupts and precipitates a break from traditional moral ideology. And though he 
and other characters view his actions as primarily irresponsible, Aaron senses that what he 
has done cannot be avoided.  
This possibility of a new ethics poses a threat to other characters’ worldviews and 
moral ideologies as well. Later in the novel, another cross-examination similar to Josephine’s 
associates Aaron’s immorality with unlawful conduct. While a guest of Sir William and Lady 
Franks in Novara, the Major questions Aaron’s behavior, calling it “‘almost criminal 
selfishness’” (145; my emphasis). He point-blankly asks Aaron, “‘upon what grounds did you 
abandon your family?’” as though to elicit a coherent, rational explanation that would 
correspond to an established moral system (145). Subsequently, exhausted by Aaron’s 
resistance, the Major adds, “[m]ere caprice?” to Aaron’s rather pithy response: “[t]here were 
no grounds […]. No, there weren’t. I just left them’” (145). The overt institutional authority 
connoted by both the Major’s title and affiliation, not to mention the company he keeps 
(including a Colonel), suggests that Aaron’s indictment by various characters in the novel has 
now shifted paradigmatically. The naïve, romantic moral conceptions of love invoked by 
Josephine to criticize Aaron now instead bear the weight and language of legal censure that 
 
9 This scene in the novel recalls Nietzsche’s “God is dead” aphorism in which the very “death” of God seems 
lost on the townsfolk in the marketplace who continue to act and behave as if God still exists as a moral 
foundation for human action. Through the figure of the “madman,” the aphorism tacitly expresses the view 
that responsibility lies, has always lied, not with God (as a moral center) but with humanity itself, by itself. The 
point is that Josephine, like most people, espouses desire for change yet rigidly adheres to her principles and 
beliefs once they are called into question or disrupted. And Aaron himself, like the wiser madman who has 
arrived “too early” to disseminate the news of God’s “death” among the townsfolk, represents a force of 





attempts to bring him back within the space and control of the “law,” of the national and 
cultural home that is Britain. In other words, this collective accusation—“‘[m]ay we ask you 
another question, Mr. Sisson?’”—instances the invocation of power (145; my emphasis). 
More so, this division between the Major’s cohort and Aaron once again evokes Aaron’s 
otherness. It demonstrates that Aaron, as an outsider, has the potential to disrupt the 
relationships between even the most established persons and relations of power. At one 
point, the Major even uses “catechism” to describe the scene—absurdly elevating Aaron’s 
mock trial to a question of religio-moral salvation. Aaron, amused, defiantly says he awaits 
the Major’s “‘judgment afterwards’” (145).  
Most notably, the scene turns on whether or not Aaron provides financial support 
for his family in absentia. Here there weight of the censure of Aaron’s desertion (of family, of 
home, of nation) also becomes quite palpable through Lady Franks’s condemnation of 
Aaron’s actions. The matronly woman has the final word on Aaron’s “‘wicked state of 
mind,’” and she leads Aaron to the false conclusion that reconciliation with his family is still 
possible (146). She states: “‘I would like to frighten you indeed, so that you went back 
humbly to your wife and family’” (146). But Aaron remains obstinate though ambiguous 
about why he left: “‘[i]t would have to be a big fright then, I assure you,’” though, prior to 
this, he suggests that “‘I didn’t leave off loving her [Lottie]—not as far as I know’” (146). 
Echoing Josephine in the early episode at Shottle House, Lady Franks asks Aaron, “‘[t]hen 
why are you so wrong, so wrong in your behavior?’” (147). All Aaron can muster in response 
is, “‘I suppose I’ve got to have my bout out: and when it’s out, I can alter’” (147). Neither 
the Major’s nor Lady Franks’s interrogation of Aaron leads them to a transparent, acceptable 




their reaction to Aaron. In fact, Lady Franks goes so far as to insult Aaron outright, revealing 
the tension of this confrontation: “‘It seems to me altogether cold and unmanly and 
inhuman. Thank goodness my experience of a man has been different’” (147). If Aaron 
presents a threat to British society, he does so by striking at the core of their moral 
sensibilities.  
At odds with his compatriots, Aaron finally does reveal that his election to 
responsibility is beyond even his own control or comprehension. He suggests, “‘[i]t 
happened to me: as birth happened to me once—and death will happen. It was a sort of 
death too: or a sort of birth. But as undeniable as either. And without any more grounds” 
(145). The “it” in this remark refers to Aaron’s capriciousness, that is, what others view as 
his unpredictability and rebelliousness. Sir William, fascinated by “[t]he glistening youth of 
Aaron” who “seemed to calmly contradict his own wealth and honours” (144), can only 
perplexedly describe Aaron’s election as a “‘[n]atural event’” (145). In other words, he can 
only render Aaron’s call to responsibility as something which defies understanding but also 
disrupts the natural order of the world. Elevating the seriousness that Aaron poses, the 
Major in a mocking way equates Aaron’s decision to an “‘almost unique event’” (146). This 
description, despite its derisiveness, echoes Derrida’s view of “the event”—a concept worth 
a brief discussion because it helps to illuminate the profundity of Aaron’s call. In Philosophy in 
a Time of Terror, Derrida states, “the event is first of all that which I do not first of all 
comprehend. Better, the event is first of all that I do not comprehend. It consists in that, that 
I do not comprehend: that which I do not comprehend and first of all that I do not 
comprehend, the fact that I do not comprehend: my comprehension” (90). In Derrida’s 




this light, Aaron’s calling to responsibility can be seen to upend his if not everyone else’s 
understanding. Aaron’s ethical transformation, in other words, exceeds categorization and 
knowledge. 
Indeed, Josephine, the Major, Sir William, and Lady Franks—each attempts to 
interpret Aaron’s decision to leave home in a recognizable, determinate, knowable manner, 
even though Aaron insists that the choice to leave was out of his control. It might be that 
Aaron’s decision can be likened to “the event” since both seem to be a kind of breach or 
rupture within the modality of the normative world. “For a decision to be a decision,” 
Derrida explains, “it must be made by the other in myself, which doesn’t exonerate me from 
responsibility. On the contrary, I am passive in a decision, because as soon as I am active, as 
soon as ‘I’ am the master of my decision, I am claiming that I know what to do and that 
everything depends on my knowledge, which, in turn, cancels the decision” (Derrida, 
“Hospitality” 67). That the decision is “made by the other in myself” can only mean that, 
like “the event,” it is “what comes and, in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and to 
suspend comprehension” (Philosophy in a Time of Terror 90). In this sense, then, Aaron not 
only disrupts or contradicts world order, he deconstructs the normative world itself. To put 
it another way, Aaron’s call to responsibility denaturalizes what is not natural. Thus, 
concepts like marriage, family, home, nation, individualism fracture as a result of his decision 
to abscond from traditional morality. Even responsibility itself, that is, responsibility for the 
other seems to be exploded by Aaron in the sense that his response can only be his alone. In 
other words, no one else can take the place of Aaron’s responsibility: he must, in the 




In Writing in the Margins: The Ethics of Expatriation from Lawrence to Ondaatje, Marilyn 
Adler Papayanis reads Aaron’s actions in light of an ethics of expatriation. She claims that 
Aaron’s “artistic and emotional needs exceed the fulfillments of bourgeois domesticity, the 
life of production and reproduction that modernity has embraced as its cultural dominant” 
(103). In this way, her critique echoes Taylor’s view that modernist writers such as Lawrence 
rejected the routinization and standardization of modern life—and it views expatriation 
primarily in terms of an ethics of reclaiming identity. Moreover, she argues that the 
normative home fails to satisfy Aaron’s desire for the “world in its diversity,” that is, the 
world of life absent its stifling moral restrictions and domestic obligations (106). Papayanis 
concludes that “Aaron’s ethical project […] is not indebted to principles of equality and 
universal brotherhood and this puts him at odds with the democratic institutions of home” 
(105). As a result, she suggests, as I have done, that Aaron “is in the thrall of a calling,” but 
one that, means a “solitary quest for spiritual salvation” or “self-artistry”(108). Thus, Aaron’s 
call to responsibility, insofar as Papaynis understands it in the novel, is really “an existential 
project of self-fashioning” (108). 
No doubt Aaron disrupts the “democratic institutions of home,” but it seems less 
the case that Aaron’s Rod necessarily jettisons the “principles of equality and universal 
brotherhood.” Rather, the novel actively toys with them only to transform them into 
something more transcendent than simple abstractions. Further, it has been shown above 
that Aaron’s quest appears less a solitary endeavor than it does an integration into the world. 
Indeed, his journey may be considered as singular in the sense that his responsibility is his 
alone. Moreover, if by “universal brotherhood” one entertains a utopian fantasy in which 




individuals against other individuals, then, no, the novel does not champion such a notion. 
However, if “universal brotherhood” is defined and understood in the context of proximity, 
then Aaron’s Rod affords a view of brotherhood in the form of responsibility. Everywhere 
Aaron travels and everyone he encounters results in this disruption of his self through 
proximity with others. Yet despite the often fraught exchanges and accusatory dialogue with 
others, Aaron forges intersubjective relationships that prevent his total disengagement from 
the world. By contrast, Papayanis’s reading of the novel operates on a different assumption 
that “in Lawrence diversity often runs afoul of the concrete Other, recognition of whom, in 
intersubjective terms, is problematic” (103). For example, Papayanis reads Aaron’s encounter 
at “Royal Oak” as proceeding from an “ominously racial note” (103) that prefigures his 
disconnectedness and thus unwillingness to heed “the demand of the Other” (109).  
It would seem that in Papayanis’s view, then, any authentic ethical encounter can 
only be rooted in “the intersubjective relations between self and Other” (110). By 
intersubjectivity, she seems to assume, in the words of Simon Critchley, “a relation of 
equality, symmetry, and reciprocity” (Infinitely Demanding 59). Yet as Critchley points out, 
“[w]hen I am within the relation, then the other is not my equal and my responsibility 
towards them is infinite” (60). This “non-dialectical model of intersubjectivity” disrupts 
normative conceptions of equality and universal brotherhood, but it does not dispense with 
them altogether (60). In this light, equality might be understood on the basis of “an 
exorbitant demand of infinite responsibility” that burdens all subjects as such (40). In other 
words, all subjects are equal in their “infinite responsibility” to and for the other. Yet 
responsibility is never identical: it occurs in different contexts and from disparate demands. 




need not always adhere to prescribed notions of “intersubjective relations” such as those 
invoked by Papayanis. Thus, at the core of Aaron’s quest for solitude is in fact a calling to 
responsibility, a contradiction that teases out ethical experience as one that “divides and 
sunders the subject”—what Aaron later regards as a horror-inducing experience (40). 
The asymmetrical relationship with the other thus threatens the possibility of a 
unitary self. This problem emerges as early as Aaron’s desertion from home when he appears 
overwhelmed and beset by the exorbitance of his responsibility. For instance, the narrator 
relates Aaron’s initial reaction to a frenzied crowd precisely in terms of ambivalence and 
undecidability: 
When he got into the main street, the only street of shops, it was 
crowded. There seemed to have been some violent but quiet contest, a 
subdued fight, going on all afternoon and evening: people struggling to buy 
things, to get things. Money was spent like water, there was a frenzy of 
money-spending. Though the necessities of life were in abundance, still the 
people struggled in frenzy for cheese, sweets, raisins, pork-stuff, even for 
flowers and holly, all of which were scarce, and for toys and knick-knacks, 
which were sold out. There was a wild grumbling, but a deep satisfaction in 
the fight was witnessed whenever a tram-car stopped, or when it heaved its 
way into sight. Then the struggle to mount on board become desperate and 
savage but stimulating. Souls surcharged with hostility found some outlet for 
their feelings. (15) 
This passage of postwar consumerism is noteworthy for a number of reasons. To begin, it 




The passage simply hangs in a kind of hermeneutic suspension—a particular modernist 
ethical strategy that refrains from imposing meaning on the text. Both the narrator and his 
protagonist withhold their critique of the citizens’ impetuous behavior—“[m]oney was spent 
like water”—and their “struggling to buy things.” In effect, the narrator keeps Aaron at a 
distance from the ugliness and violence of democratic-capitalist culture in order to contrast 
his singularity with the mass identity of the crowd. More importantly, he places him in a 
non-dialectical relationship with the crowd. Indeed, Aaron finds himself in proximity with 
the townspeople but he does not engage them. His ethical mode of being thus appear mixed 
in the sense that he both retains his identity but that identity only exists in relation to others. 
Unwittingly, Aaron glimpses his responsibility to the other—a responsibility that will require 
him to engage even the most violent and disruptive alterity. 
 Perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the violent other in Aaron’s Rod is 
women. In D. H. Lawrence and Modernism, Tony Pinkney has shown that the various romantic 
encounters Aaron has with women—including his wife—suffocate him to the point of near 
death. Pinkney claims that the “fear of women in Lawrence is always at least shot through 
with other, equally fundamental anxieties, and can even at times become a kind of mask or 
code-word for these latter” (111). The anxieties Pinkney has in mind refer to the rise of 
mass-culture and the Great War, though he does concede that “Aaron’s sexual relations [can] 
be seen as a code for the study of an entire new culture—one which can no longer be 
comfortably labeled in the old class terms” (112). In other words, because Aaron’s 
relationships often cut across the class divide—both Josephine and the Marchesa belong to 
the middle- and upper-classes, respectively—the possibility of a “new culture” of women 




collapses, usually due to a breakdown in Aaron’s health and emotional vitality. For instance, 
after having slept with Josephine, Aaron contracts the flu that in turn leads to his lapse in 
consciousness. This breakdown occurs at the beginning of “Low-water Mark,” which 
curiously presents Aaron without name or mention. It seems that his illness, brought on by 
his physical contact with a woman, threatens not only to bring him to the edge of death but 
also to erase his identity. He explains to Lilly that “‘I gave in to her—and afterwards I cried, 
thinking of Lottie and the children. I felt my heart break, you know. And that’s what did it. I 
should have been all right if I hadn’t given in to her—’” (89). This moment, though certainly 
not an encouraging endorsement of women, serves to facilitate Aaron’s ethical 
transformation. For his physical contact with the other not only does him near-irreparable 
harm, but it also reveals to him that ethical relationships must be founded on a new set of 
terms or codes. Thus sex, as familiar structure/code between a man and a woman, violates 
the other—appropriates and transforms the other into a familiar figure. Ironically, Aaron’s 
violation of Josephine, as it were, leads to his own physical and emotional demise.  
 
ESCAPE 
The term “escape” has been used in the discussion above to describe Aaron’s 
desertion or flight from home. As such, escape in the novel has been presented as a radical 
disruption of the normative home inasmuch as a kind of noncritical awareness of Aaron’s 
call to responsibility, at least throughout the first half of the novel. However, it seems that 
his escape often coincides with his encounter with the other. This point is significant 
because, as Levinas explains, “[e]scaping is the quest for the marvelous, which is liable to 




“quest for the marvelous” might be thought in terms of fleeing home in order to answer the 
call to responsibility. On the surface, Aaron’s refusal to justify his actions seems to other 
characters in the novel to be a self-serving abdication of his duty—not only to his family but 
also to account for his wrongdoings. Further, it appears that he refuses to engage in acts of 
self-reflexivity epitomized by modernism’s more well-known characters who might have 
provided a kind of internal confession or apology in the same situation. However, this 
refusal does not mean that Aaron totally refrains from revealing emotional state. For it is the 
narrator himself who often provides access to Aaron’s thoughts and feelings. As noted 
before, the narrator’s depiction of Aaron is “a translation of the man.” Thus, even the act of 
giving readers access to an authorial justification of Aaron’s actions further complicates the 
issue of Aaron’s apparent lack of contrition. The point is that in order “to break up the 
somnolence of our bourgeois existence,” the ethical subject must act in ways that challenge 
and confuse preestablished conceptual and moral lines of understanding. 
The urgency of Aaron’s escape appears all the more necessary when, in “The Pillar 
of Salt,” he returns home in order to retrieve his handbag containing his flute and piccolo. 
The physical enervation and nausea he experiences as he reenters the domestic space, 
described in the passage below, reaches to levels of existential despair and forlornness: 
He sat down on the sofa by the window. The energy had suddenly 
left all limbs. He sat with his head suck, listening. The familiar room the 
familiar voice of his wife and children—he felt weak as if he were dying. He 
felt weak like a drowning man who acquiesces in the waters. His strength was 
gone, and he was sinking back. He would sink back to it all, float henceforth 




Similar experiences occur in the novel when Aaron, having spent “a pleasant month” seaside 
after the music season, returns to London and then to the Beldover again (122). The narrator 
explains that “[q]ualms and emotions concerning his family overcame him” (122), that “[t]he 
place, the home, at once fascinated and revolted him” (122), that “[w]ild emotions attacked 
his heart” (123), that “[h]e was filled with a violent conflict of tenderness, like a sickness” 
(123), that “[c]urious sensations and emotions went through the man’s frame, seeming to 
destroy him” (123). The emotional pain Aaron experiences in breaking from the familiarity 
of his home life is seemingly designed to underscore the asymmetry and seriousness of his 
call to responsibility. Critchley explains, “[e]thical experience is heteronomous, my autonomy 
is called into question by the fact of the other’s demand, by the appeal that comes from their 
face and lays me under an obligation that is not of my choosing” (Infinitely Demanding 56). 
The terms on which Aaron’s responsibility has been radicalized exceed even the 
understanding of those who know him best. For instance, when Aaron temporarily returns 
home, his presence goes undetected while he listens to his wife discuss their marriage with 
Sherardy, an Indian doctor Aaron had encountered at the Royal Oak tavern. This brief scene 
is focalized around Lottie’s despair in being left to attend to all domestic matters of the 
home, including raising their children, by herself—“‘[b]ut to leave me alone […]. To go off 
and leave me with every responsibility, to leave me with all the burden’” (Aaron’s Rod 43). 
Lottie’s comments about her marriage provide readers with deeper insight into Aaron’s 
character: “‘[h]e was a man you couldn’t quarrel with, and get over it. Quiet—quiet in his 
tempers, and selfish through and through. I’ve lived with him twelve years—I know what it 
is. Killing! You don’t know what he was—’” (43). This depiction of Aaron reinforces what 




selfishness, obstinacy, and aloofness. When Aaron realizes that he might be discovered in 
the house, the narrator explains that “[h]e was tempted to wait and meet them—and accept 
it all again” (43). What “it” refers to is not divulged, though it can be surmised that “it” 
probably means domestic responsibility. In the end, Aaron decides to abscond to London, 
and the narrator once again reiterates the emotional conflict that Aaron’s call to 
responsibility causes him: “[i]t seemed a burden just then—a millstone around his neck. He 
hated the scene he left—and he hated the hard, inviolable heart that stuck unchanging in his 
own breast” (44).  
Aaron’s call to responsibility and his flight from home ultimately mean that his desire 
to reclaim his self cannot be accomplished. Aaron’s Rod makes it clear that the transformative 
process through which the subject must go in order to achieve solidarity with the absolute 
other is “infinitely demanding.” This process is represented by Aaron’s quest for an 
authentic self that is simultaneously undermined by a restlessness that cannot be assuaged. In 
other words, Aaron finds himself torn between self-interest and care for the other. Neither 
his insular home in Beldover nor the larger cultural space of postwar London afford him a 
respite from contact with other characters. Aaron’s restlessness in the first half of the novel 
is thus a result of his undecidability about leaving the familial and social circles to which he 
belongs. What remains to be seen is Aaron outside the familiar frames of home and nation 
in order to demonstrate his own understanding of responsibility.  
 
EXILE AND THE “HORROR” OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 This last section examines Aaron’s self-imposed exile in Italy and its consequences 




space situating Aaron beyond the familiarity and comfort of England. In this way, 
Lawrence’s protagonist not only finds himself to truly be an outsider but he also realizes 
what his call to responsibility means. His flight from home, as a deliberate act of self-exile, 
begins as a necessary condition to responding to the demand demanded of him by the other.  
Moreover, his physical dis-placement into the unfamiliarity of an unknown, diverse world 
metaphorically awakens him to the other—that is, to what is other than himself. Thus, the 
consequences of his desire for singleness are such that Aaron ironically attains only a 
temporary state of solitude. Ironically because the narrator continually undermines his 
protagonist’s search for “perfected singleness” (128) despite the novel’s insistence on 
singularity as necessary to Aaron’s “exercise in self-remaking” (Vine xxvi). It might be an 
over-exaggeration to say that the novel wholly condemns the self as the “ground” of ethical 
experience, though, to recall Critchley, “the exorbitant demand of infinite responsibility” 
precedes the subject’s autonomy. On this score, Aaron’s self-imposed exile is much more 
than a consequence of his abdication of traditional morality and domestic duty. It would 
seem, rather, that the exile of the self—or the self in exile—is the basis upon which the 
possibility of a new mode of ethical existence rests. 
In the 1920s Lawrence himself was in search of a “world” beyond the trappings of 
modern culture. In “Education of the People” (1920), for example, he writes: “[w]e have got 
to discover a new mode of human relationship. Which means, incidentally, that we have got 
to get a new conception of man and of ourselves. And we have then to establish a new 




as that related by Lawrence in his essay.10 In fact, as I have shown, Aaron remains largely 
unconscious about the source of his “need” to flee home and country. His self-imposed 
exile, in other words, does not register with other modernist characters such as Stephen 
Dedalus who deliberately “go[es] [to] encounter for the millionth time the reality of 
experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” 
(Joyce 253). Instead, Lawrence’s narrator represents Aaron as an aloof and directionless 
wanderer neither with the predisposition to redeem his country nor with the youthful 
courage to “forge” a new conscience of his race. The dissonance between Lawrence’s 
outward desire “to discover a new mode of human relationship” and his literary 
“enactment” of that desire in Aaron’s Rod is striking. It reveals an ambivalence about the 
possibility of establishing “a new morality” for which the novel calls.  
 It is interesting to note that in spite of the representation of Aaron as a detached and 
aloof wanderer—perhaps attributable to his working class background—he is something of 
a recalcitrant intellectual: “[h]e had a curious quality of an intelligent, almost sophisticated 
mind, which had repudiated education. On purpose he kept the midland accent in his 
speech. He understood perfectly what personification was—and an allegory. But he 
preferred to be illiterate” (65). This way of depicting Aaron’s intelligence, especially his 
“preferred” illiteracy, sets him apart from other characters in Aaron’s Rod who often toe the 
line of conventional morality. In other words, Aaron’s consciousness, that is, his perception 
 
10 Aldous Huxley, in his Introduction to The Letters of D. H. Lawrence (1932), writes: “It was, I think, the sense of 
being cut off that sent Lawrence on his restless wanderings round the earth. His travels were at once a flight 
and a search: a search for some society with which he could establish contact, for a world where the times were 
not personal and conscious knowing had not yet perverted living; a search and at the same time a flight from 
the miseries and evils of the society into which he had been born, and for which, in spite of his artist’s 
detachment, he could not help feeling profoundly responsible” (xxvi). In the end, Huxley characterizes 
Lawrence’s search “as fruitless as his flight was ineffective” because he believed Lawrence “never found a 




and understanding of the world, is susceptible to being attuned to what is otherwise. Perhaps 
this explains why the narrator can only translate the “inaudible music of [Aaron’s] conscious 
soul” (164). For his musical consciousness—“[h]is mind was music” (164)—expresses a 
mode of existence that upends “the metaphysics of the subject,” to borrow a phrase from 
Derrida (“Eating Well” 264). Aaron’s “conscious vibrations” resist the many discursive and 
narrative practices—especially those inherent in literature—that attempt to subjectivize 
subjects as such (Aaron’s Rod 164). Thus, Aaron’s separateness from others in the text, 
exemplified by his intelligence, already marks him as an exile even within English society. 
Yet it is only in the wake of his exile that he comes to recognize his call to responsibility. 
Aaron’s decision to pursue a state of “perfected singleness” not only occasions his 
exile into Italy, but also represents something of an inflection point in Aaron’s Rod. For it 
might be said that Aaron’s undecidability—that is, at least until the moment he determines 
to leave his family and England permanently—has been the source of his anxiety. In this 
way, his quest in the first half of the novel resonates with the “terrible experience” Derrida 
describes as necessary to making a decision and in being responsible (“Hospitality” 66). For 
as Derrida states, “[f]ar from opposing undecidability to decision, I would argue that there 
would be no decision […] in ethics, in politics, no decision, and thus no responsibility, 
without the experience of undecidability” (66). Aaron’s meanderings from “Royal Oak” to 
Shottle House to London and back home serve no other ostensible purpose than to lead 
him to a decision to go into self-exile. Yet the decision itself has far-reaching consequences 
that Aaron himself cannot anticipate: it awakens him to the other in himself.11 This ethical 
 
11 As Derrida explains, “[f]or a decision to be a decision, it must be made by the other in myself, which doesn’t 
exonerate me from responsibility. On the contrary, I am passive in a decision, because as soon I am active [sic], 




awakening has been part of the process through which Aaron’s consciousness becomes 
attuned to otherness. To this end, Chalk has observed that “[a]fter Aaron flees England and 
his family, the mediations through which he has been perceived by the social world fall away, 
and his identity is disarticulated” (61). She further notes, “Lawrence’s protagonist travels 
away from social roles and responsibilities into a foreign netherland of temporary affiliations, 
rather than progressing toward a fixed state of fulfillment” (61). Thus, Aaron’s Rod appears 
consistent with many modernist novels that “aimed to revise the social values of the 
[nineteenth-century] novel” as it attempted “to propel [a protagonist] toward a stable 
position in the social order” (61). Both Aaron’s disarticulated identity and destabilized social 
position are in fact part of the novel’s ethical “project.” Even the opening chapter of Aaron’s 
Rod, as shown above, depicts an unstable environment in which Aaron himself appears not 
to have a fully articulated identity. 
When Aaron goes into self-imposed exile in Italy, the narrator depicts him as a guest 
whose arrival continues his transformation in ethical consciousness. Notably, Aaron arrives 
“on a wet dark evening” in Novara where a “stream of people carried him automatically 
through the barrier [of the train station] […] and volleyed unintelligible questions at him. 
Aaron understood not one word” (131). The motif of darkness in this brief scene redoubles 
the unfamiliarity of a world into which Aaron is being ushered and reinforces his passivity as 
an ethical subject responding to the other’s demand. It is not a coincidence, then, that he 
encounters others who, in his mind, are unintelligible and who “carry” him “through the 
barrier.” For his self-exile means, in a sense, a relinquishing of the self to the unfamiliar. 
That they “volley” questions at him recalls the faint voices he hears calling to him in the first 
 




chapter of the novel. And when Aaron hires a cab to drive him to the Frankses’ estate—
Aaron has been invited there by Lilly to join him and play the flute to earn money—he is 
conducted “under the hood [of the carriage], clattering down the wide darkness of Novara, 
over a bridge apparently, past huge rain-wet statues, and through more rainy half-streets” (131; 
my emphases). The whole scene is rife with uncertainty—“Aaron stood there in the dark 
outside the big gates, and wished himself elsewhere” (132; my emphasis)—until Aaron reaches 
the estate, enters its “circle of light,” and is effectively reintegrated albeit briefly into English 
society (133).   
Aaron’s visit to Italy as an exile thus enables him to acquire a critical distance from 
England that further prepares his new ethical mode of being. The morning after his arrival in 
Novara—and his interrogation by the members of Sir William’s party—Aaron takes to Sir 
William’s gardens where he “noted with gratification a certain big magnificence, a certain 
reckless powerfulness in the still-blossoming, harsh-coloured, autumn leaves” (150). The 
language of wildness and harshness, of expansiveness and violence, in this scene is 
suggestive of a final liberation from the domesticity and familiarity of home. Aaron is literally 
ex-posed in this moment, and he attains a state of solitude that paradoxically results from his 
proximity to the other. This is discerned in the central passage of Aaron’s Rod, when 
Lawrence’s protagonist is awakened to his call to responsibility: 
Aaron sat watching in silence. Only the uneasy birds rustled. He 
watched the city and the winding river, the bridges, and imminent Alps. He 
was on the south side. On the other side of the time barrier. His old sleepy 




time to wake up, and who doesn’t want to wake up, to face the responsibility 
of another sort of day.  
To open his darkest eyes and wake up to a new responsibility. Wake 
up and enter on the responsibility of a new self in himself. Ach, the horror of 
responsibility! He had all his life slept and shelved the burden. And he 
wanted to go on sleeping. It was so hateful to have to get a new grip on his 
bowels, a new hard recklessness into his heart, and new and responsible 
consciousness into his mind and soul. He felt some finger prodding, 
prodding, prodding him awake out of the sleep of pathos and tragedy and 
spasmodic passion, and he wriggled, unwilling, oh most unwilling to 
undertake the new business. (151) 
It is worth remarking that Aaron’s “watching” in this passage harmonizes the city, the river, 
and the “imminent Alps” into focus the moment he finds solitude. In turn, this act initiates 
his awareness of responsibility, which startles him from a deep slumber. The incessant 
prodding of “some finger”—or, the “new self in himself”—disrupts Aaron’s reverie such 
that he subsequently plans to escape to Milan. Finding himself surrounded by a multitude of 
others at the train station, described as “dynamically different” by the narrator, Aaron 
reluctantly returns to the Frankses’. This moment of return crucially marks his willingness to 
accept his responsibility despite his initial rejection to “undertake the new business.” 
However, the degree to which Aaron fully realizes his call to responsibility remains 
unresolved. The conclusion of the novel leaves Aaron in a state of paralysis and 
undecidability as he ponders what it means to “take” responsibility. In other words, Aaron 




engage responsibility is an entirely different matter. In the final chapter of Aaron’s Rod, Lilly 
reminds Aaron that the burden of responsibility lies on him alone: “[b]ut remember, all the 
time, the responsibility is upon your own head, it rests with your own lonely soul, the 
responsibility for your own action” (296). Aaron partially rejects Lilly’s notion of 
responsibility in the sense it falls back on “your own action.” He states, “‘[b]ut you talk […] 
as if we were like trees, alone by ourselves in the world. We aren’t. If we love, it needs 
another person than ourselves. And if we hate, and even if we talk’” (297). Lilly clarifies that 
his conception of responsibility does not have to conform to any one mode—love, hate, 
talk—so much as follow what he calls “the power motive” (297). For Lilly, this motive 
means disruption of “the old leaves, the inception of the new” which resides in the self, “not 
seeking its centre outside, in some God or some beloved, but in acting indomitably from 
within itself” (298). It would seem that while Lilly seems so convinced of this new mode of 
being, Aaron resists it because it falls back on a traditional discourse of subjectivity that 
privileges the self over the other. In fact, Aaron repeatedly tells Lilly that “‘[y]ou’ll never get 
it’” because he knows that self-interested power, like romantic love, cannot provide a path to 
responsibility for the other (298). Rather, responsibility means submission to the other’s call 
and its demands in spite of all other domestic duties.  
Aaron’s Rod, despite its circuitous plotline and its unlikeable protagonist, effectively 
imagines a “new responsibility” well before many of today’s prevailing critical and ethical 
theories. Published over ten years before Levinas’s landmark On Escape (1935), Lawrence’s 
postwar novel tediously works through the experience of responsibility defined largely in 
terms of responding to the call of the other. The novel’s mixed messages about ethical 




action. But it can also be linked to Lawrence’s own ambivalence about the genre of the novel 
as means of ethical representation. In this way, Aaron’s meandering can be said to mirror the 
novel’s hesitation to endorse an aesthetics that subscribes to past conventions and standards 
of narrative representation. That the protagonist uses realist strategies of representation only 
exposes their artificiality, that is, their use as scaffolding or as frameworks for traditional 
storytelling. Thus the nonlinearity of the plot, coupled with the narrator’s detachment from 
his protagonist, undermines past narrative strategies. Added to this narrative subversion is 
the novel’s lack of closure. It ends with Aaron asking Lilly, “‘[a]nd whom shall I submit to?’” 
to which Lilly only responds, “‘[y]our soul will tell you’” (299). If Aaron has become fully 
conscious of his ethical responsibility, it is left to the reader to decide. Like the modernist 
novels under consideration in this project, then, the reader always seems to be implicated in 
the decidability of the text. However, the reader almost always finds herself confounded by 























Refusal and Responsibility in A Passage to India 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A study of responsibility and the modernist novel eventually finds itself confronted 
with the writing of E. M. Forster. His novels have been canonical to wide-ranging 
discussions about class and identity politics, about the erosion of tradition in the modern 
world, and about Britain’s colonial mission and imperial exploits in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Forster’s work is equally central here, for his writing echoes many 
contemporary theories related to the “ethics of alterity.” Specifically, his novels investigate 
the self-other encounter that similarly informs and shapes much of the current critical 
discourse about the intelligibility of the other—particularly in terms of narrative 
representation. Forster’s writing additionally betrays a preoccupation with the possibilities 
and limitations of subjective experience. His fiction explores the bounds of subjectivity and 
the capacity to empathize with who/what exists fundamentally outside the scope of the 
humanist subject, or “the knowing ego” (Critchley, Ethics 6). In this way, his account of 
subjectivity conveys an underlying anxiety and hesitation with regard to the representation of 
otherness. It does so in part by contrasting the “rigid, paternalistic, stratified world” of the 
ruling elite with the “geographically peripheral and socially unstructured spheres” of the 
lower middle-classes and colonized other (Land xiii). More so, Forster’s fiction discloses a 
disquieting sense that representation does violence to the alterity of the other—that is, that 
representation objectifies and reduces the other to the world of the subject, of knowledge, of 
perception. As a result, his work resonates with a particular problem in contemporary ethics, 




representation.1 In broad terms, Forster’s disquietude can be ascertained by reviewing the 
trajectory of his major fiction. It initially maintains a fidelity to the conventions of 
nineteenth-century realism, as in Where Angels Fear to Tread (1905) and The Longest Journey 
(1907), yet gradually gives way to modernist narrative techniques—in Howards End (1910) 
and A Passage to India (1924)—marked by narrative fragmentation and uncertainty. Put 
another way, the arc of Forster’s work gradually shifts from the secure repose of Victorian 
culture, with its realist pretensions to sameness and closure, to a modernist world that values 
transformation, difference, and ambiguity. Forster’s novels not only offer engaging 
responses to a world under tremendous change: they collectively afford a unique 
examination of modernist ethics. 
It is surprising, then, that scant attention has been paid by modernist critics to the 
ethical aspects of Forster’s novels.2 Perhaps such a paucity in contemporary scholarship 
exists because past critics relegated Forster to a status of tertiary importance in modernist 
studies. Their general dismissal of Forster seems to have originated from a concern with his 
refusal to adopt modernist techniques in his writing. In other words, despite the widespread 
experimentation with narrative style by British writers during the early decades of the 
twentieth century, Forster often expressed a certain uneasiness with modernist “fiction-
form.” In a letter to a close friend, for example, he explains his displeasure with “the 
[modernist] convention that one must view the action through the mind of one the 
characters; and say of others ‘perhaps they thought’, or at all events adopt their view-point 
 
1 See Marais. 
 
2 It might argued that postcolonial readings of A Passage to India have already raised and engaged ethical 
questions about alterity, justice, hospitality, and responsibility in the novel. No doubt, postcolonial critics have 
recruited ethical theory to address the injustices and evils of British imperialism and colonialism. However, 
their line of analysis is often infused with broader historical problems of empire whereas I am interested in 




for only a moment” (Selected Letters 26). Critics have taken this and similar statements as 
proof of Forster’s anti-modernism—so much so that the critical debate about Forster’s 
commitment to modernist style pervades even the most recent studies of his work.3 While 
this issue deserves some discussion, especially in light of modernism’s critical resurgence 
today, it has the negative effect of essentializing modernism as a monolithic literary 
movement—and it risks disregarding the impact of the social milieu within which Forster 
worked. His peripheral involvement with the Bloomsbury Group included critical exchanges 
with some of the most prominent modernists of the period, among them Virginia Woolf.4 
No doubt these exchanges between Forster and the members of this small circle of artists 
profoundly affected his work. Thus, to argue Forster’s inclusion in or exclusion from the 
modernist canon seems nothing more than a sideshow to the fact that his writing 
contributed significantly to modernism. 
With few exceptions, contemporary studies that have examined Forster’s work tend 
to subordinate the issue of modernism to social, political, and historical analysis. Most recent 
scholarship, for instance, has turned to questions related to British jurisprudence in the 
context of colonial life depicted in A Passage to India.5 These newer examinations of legal 
practices during the British Raj, however, remain indebted to postcolonial approaches to the 
novel, which have spanned the literary field for over two decades. Critics such as Edward 
Said, Susan Suleri, Benita Parry—and numerous others—have largely and carefully shaped 
 
3 Postcolonial readings of Forster, which I briefly discuss below, also wade into discussions about style and 
form. For instance, see Parry. 
 
4 Forster’s impact was not lost on Woolf. She writes in her diary for 6 November 1919 that “Morgan has the 
artist’s mind; he says the simple things that clever people don’t say; I find him the best of critics for that reason. 
Suddenly out comes the obvious thing that one has overlooked” (A Writer’s Diary 20). 
 





the critical view that regards A Passage to India as an “essentially colonialist, even imperialist 
text” (May 136). Their primary line of analysis has rallied around Said’s claim that political 
reconciliation between the East and West will always and necessarily result in failure. He 
writes, “[w]e are left at the end with a sense of the pathetic distance still separating ‘us’ from 
an Orient destined to bear its foreignness as a mark of its permanent estrangement from the 
West” (Orientalism 244). The conclusion of A Passage to India, Said remarks, harbors “this 
compact definition” (244) of irreconciliation between the Orient—“the source of [Europe’s] 
civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one its deepest and most recurring 
images of the Other” (1)—and the West. In light of Said’s judgment, I would suggest that 
postcolonial readings of A Passage to India, though ostensibly political, make implicit ethical 
claims that undergird and motivate them. For ethics already implies politics—it contemplates 
the possibility of justice as an unconditional “[o]penness to the Other beyond the Same” 
(Kearney 67).6 Therefore, an ethical investigation of A Passage to India would not deny 
politics so much as afford extend our understanding of the novel’s responsiveness to the 
political impasse Said identifies as constitutive of East-West relations.  
The previous two chapters of this project investigated the “terrible experience” of 
undecidability—the hallmark of modernist responsibility—in both Jacob’s Room and Aaron’s 
Rod. Woolf’s novel concerns an unnamed narrator whose ethical responsibility, I argued, is 
involved with her struggle to represent Jacob Flanders, the figure intimated in the novel’s 
title, without betraying his singularity. My analysis of the novel’s porous structure, as both a 
deliberate strategy of representation employed by the narrator as well as a reflection of her 
 
6 As Simon Critchley explains in The Ethics of Deconstruction, “[t]he ethical relation [with the other] does not take 
place in an a-political space outside the public realm; rather, ethics is always already political, the relation to the 




anxiety due to undecidability, occasioned a broader discussion about modernist subjectivity 
and the so-called inward “turn.” Here I posited that the modernist subject’s desire to “turn” 
away from the external world can never be fully realized. For the subject as such is always 
already beset by an ethical duty to respond to the other’s demand. Woolf neither supplies an 
explanation about her narrator’s relationship to Jacob nor does she provide a reason for the 
narrator’s compulsion to represent him. In this way, it might be said that Woolf abandons 
her narrator, that is, leaves her to attend to the duty of representing Jacob without a stable, 
authorial foundation. Finally, I claimed that although Jacob’s Room retains some of the 
trappings of conventional representation, it ultimately “breaks” with realism’s commitment 
to closure. By contrast, Lawrence’s Aaron’s Rod adheres to many of the formal properties of 
the nineteenth-century novel, though it too ends without definitive closure. This absence of 
closure in Lawrence’s postwar novel—that is, its undecidability—results from the 
irresponsibility of the protagonist’s decisions and actions. On the one hand, Aaron Sisson 
behaves recklessly as he tries to escape from the social and moral constraints of domestic life 
in an effort to realize his “authentic” self. He abandons his family, his occupation, and his 
nation only to discover that his endeavors have failed. On the other hand, Aaron’s struggle 
to free himself from social responsibility, I suggested, has its basis in a more primordial, 
ethical responsibility. My approach to Aaron’s Rod drew on Levinas’s concept of proximity, 
and I asserted that the basis of Aaron’s call to responsibility in the novel issues from “a 
corporeal obligation to the [o]ther, an obligation whose form is sensibility” (Critchley, Ethics 
180).  
This concluding chapter shifts to A Passage to India—the novel in which Forster’s 




narrative representation.7 I examine how Forster grapples with undecidability as a crucial 
problem to the shared field of ethics and modernist form. In particular, my analysis of the 
novel’s central episode, the “tedious expedition” to the Marabar Hills (141), yields significant 
observations about modernist responsibility—especially in that the narrator withholds, or 
refuses to disclose, the details and events comprising Miss Adela Quested’s alleged attack 
inside one of the caves. This textual aporia raises broader questions related to Forster’s 
modernist practices—questions, that is, connected to narrative fragmentation and 
abstraction. Namely, the unreliability of Forster’s narrator in the novel functions to 
disengage the reader from the text and thus from the production of meaning. In this way, 
the narrator effectively denies the responsibility of the reader who, according to Forster in 
Aspects of the Novel, “must sit down alone and struggle with the writer” (13). Compounding 
the problem of the reader’s disengagement, the narrator refuses to single out a main 
protagonist in the novel. Instead, he diffuses character across the chief figures of Adela, Dr. 
Aziz, Mrs. Moore, and Cyril Fielding. I claim that this “fragmentation” of character 
exacerbates the novel’s undecidability, for it frustrates the reader’s capacity to identify with a 
particular perspective or storyline. In other words, the reader finds herself in a state of 
disorientation with respect to the novel’s multiple and shifting viewpoints. I argue that the 
interminable disruption of narrative determinacy by Forster’s narrator interferes with the 
reader’s claims to mastery of the text. It causes the reader to confront her “epistemological 
limits” and thus forces her into a state of vulnerability that further predisposes her to the 
“characterological alterity” central to the modernist novel. (Hale, “Aesthetics” 901, 903).  
 
 
7 E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (New York: Penguin, 2005) 3 – 306. I will cite the novel by page numbers 





Before turning to A Passage to India, I want to briefly examine some of Forster’s 
reflections on India in order to consider his response to the socio-political impasse that had 
developed between Britain and the Indian subcontinent after the Great War. Although his 
thoughts on the matter seem less concerned with ethics than one might expect, they 
occasionally betray his desire for a mutual understanding between individuals despite their 
respective national/ideological commitments. Indeed, many of Forster’s letters, book 
reviews, and essays written in the years preceding the publication of A Passage to India testify 
to his increasing frustration with the British Raj, particularly in the way Anglo-Indian officers 
often (mis)treated local inhabitants.8 His comments about the state of affairs in India help to 
illuminate the connections between fragmentation and epistemology explored in the novel. 
More specifically, they demonstrate that for Forster the political muddle in India raised 
crucial questions about ethics, alterity, and responsibility. In a letter to his mother from 
Hyderabad—written in the context of the “ill-omened visit” by the Prince of Wales in 
1921—he observes that “[p]olitics here have unexpectedly turned to the worse” (Selected 
Letters 17). He notes that local schoolboys and scholars have spontaneously boycotted the 
Prince’s arrival and that “the streets for seven miles are absolutely deserted by the 
inhabitants when the Prince passes” (17). His worry that the colonial police have overreacted 
by demanding “a list of the boys who didn’t come” is amplified by the claim that “[t]he 
arrests elsewhere in India have exasperated everybody so much” (17). At the same time, 
Forster explains that if the police had refused to act—in terms of showing force—the results 
might have been much worse than quiet protest throughout the subcontinent. Forster’s 
 
8 Pankaj Mishra explains that “Forster was instinctively against authority of any sort; and he did not take too 




conclusion that “[y]ou can’t solve real complicated and ancient troubles by sending out a 
good-tempered boy” taps into his uncertainty that anything could have be done at this point 
to salvage British-Indian relations (17). Moreover, it suggests his belief that the political 
situation in India had become untenable, particularly on the side of the Indians who he 
claims regard the Prince as “just a piece of luggage that must be carried about carefully” (18).  
This event appears to have significantly affected Forster’s view that a rapprochement 
between the two nations could not be achieved. For Forster, however, irreconciliation 
between the British Raj and India had less to do with colonial policies and practices than 
with a decisive change in social attitudes by both sides. A month after writing the 
aforementioned letter, in two unsigned articles originally published in The Nation and the 
Athenaeum, Forster elaborated upon the “the great blunder of the past [that] is neither 
political nor economic nor educational, but social” (The Prince’s Tale 243). The first article, 
“Reflections in India I: Too Late?,” registers Forster’s sense that the processes of 
modernization in India had resulted in “the present crisis” (243). That is, India’s decreasing 
dependence on British authority could be traced to both its adoption and alteration of 
Western customs—the Indians “had taken what they wanted from the West, and were using 
it instead of being used by it” (244). The resulting breakdown in social relations, explains 
Forster, produced an impasse that neither side could bridge. He writes that “there is little 
hope now of spontaneous intercourse between the two races. The Indian has taken up a new 
attitude” (243). Furthermore, the “social friction” between the Englishman and Indian 
underscored for Forster the inevitable decline of Britain’s foothold in the world (245). As the 
subtitle of the article suggests, he believed the dissolution of the Empire had already begun: 




In Forster’s view, the failure of the British occupants to build and maintain 
friendships with Indians directly contributed to the political muddle at the time. In a telling 
passage, Forster registers the dramatic shift in social relations that might have been 
forestalled if some kind of mutual understanding had been achieved between the two sides. 
He writes: 
Ten or fifteen years ago he [the Indian] would have welcomed attention, not 
only because the Englishman in India had power, but because the etiquette 
and customs of the West, his inevitable destiny, were new to him and he 
needed a sympathetic introducer. He has never been introduced to the West 
in the social sense, as to a possible friend. We have thrown grammars and 
neckties at him, and smiled when he put it on wrongly—that is all. For a time 
he suffered, and it was with shame and resentment that he found himself 
excluded from our clubs. […] Today he has ceased to suffer. He has learnt to 
put on neckties the right way, or his own way, or whatever one is supposed 
to do with a necktie. He has painfully woven, without our assistance, a new 
social fabric, and, as he proceeds with it, he has grown less curious about 
ours. (243 – 44). 
In short: British condescension, combined with mockery, has turned “a possible friend” 
away so that “modern India […] does not care how Englishmen amuse themselves, nor 
whether they are amused” (244). The resultant void in contact and communication, from 
Forster’s perspective, only reinforced and hardened India’s resentment of imperial Britain. 
Indeed, Forster recounts the Prince’s visit in the second article, “Reflections in India II: The 




between England and India […] at the moment it is under revision” (247). However, as a 
liberal optimist, Forster held out hope that “[u]ntil the unimportant Englishmen [that is, 
non-officials] here condescend to hold out their hand to ‘natives’, it is a waste of money to 
display the affabilities of the House of Windsor” (250). In other words, until the British take 
a sincere “stand upon a common humanity instead of the pedestal of race— [only] then 
[can] the foundation of a democratic empire [be] well and truly laid” (250). Whether sincere, 
or profoundly naïve, Forster’s hope for reconciliation would not come to pass.  
The socio-political impasse that thus defined British India in the early 1920s would 
make its way into A Passage to India as the novel’s central problem. However, Forster treats 
this impasse in the novel largely in terms of representation, that is, in terms of a 
representational mode maintaining “discursive indeterminacy,” resisting closure, and 
welcoming otherness (Cuddy-Keane 209). Marked by multiple viewpoints and narrative 
fragmentation, A Passage to India investigates the experience of impassability in its characters 
and its readers. In Derridean terms, Forster renders the novel’s formal and thematic 
ambiguity as “the interminable experience” of the aporia (Aporias 16). For Derrida, aporia 
means “the difficult or impracticable, here the impossible, passage, the refused, denied, or 
prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage” (8). The aporia, in other words, disrupts the 
possibility of subjective certainty by disallowing “passage” to “any presentable determination” 
(17). In this way, the aporia conditions undecidability and thus responsibility—it is, as 
Derrida suggests, “the law of all decisions, of all responsibilities, of all duties within duty, and 
of all the border problems that ever can arise” (78). Additionally, the subject’s maddening 
experience of the aporia always already (and necessarily) involves “the absolute risk that 




(19). Yet, the subject called to responsibility—that is, hailed to respond to the demands of 
the other—has an ethical commitment that cannot be refused, denied, or ignored.9  
Consequently, the impassability/impossibility of decision—that is, of epistemological 
and moral assuredness in decision-making—disrupts even the foundations of the subject’s 
subjecthood. For the aporia, by denying resolution or closure, undermines “every concept or 
phenomenon that traditionally has been stabilized, fixed, subjected, represented and 
normalized by Western metaphysics” (Debrix). The destabilization of the subject—achieved 
by the subject’s inexorable waiting for passage—upends identity in the sense that the subject 
suffers an unendurable anticipation of a future event. Who or what will come to pass, in 
other words, torments the subject, “put[s] into operation the aporia” (Aporias 32). Yet 
Derrida questions if it “is possible to undergo or to experience the aporia, the aporia as 
such?” (33). The possibility of coming up against a limit, a border, a threshold in experience 
engenders, according Derrida, either a renewed search for passage or a transgression that 
would “end” in the subject’s death. Here he emphasizes that the experience of the aporia, if 
possible, “is not necessarily a failure or a simple paralysis, the sterile negativity of the 
impasse. It is neither stopping at it nor overcoming it” (32). In this way, it might be said that 
the subject finds herself caught in a double bind. On the one hand, she must make a 
responsible decision that will in turn occasion action, response, passage. On the other hand, 
she cannot but help defer her decision because she continually comes up against a limit that 
denies its surpassing. In the most radical sense of the term, then, aporia constitutes non-
 
9 Recall Cuddy-Keane’s understanding of ethics as that which “is predicated on some notion of compulsion, 
some concept of obligation, some demand for response in the way we live” (208). I would only add (or clarify) 
that the ethical subject’s response engages the other, that is, acknowledges someone or something exterior to 
the subject. In other words, the subject directs her response to an “outside” that necessarily imposes and 
impinges on the sovereignty and primacy of her “self.” Responding to the other means, in other words, a 




experience—or, perhaps, an experience of non-experience. Without experience, therefore, 
the subject’s onto-epistemological foundations become untenable.  
Derrida and Forster seem to share the view that responsible decision-making 
remains foreclosed to the subject despite the ethical injunction that she must make a decision. 
Put differently, both philosopher and writer regard responsibility as an ethical commitment 
which must “pass” through the aporetic experience of undecidability. In his “most 
modernist” work, A Passage to India, Forster orchestrates this interminable undecidability in 
the novel’s structure, plot, and characters (Childs 202). My analysis below follows this “top 
down” sequence in order to illustrate the radicalism of Forster’s modernist project in the 
novel, particularly as it concerns the role and responsibility of the subject-reader to 
participate in “the act of interpretation that is the basic element of the reading process” (Iser 
280). I additionally want to suggest in the following pages that the multiple indeterminacies 
that inhabit or reside in the structure of A Passage to India point to Forster’s own ethical 
fidelity to the novel form. Like many modernist writers, he too virtuously disrupts “familiar 
narrative patterns” in order to reinvigorate the novel’s power to respond to modern social, 
political, and ethical problems.  
 
A NONPASSAGE TO INDIA 
A Passage to India hardly needs introduction. It has been a mainstay of twentieth-
century fiction since its publication and has attracted considerable critical reaction. Its staying 
power can be attributed to the fact that it deals with a broad range of interrelated problems 
such as friendship and politics, art and reality, hope and disillusionment, understanding and 




novel, Forster remarks that “I tried to indicate the human predicament in a universe which is 
not, so far, comprehensible to our minds” (Forster, Passage 327). Indeed, A Passage to India 
operates on an enormous scale yet compresses every detail and event into “something much 
neater and tidier than diffuse reality” (Burra 310). Forster’s depiction of India at once eludes 
comprehension and categorization, yet the subcontinent itself endures as a material, 
geopolitical space of trade, conquest, mutiny, injustice, and death. Further, both mythic 
structure and everyday triviality unite in the novel, elevating its philosophical concerns above 
the trite and clichéd problems of English bourgeois culture. Finally, Forster’s indictment of 
rationalism and epistemology in the novel—through his refusal to explain what exactly 
happened in the Marabar Hills—strikes at the heart of the mimetic practices of realist 
fiction.  
The story of the novel, insofar as it goes, appears simple enough. It begins with the 
arrival of the young and impressionable Adela Quested along with her chaperon (Mrs. 
Moore) in the fictional city of Chandrapore, British India. The ostensible reason for Adela’s 
visit pertains to her decision to marry Ronny Heaslop—Mrs. Moore’s son and 
Chandrapore’s city magistrate—though she claims really to be “desirous of seeing the real 
India” (21). During their first night’s stay, Mrs. Moore slips away from the exclusively 
English nightclub and visits a local mosque where she meets Aziz, a young Muslim physician 
who had been erroneously called away by the city’s Civil Surgeon. Despite an initial 
misunderstanding wherein Aziz mistakenly accuses Mrs. Moore of not removing her shoes 
before entering the mosque, the two quickly become friends. Aziz shows himself to be 
charming and, above all, hospitable, offering to call Mrs. Moore a carriage for safe return to 




Englishwoman back to the club whereupon her return she expresses regret at not having the 
power to invite the doctor inside. In a telling response that registers the English-Indian 
divide, Aziz modestly explains that “Indians are not allowed into the Chandrapore Club even 
as guests” (20). After Aziz’s departure, the focus quickly turns to the Club, where the 
“[w]indows were barred, lest the servants should see their memsahibs acting” (21). Here, the 
social politics of British society in Chandrapore play out for the first time and in such as way 
that they disabuse the new arrivals of the benevolence of colonial rule. When, for instance, 
Adela presses Ronny to show her “the real India,” she learns that he has adopted many of 
the racial prejudices as the British ruling “caste” (30). And when she suggests that Ronny 
“‘never used to judge people like this at home,’” he retorts, “‘India isn’t home’” (29).  
Another prominent character in the novel is Cyril Fielding, principal of the 
government college in Chandrapore. At the outset of the novel, Forster’s narrator describes 
Fielding as “a hard-bitten, good-tempered, intelligent fellow on the verge of middle age, with 
a belief in education” (56). Known for his success with students—and noted by the narrator 
for his cosmopolitanism—Fielding exemplifies the best of the liberal humanist tradition: 
The world, he believed, is a globe of men who are trying to reach one another 
and can best do so by the help of goodwill plus culture and intelligence—a creed 
ill suited to Chandrapore, but he had come out too late to lose it. He had no 
racial feeling—not because he was superior to his brother civilians, but because 
he had matured in a different atmosphere, where the herd-instinct does not 
flourish. (57) 
Ever the eternal optimist, Fielding stands apart from his fellow countrymen who see him as 




subscribe to the ideology of the British Raj and sees through the ultimate fiction of racial 
superiority as the basis of colonial rule. He consequently albeit unintentionally disrupts social 
propriety by expressing what ought to remain undisclosed about the matter. His flippant 
comment, for instance, that “the so-called whites are really pinko-gray” (57) scandalizes his 
fellow countrymen and awakens him to their deep-seated sense of privilege and power. More 
so, Fielding enjoys “the give-and-take of private conversation” (57) and often eschews his 
social obligations “in a community where the male is expected to be lively and helpful” (57). 
Not only does this eschewal garner him disfavor by the women in the community, but it also 
marks him as a loner and outsider. Fielding’s contrast to Ronny and the rest of the public 
officials could not be more stark—and it will prove significant to my analysis below. For 
Fielding’s failure to bridge the divide between the British and the Indians in the wake of 
Adela’s attack results in the breakdown of his friendship with Aziz. 
The drama of the novel hinges not so much on the social improprieties of British 
India nor on the palpable tensions galvanized by the English-Indian cultural divide. Instead, 
it plays out in the events surrounding the expedition to the Marabar Caves. While attending 
“an ‘unconventional’ party” at Aziz’s modest home (62), Adela and Mrs. Moore are invited 
to explore the caves as Aziz’s guests. Nothing seems to go according to plan and, ultimately, 
the British arrest Aziz on the accusation that he has sexually assaulted Adela. Attempts by 
Fielding to clarify the matter—he rightly does not believe that Aziz would engage in such 
heinous behavior—fail and the case goes to trial. Overwhelmed by these events, in addition 
to being disoriented by the echo of the caves, Mrs. Moore departs from India and dies 
aboard a ship en route to England. Thereafter, Aziz’s trial ends in his dismissal when Adela 




caves. With a mixture of outrage and a sense of justice, the Indians riot while Fielding 
escorts Adela, who “felt emptied, valueless” (220), from the courthouse. In the aftermath of 
the trial, Adela returns to England—the British feel that she “had renounced her own 
people” (218)—and Aziz relocates to the northeast town Mau. Fielding briefly visits England 
but goes back to India where he sees Aziz for the last time. Fielding, it is revealed, has 
married Stella, the daughter of Mrs. Moore, and has taken a new position in Chandrapore. 
The novel ends with Aziz rebuffing Fielding’s desire for friendship and the collective voices 
of India—“the temples, the tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest 
House” (306)—murmuring the novel’s oft-cited concluding lines, “‘[n]o, not yet […] [n]o, 
not there’” (306). 
Notwithstanding this plot summary of the novel, the narrative structure of A Passage 
to India largely plays on the conventional “insistence on mimesis” against modernist 
representational practices that actively disrupt epistemological certainty (Gutkin 43). Indeed, 
the novel’s structure has long been the source of critical attention and scrutiny, particularly 
in terms of its (non)adherence to the conventions of the nineteenth century novel. In Culture 
and Imperialism, for instance, Said states that he “always felt that the most interesting thing 
about A Passage to India is Forster’s using India to represent material that according to the 
canons of the novel form cannot in fact be represented—vastness, incomprehensible creeds, 
secret motions, histories, and social form” (200). However, he also suggests that Forster 
tempers this break with the “canons” of novelistic representation with a return “to a 
traditional sense of social propriety in its last section, where the author deliberately and 




property)” (200).10 Said’s remarks have thus enabled critics such as Benita Parry to posit that 
“[t]he reputation of A Passage to India as conventional in form, language, and attested value 
has inhibited discussion on an emergent modernism that is inseparable from the novel’s 
failure to reach the destination intimated in its title” (“Materiality” 175). For Parry, the novel 
“exists at the limits of realist writing, [and shares] affinities with modernism evident in the 
prominence of its anti-representational registers” (176; my emphasis). And she observes that 
“the perplexity with which the novel reconfigures the distant, alien complex of cultures that 
is its ostensible subject, signals an anxiety about the impasse of representation” (176; my 
emphasis). Whether A Passage to India can (or should) be read as realist or modernist seems 
beside the point in the context of what it does, that is, how it produces “anxiety about the 
impasse of representation.” The novel slides around, as it were, between both realist 
coherence and modernist fragmentation. It promises formal unity and order only to tease the 
reader by withholding closure. In this way, A Passage to India virtuously disrupts modernism 
from within: Forster’s admixture of realist and modernist elements participates in the novel’s 
undecidability.  
The tripartite structure of the novel, for instance, offers the possibility of formal 
unity but simultaneously refuses any causal relationship between its sections.11 “Mosque,” 
“Caves,” and “Temple”—as Forster has labeled the three main divisions of the novel—point 
immediately to the dominant religious faiths in the world (Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism, 
 
10 In an earlier essay, “Colonizing the Represented: Anthropology’s Interlocutors,” Said seems less sure about 
“resolution” in the novel when he remarks that at “the ending of A Passage to India […] Forster notes, and 
confirms the history behind, a political conflict between Dr. Aziz and Fielding—Britain’s subjugation of 
India—and yet can neither recommend decolonization, nor continued colonization” (223). 
 
11 Parry recounts that “the book’s triadic structure has been variously glossed as corresponding to the Indian 
seasonal cycle [I discuss this below], the movements of a musical score, the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-
antithesis-synthesis, the recurrent process of birth, destruction, and re-birth recited in Hindu mythology, and as 




respectively) and their respective spaces of worship. As such, they signify separate though 
not incompatible moral systems that have been at the core of civilization around the world. 
But these faiths also account for much of the strife, conflict, and violence in the modern 
human history. That is to say, religion—with its impulse to spread and unify—has been the 
source of political disagreement and hostility, both domestically and globally. In this way, 
religion represents something of a contradiction. On the one hand, it offers the promise of 
peace (either here or in the afterlife) and goodwill toward others; yet, on the other hand, it 
suggests dogmatism, crusade, and domination. It might be said, then, that Forster’s use of 
religious appellations reverberates with the interrelated political ideologies of imperialism, 
“whereby a nation establishes rule over another country or group of countries through the 
application of military force or conquest,” and colonialism, which “designates the institution 
and administration of an imperial power’s foreign holdings and dependencies” (Begam and 
Moses 3). The idea here is that religion and imperialism share the same utopian dream of 
order, disciplinarity, regularity, predicatability, and homogeneity. However, that Forster 
divides the novel into three distinct sections shows us that indeed divisions exist—despite 
their unity under the title of the book. Thus, even at the structural level, the novel resists 
closure both by not championing a religious creed (all seem to be under indictment) and by 
exploding the typical binary of Western logic of either/or: either Christianity or Islam; either 
Christianity or Hinduism; either Islam or Hinduism.  
To complicate matters, Forster himself later explained that the sections correspond 
to “the three seasons of the Cold Weather, the Hot Weather, and the Rains which divide the 
Indian year” (qtd. in Herz 57). Yet it does not seem too far a stretch to suggest that whether 




the seasonal weather patterns in India, they ultimately disclose conflict and flux—not unity. 
At its root, human history has been propelled by the desire to spread and foist one system of 
beliefs on others, yet none has ever dominated entirely (much like the weather does not 
dominate the year). But maybe Forster’s indictment goes much further than religion or 
politics. Perhaps, given the widespread bloodshed of the Great War, Forster’s real object of 
critique is nationalism. For it seems rather telling that while most of his contemporaries had 
written novels in the 1920s dealing explicitly with the War—with the exception of Joyce—
Forster’s novel should take up matters seemingly unrelated.12 Yet, Forster appears to be 
suggesting that nationalism is at its root the source of war and imperialism—and, in turn, 
misunderstanding and division between people, whether between English and Germans or 
English and Indians. The narrator, for instance, describes Aziz’s connection with Islam 
strictly in terms of nationalist discourse. Immediately before encountering Mrs. Moore in 
Chapter II, the narrator explains that “[a] mosque by winning [Aziz’s] approval let loose his 
imagination. The temple of another creed, Hindu, Christian or Greek, would have bored him 
and failed to awaken his sense of beauty. Here was Islam, his own country, more than a 
Faith, more than a battle-cry, more, much more…Islam, an attitude towards life both 
exquisite and durable, where his body and his thoughts found their home” (16). That Aziz’s 
faith is intimately bound up with “his own country” discloses that, as he tells Ralph Moore at 
the end of the novel, “‘the two nations cannot be friends’” (296).  
These layers of possible associative meanings for the section divisions, however 
much we try to correlate them to a specific thematic problem in the novel, ultimately resist 
determination. Each section begins with the narrator’s description and meditation on the 
 





Indian landscape, which do much to produce the illusion of unity and coherence for the 
novel as a whole. But India, insofar as the narrator describes the subcontinent, seems 
removed or resistant to the Western scientific impulse to map, categorize, classify—
ultimately, to know. Chandrapore, for instance, is presented in the opening paragraphs of the 
novel as “nothing extraordinary” (5), as a place devoid of decoration and life. And later, as 
the excursion to the Marabar Caves begins, the enormity of the Indian landscape is described 
in terms of an empty promise, that is, as something that exceeds cognition and knowledge: 
Unfortunately, India has few important towns. India is the country, fields, fields, 
then hills, jungle, hills and more fields. The branch-line stops, the road is 
practicable for cars to a point, the bullock-carts lumber down the side-tracks, 
paths fray out into the cultivation, and disappear near a splash of red paint. How 
can the mind take hold of such a country? Generations of invaders have tried, 
but they remain in exile. The important towns they build are only retreats, their 
quarrels the malaise of men who cannot find their way home. India knows their 
trouble. She knows of the whole world’s trouble, to its uttermost depth. She calls 
‘Come’ through her hundred mouths, through objects ridiculous and august. But 
to come to what? She has never defined. She is not a promise, only an appeal. 
(127) 
In this passage, the narrator evokes the eternal quality of India: it can be traversed, mapped, 
and understood—but only up to a certain point. The subcontinent’s undefined call to both 
no one in particular and at the same time to everyone suggests a return to an origin that does 
not exist. This contradiction calls to mind Fielding’s claim earlier in the novel that “‘India’s a 




The title of A Passage to India—taken from Walt Whitman’s poem of the same 
name—suggests Forster is seeking some way, some path to understanding India. But the title 
is ironic. No passage seems possible: no impasse can be bridged epistemologically or 
otherwise. For Forster, understanding cannot be gained through knowledge, for knowledge 
only produces a false sense of connection with others and most often leads to division and 
conflict. “My world” is just as valid, just as certain as another’s—and no “passage” can occur 
so long as we continually “attempt to pose, to impose, to propose, to stabilize” that which 
remains other (Derrida qtd. in J. H. Miller 285). At bottom, any “passage,” any encounter 
runs the risk of turning into a situation whereby the other becomes appropriated or 
assimilated into the norms and standards of “the ‘my world’” (285). A true passage to India 
would require—as it does to the narrator of Forster’s early short story, “The Other Side of 
the Hedge”—being stripped of all the “things” (not just one’s material possessions but also 
that which constitutes one’s identity). However, as even “The Other Side of the Hedge” 
intimates, one can never be wholly dispossessed of one’s sense of self. Forster seems to have 
known all along that connections made through encounter result in failure, if not disaster, 
just as it does in the Marabar Caves. A passage to India is always already an “appeal” with no 
“promise” or fulfillment of connection—it is always a “misquest” as Adela’s surname 
suggests.  
It is to this end that that the role of the narrator comes into view. I claim that as 
Forster’s “agent” the narrator functions to perpetuate the novel’s indeterminacies, gaps, 
lacunae, and impasses. Indeed, the narrator himself seems conspicuously absent from the 
novel, raising questions about the reliability of “his” story. In A Passage to India: Nation and 




considerable authority, does not occupy a position of privilege within the text; possibly he 
may be as uncertain of the ‘meaning’ of his narrative as any of his readers” (74). She views 
the narrator as “a shape-shifter” and “a polyvocal character” who “takes a stance of 
omniscience one moment and is quite dark the next” (74). Her extensive analysis of this 
elusive figure, “contrived by the author outside it,” builds on a problem similar to the one 
explored in the second chapter of this project: namely, the responsibility of the narrator. For 
Herz ultimately wonders “if he [the narrator] is responsible for it [the story]?” (74). This 
question raises broader questions about modernist ethics, specifically in relation to 
undecidability. In other words, an examination of the narrator’s ethics in A Passage to India 
cannot finally provide a sound decision about the narrator’s involvement in the novel. To 
assign or “take” blame in this sense would mean establishing responsibility as “a moral-
philosophical category through the context of judgment and justification of particular actions 
for which one is deemed ‘responsible’” (Thiem 4). That is, responsibility would lock the 
narrator’s actions into a binary logic (right/wrong) of which Forster seems to be suspicious 
if not critical. However, the consequences of the narrator’s radical disengagement from his 
responsibility can provide insight to Forster’s own ethical commitments to novelistic 
representation. 
Forster’s strategy of deploying a separate narrative voice to manage the novel also 
evokes the problem of authorial presence and reader responsibility. Unlike Woolf’s narrator 
in Jacob’s Room, however, the narrator of A Passage to India seems neither concerned with nor 
anxious to attend to his responsibilities as storyteller. Indeed, the moments in which he does 
appear serve to build anticipation for some kind transcendent or revelatory experience by the 




wherein the various gaps and blanks will be filled. However, this disclosure never comes: the 
mystical qualities of the Marabar Hills remain mysterious; the entity that strikes the Nawab 
Bahadur’s car as Ronnie and Adela break off their engagement receives no explanation; 
Adela’s alleged “attack” persists as a literal gap in the text. The narrator’s absence thus leaves 
the reader in a suspended state, that is, his withdrawal induces the reader’s necessary 
involvement in the production of the novel’s meaning. To this end, the reader cannot 
maintain a distanced stance toward the novel—she now becomes responsible for it. In light 
of contemporary ethical theory, Lawrence Buell explains such readerly responsibility in terms 
of “literature as the reader’s other”: “a work is an other in the form of a creative act for 
which readers are called to responsibility, to allow themselves to become engaged even to 
the point of being in a sense remade” (12). However, unlike older reader-response 
criticism—which privileges the reader’s engagement with a text as a mode of “appropriation 
and reinvention”—the new ethics posits the reader’s responsibility as a “conscienceful 
listening” (12). In other words, the reader remains in a state of suspension and finds herself 
vulnerable to the alterity of the text, much like “‘the unconcealing that goes on in the ethical 
hermeneutics of being open to […] the truth of another person’” (Gadamer qtd. in Buell 13). 
To decide the meaning or truth of the text, as in the case of another, requires patience and 
passivity: responsibility for the novel implies preserving indecision and uncertainty. 
Therefore, it might be said that the narrator’s protracted absence is responsible in the sense 








The narrator’s (ir)responsibility comes into full view in the central episode of the 
novel, which concerns the expedition to the Marabar Caves where Adela is the alleged victim 
of an unspecified “insult.” It begins with Fielding—who has agreed with Ronny to take “full 
responsibility” (119) for the trip—missing the branch-line train to the hills where the travel 
party will then climb to the caves. Agitated and scandalized, Aziz believes that “‘our 
expedition is a ruin’” (123) only for Mrs. Moore to calm him down by suggesting that “‘[w]e 
shall be all Moslems together now, as you promised” (123). Along the way, while on 
elephant, Mrs. Moore, Adela, and Aziz engage in conversation about the history of the 
Moguls in India. Adela remarks that the Mogul emperor Akbar wanted to use religion “‘to 
embrace the whole of India’” to which Aziz replies, “‘[y]ou keep your religion, I mine. That 
is the best. Nothing embraces the whole of India, nothing, nothing, and that was Akbar’s 
mistake’” (135). Adela’s naiveté about the history of India—let alone the current political 
situation—becomes clear when she expresses her belief in a “universal brotherhood” that 
can overcome all political, racial, and cultural barriers (135). Realizing her error on the 
matter, Adela then shifts the discussion to the “Anglo-Indian difficulty” which involves her 
marriage to Ronny (135, 136). She states that [s]ome women are so—well, ungenerous and 
snobby about Indians, and I should feel too ashamed for words if I turned like them […]” 
(135). Aziz, sensitive to the matter, feels insulted by the truth of Adela’s observation but 
recovers himself as they arrive at the first cave. Here, the party and their retinue enter the 
“small black hole” (136) where Mrs. Moore panics and feels overwhelmed by “a terrifying 





At Mrs. Moore’s behest, Aziz and Adela—with their guide in tow—continue the 
flight up the hills toward the caves. The narrator informs us Aziz “had never liked Miss 
Quested as much as Mrs. Moore, and had little to say to her […]. Nor had Adela much to 
say to him” (141). But their mutual dislike for one another does not prevent them from 
engaging in small talk on the topic of marriage. When Adela asks Aziz if he has a wife, he 
responds affirmatively—despite the fact that his wife has died many years before—but feels 
overcome with resentment when she inquires if he has more than one wife. The narrator 
relates Aziz’s thoughts through indirect speech: “The question shocked the young man very 
much. It challenged a new conviction of his community, and new convictions are more 
sensitive than old. If she had said, ‘Do you worship one or god or several?’ he would not 
have objected. But to ask an educated Indian Moslem how many wives he has—appalling, 
hideous!” (143). In order to collect himself, Aziz quickly enters a cave where he smokes a 
cigarette while pondering what to say when he rejoins Adela outside. When he exits the cave, 
he discovers that Adela has disappeared and admonishes the guide for not keeping watch for 
her: “‘[y]ou should have kept her in sight, it was your duty’” (144). Frantically, Aziz searches 
for Adela, only to discover that “Miss Quested wasn’t lost” (145) but instead has joined her 
friends in a motorcar at the base of the hills. As he starts back toward the camp at the first 
cave, he finds Adela’s binoculars, “at the verge of a cave, halfway down an entrance tunnel,” 
with a broken leather strap (145). Finally, Aziz returns to the camp site where he runs into 
Fielding who, after inquiring after Adela, “felt at once that something had gone queer” (147). 
Aziz nonchalantly explains that “‘Miss Quested was always to do what she wished, it was our 
arrangement’” (149). The scene ends with the Inspector of the Police arresting Aziz, though 




Numerous critics have addressed the events surrounding Adela’s attack at the 
Marabar Caves, attempting to explain what happened in the interval between her 
inappropriate remark to Aziz (at the end of Chapter XV) and her flight from the caves (in 
Chapter XVI). Some have suggested that Adela suffers from sunstroke on her way up to the 
caves and thus imagines the incident. Others like Jo Ann Hoeppner Morgan read the 
incident as retaliation by religious devotees of the cave for Adela’s “rape of the rock,” that is, 
when she “scratched or struck the polished walls to raise an echo” (602). Morgan’s account 
argues that Adela’s perception of the attack as sexual must be understood within the context 
of her immediate preoccupation with marrying Ronny—when Adela realizes that she does 
not love Ronny and considers breaking off her engagement (for a second time)—as she 
follows Aziz to the upper caves. Other critics, by contrast, have not ventured to explain what 
happened to Adela inside the caves. Rather, they have turned their attention to Forster and 
asked why his narrator omitted the event itself in the final version of the novel. David 
Medalie, for example, devotes an entire chapter of E. M. Forster’s Modernism to examining the 
manuscripts of A Passage to India. He shows that while in earlier versions of the novel “Adela 
is quite unambiguously attacked by someone” (175), the manuscript revisions reveal an 
“increasing propensity towards the secretiveness on the part of the narrative voice” (177). 
Yet while the narrator does temporarily withhold information from the reader throughout 
the novel—for instance, Mrs. Moore’s death—he ultimately “cannot divulge [what happened 
to Adela in the Caves] for it does not know” (177). Thus, what appears to be “narrative 
guile” at certain moments in the novel turns out to be sheer ignorance with episode at the 
caves. For, as Medalie explains, not even the narrator can protect us from the gaps and voids 




The inconclusiveness of the “uneventful” event at the Marabar Caves—reified by the 
narrator’s absence—underscores the radical desire to know what happens. The caves 
themselves represent an affront to western epistemology as they negate pure, unmediated 
experience. Presented as an exception to Chandrapore in the first line of the novel, they 
eternally preside over the monotony and debased activity of human life. Their contradictory 
nature renders them irreducible and thus threatening to purveyors of rationalism. The 
narrator describes the caves as “like nothing else in the world, and a glimpse of them makes 
the breath catch” (116). They do not actively call attention to their presence, yet they 
interrupt “the endless expanse” (7) of the Indian landscape. Nor do the caves “bear […] 
relation to anything dreamt or seen” (116), yet the narrator anthropomorphizes them as “a 
group of fist and fingers [that] are thrust up through the soil” (7). “[O]lder than all spirit” 
(116), the caves are represented as holy shrines, yet they expel all those who attempt to settle 
them—even the Buddha, who “shunned a renunciation more complete than his own, and 
has left no legend of struggle or victory in the Marabar” (116). The Buddha’s mistake: to 
domesticate the caves, to make them familiar through appropriation and settlement. That 
“no legend,” or trace, remains of the Buddha’s visit suggests the narrator’s desire remind us 
that order and meaning cannot be imposed, that is, because no evidence remains to 
corroborate it. In other words, no narrative or system of categorization can “seize” the 
experience of these “extraordinary caves” (7). Their inscrutability—but not because of their 
active resistance or inertness—involves universal indifference and certain mockery. 
The interiority of the caves intensifies and reinforces the aporetic experience of those 
who visit. Circular and dark, with “most marvelously polished walls” (116), the inner 




tunnels leading inside. More so, the caves do not vary—their structure and pattern repeat 
infinitely, producing a sense of uncertainty and doubt. The narrator relates that the visitor 
thus “finds it difficult to discuss the caves, or to keep them apart in his mind, for the pattern 
never varies, and no carving, not even a bees’ nest or a bat, distinguishes one from the 
another. Nothing, nothing attaches to them, and their reputation—for they have one—does 
not depend on human speech” (116). Outside the reach of language, that is, beyond human 
intellect, the caves persist autonomously as they evade reification and signification. For 
instance, Aziz’s erroneous description of the caves to Adela earlier in the novel as 
“‘immensely holy’” and “‘ornamented in someway’” (68) is met with Professor Godbole’s 
refutation precisely because they do not even correspond to religious gnosis or aesthetic 
abstraction. Further, their mysteriousness provokes the narrator to muse on the existence of 
“certain chambers that have no entrances” (117), entertaining the notion that “[o]ne of them 
is rumoured within the boulder that swings on the summit of the highest of the hills; a 
bubble-shaped cave that has neither ceiling nor floor, and mirrors its own darkness in every 
direction infinitely” (117). This final image of the Kawa Dol, “empty as an Easter egg” (117), 
engenders “emptiness, the nothing that is so insistently elaborated and ‘confabulated’ 
through the text” (Herz 99). Void of meaning and possibility, the Kawa Dol shuns 
exteriority and denies cooptation.  
Despite their mysteriousness, or rather because of their incomprehensibility, the 
caves excite Adela’s romantic imagination and prompt her ill-fated quest to see “the real 
India.” Yet, as noted above, her experience in the Marabar Hills never comes to light: she 
herself never quite knows what has taken place inside the caves. As Forster himself observes 




happened in the Malabar [sic] Caves, and that it would have a central place in the novel—but 
I didn’t know what it would be” (31). But that “something” never materializes in terms of a 
full disclosure: it remains incomprehensible and undecidable. For Forster, the caves 
“represented an area in which concentration can take place. A cavity. […] They were 
something to focus everything up: they were to engender an event like an egg” (31). To fully 
appreciate what Forster means by “event” in this instance, it might be helpful to turn to 
Derrida who has elaborated on the concept of the event in terms of a disruptive, pure 
singularity that upon its occurrence refuses all comprehension. In “Autoimmunity: Real and 
Symbol Suicides,” he claims that an event “should be so unforeseeable and irruptive that it 
disturbs even the horizon of the concept or essence on the basis of which we believe we 
recognize an event as such” (90). The event “resists experience” (96) because it exceeds the 
horizon of all knowledge, foresight, and possibility. For this reason, Derrida explains, “it 
escapes, remains evasive, open, undecided, indeterminable” (90 – 91). Yet, the double bind 
of the event materializes when, in the event’s wake, those such as the English in A Passage to 
India seek meaningful explanations to what happened at the caves. Determination, 
interpretation, description, comprehension—all these occasion violence and injustice. For no 
explanation can thoroughly or totally apprehend the event itself or the aggregate of minor 
events leading to it.  
Thus, to label Adela’s experience in the caves as an “insult,” an “assault,” an 
“attack,” or even “rape” means to appropriate the unanticipated and unknowable event in 
hindsight in order to supply a valid, meaningful elucidation. This event’s interpretation, 
initially supplied by Mr. McBryde (the District Superintendent of Police) as series of 




British officers save Fielding. (157). When he addresses the Collector regarding the 
“mistake” in the matter, Mr. Turton sternly explains: “‘I have had twenty-five years’ 
experience in this country […] and during those twenty-five years I have never known 
anything but disaster result when English people and Indians attempt to be intimate 
socially’” (153). Though Mr. Turton does consider both parties at fault, the narrator reveals 
that “[h]e was still after facts, though the herd had decided on emotion” (154). More 
tellingly, the narrator states that “[i]t is impossible to regard a tragedy from two points of 
view, and, whereas Turton had decided to avenge the girl, [Fielding] hoped to save the man” 
(154). The inflexible British response—hardened by “[p]ity, wrath, heroism” (155)— both 
exacerbates the impossibility of knowing what happened to Adela and weakens an already 
fragile relationship between the two nations. More so, by the end of the novel, the event at 
the caves culminates in a series of interconnected and unjust consequences. Particularly, it 
precipitates the impossibility of an everlasting friendship between Aziz and Fielding. 
By refusing to disclose full knowledge of the event at the Marabar caves, Forster 
(through his narrative surrogate) engages in an act of responsibility that throws A Passage to 
India into a crisis of representation. In a letter written in 1924 to his friend Dickinson, who 
had inquired about what happened to Adela at the caves, Forster responds: 
In the caves it is either a man, or the supernatural, or an illusion. If I say, it 
becomes whatever the answer a different book. And even if I know! My writing 
mind therefore is a blur—i.e. I will it to remain a blur, and to be uncertain, as I 
am of many facts in daily life. This isn’t philosophy of aesthetics. It’s a particular 
trick I felt justified in trying because my theme was India. It sprang from my 




they contain certain mysteries or muddles, manage to draw rings around them. 
Without the trick I doubt whether I could have got the spiritual reverberation 
going. I call it ‘trick’: but ‘voluntary surrender to infection’ better expresses my 
state. (qtd. in Stallybrass 26). 
Forster’s emphasis on the conjunctions “either” and “or” (twice), redoubled by his willed 
uncertainty, not only serves to undermine the decidability of the novel. The “trick” he 
purports to have justifiably played deconstructs experience itself and untethers the reader 
from what, in “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas calls “the ontological order” (82). For Levinas, 
“[t]he ambivalence of meanings bears witness to a disorientation” that ultimately denies 
philosophy—and equally, art—from “reabsorb[ing] every Other into the Same and 
neutralize[ing] alterity” (90). In other words, to disrupt the order of meaning, as Forster does 
in A Passage to India, means a possibility of openness to difference, to the absolute other. But 
the other must remain unknowable, uncategorizable, beyond sense in order to endure as 
being wholly other. In terms of A Passage to India, this means that the reader can only persist 
at the margins of the novel—for she occupies an ethical subject position wherein 
responsibility means “preserving uncertainty and ambiguity in order to act in ethical ways” 
(Cuddy-Keane 210). 
 One of the fundamental problems to emerge from the novel’s crisis of 
representation—and one that further complicates the reader’s responsibility—concerns the 
“fragmentation” of character. Unlike many modernist novels that feature a central 
protagonist or deploy a central consciousness around which the text is organized, A Passage 
to India deploys multiple subject positions through its characters. In doing so, Forster’s novel 




Forster’s narrative strategy involves fracturing a coherent, unified vision of the novel: this 
begins with the subject position of the narrator. As noted earlier, the unreliability of the 
modernist narrators contributes to the general “dehumanization” of master-narratives. For 
as Peter Sheehan has suggested, “[n]arrative works to the extent that is can replace 
contingency and uncertainty with necessity and inevitability. […] Narrative compels initially 
through the creation of expectation, the production of possibility. It compels through what 
we might think is the opposing experience: the sense that its resolution, its final shape, could 
not be other than it is” (11 – 12). Without the full presence of the narrator to shape and 
unify it, the narrative becomes untenable. In turn, the reader must then look to the novel’s 
characters for coherence, security, and assurance. However, Forster’s splintering of 
character—redoubled by the myriad aporias in the structure and plot of the novel—
suspends narrative closure in that the reader must choose a “passage” through which to 
make a final judgment about the text. The ethical dilemma this problem poses for the reader 
thus has at least two consequences: a) the reader reaches a point of impasse since she cannot 
ultimately adopt all subject positions simultaneously; and b) even if the reader could 
concurrently inhabit the minds of all characters in the same way realist narrators do, the 
characters themselves only have partial knowledge of the events constituting their reality in 
the novel.  
 An example of this problem in A Passage to India occurs in Chapter VIII during the 
scene of the car accident—an incident that in many ways prefigures and prepares the reader 
for Adela’s “attack.” It begins with the narrator’s revelation that Adela has grown uneasy 
about marrying Ronny because “India had developed sides of his character that she had 




a sign of his general air of superiority. More so, it is suggested that this attitude manifests as 
direct condescension when it involves her: “[t]he point she made was never the relevant 
point, her arguments conclusive but barren, she was reminded that he had the expert 
knowledge and she none, and that experience would not help her because she could not 
interpret it” (74). The narrator’s commentary presages the disclosure shortly thereafter that 
Adela “didn’t mean to stop in India. Which meant that she wouldn’t marry Ronny” (76). 
Before Adela and Ronny partake in the car ride along the Marabar road, this background 
information comes to the fore when Adela does in fact break off her engagement. A few 
moments later, the unengaged couple set out with the Nawab Bahadur when, “owing to a 
jolt,” Adela’s hand touches his “and a spurious unity descended on them, as local and 
temporary as the gleam that inhabits a firefly” (80). Almost immediately after this erotically-
charged encounter, the Nawab Bahadur’s chauffeur loses control of the vehicle and swerves 
off the road.  
The narrator’s staccato description of the incident—“An accident. A slight one. 
Nobody hurt. The Nawab Bahadur awoke” (81)—not only interrupts this “spurious unity” 
between Ronny and Adela. More importantly, it provides the reader with a factual account of 
what happened without supplying an explanation of its cause. Instead, the narrator 
temporarily disappears and leaves the characters to work out the problem for themselves. At 
first, an unnamed voice spontaneously exclaims, “‘[w]asn’t the bridge. We skidded,’” which 
Adela rebuts by stating that “‘[w]e ran into an animal’” (81). Ronny corroborates Adela’s 
claim, though neither one can initially agree what kind of animal hit the car—goat, buffalo, 
or hyena. However, when the couple investigates the animal’s tracks, the narrator suddenly 




been used by too many objects for any one track to be legible, and the torch created such 
high lights and black shadows that they could not interpret what it revealed. Moreover, 
Adela in her excitement knelt and swept her skirts about, until it was she if anyone who 
appeared to have attacked the car” (82). The double meaning of this passage could not be 
clearer. On the one hand, it demonstrates the narrator’s limited viewpoint—an omniscient 
narrator would know with certainty the direct cause of the accident. His attempt to deflect 
the reader’s attention onto Adela as a possible cause reinforces his unreliability because he 
cannot supply a simple answer to the problem. On the other hand, the narrator seems to 
reveal something about his story as such. Suffused with uncertainty, the accident mirrors the 
aporetic experience of reading A Passage to India as a whole. In other words, like the Marabar 
road, the “passage” that the reader follows in the novel has been rendered illegible not only 
by “too many objects” (multiple subject positions) but also by the “high lights and black 
shadows” (aporias, gaps, blanks) that render the narrative uninterpretable. Complicating 
matters, Ronny later introduces an alternative version of the accident to Mrs. Moore—one 
that he apparently had acquired from the Nawab Bahadur. He tells his mother that “‘[o]ur 
excellent host [the Nawab] awoke much rattled from his dreams, appeared to think it was 
our fault, and chanted Exactly, exactly’” (88). Mrs. Moore infers from Ronny’s remark that 
the cause must have been a ghost. While the matter appears to have been put to rest, it 
briefly comes back up when Adela questions Ronny: “‘[w]hat made you call it a ghost?’” (90). 
Ronny tellingly replies, “‘I couldn’t have been thinking of what I was saying’” (90). Adela 
corrects him—reminding Ronny of the agreed upon explanation (hyena)—and the chapter 
comes to a close.  




this episode in similar terms as those presented above. He suggests that in A Passage to India, 
“Forster actively toyed with the readerly desire for closure and stability, all the while both 
denying its fulfillment and critiquing the desire itself. With this strategy, equally formal, 
thematic, and critical, Forster and the modernists more generally force the reader into an 
ethical relationship with narrative itself” (11 – 12). In light of the car accident, Ross claims 
that Forster sets a “cunning trap” for the reader (15). It would seem that from his 
perspective Forster baits the reader into seeking a coherent version of the incident. Indeed, 
as Ross states, “a committed reader can produce a hermeneutically complete account by 
fusing the two accounts as twin halves of a dialectical whole” (15 – 16). This authorial trick, 
however, seeks to upend the reader’s commitment while simultaneously “inviting [her] to 
seek yet more unifying explanations” (17). For Ross, Forster’s strategy can be glimpsed in 
the twice repeated phrase “spurious unity” before the minor wreck. Not only does Forster 
bait the reader, argues Ross, he also seems to be warning her of the dangers involved in 
seeking a total and complete account. For “if [the reader] [is] to approach ethically that 
which remains ultimately unreadable,” he asserts, “then [she] [has] to resist the urge to 
supplement the characters’ explanations with anything ostensibly more stable, rational, 
complete, likely” (18). Notwithstanding his neglect of the narrator’s role, Ross corroborates 
the point that Forster’s responsibility involves withholding certainty and disrupting clear 
“passages” to India.  
In the end, A Passage to India compels the reader to recognize that all unties are 
“spurious,” that is, that all explanations ultimately dissimulate their own contingencies and 
aporias. In the context of the car accident, the reader can adopt multiple subject positions 




the Nawab’s account can be wholly dismissed. In other words, both explanations seem 
plausible depending on the “logic” and perspective of the subject. What seems to frustrate 
and perhaps contradict the Nawab’s version of what occurred on the Marabar road has less 
to do with his supernatural explanation than it does with the fact that he had been asleep 
when the accident happened. What he could have seen or known might be described as not 
only limited but perhaps as even fabricated. Yet as Ross observes, Forster “provides a 
discursive means of unifying the two apparently opposed versions of the cause of the 
accident” (15). For “hyena” in Greek means “female swine”—a reference Aziz makes with 
regard to the legend of “‘the savage pig on the Marabar road’” (90).13 If this trivial event in 
the novel cannot reach a satisfying conclusion from the reader’s perspective, then Adela’s 
“attack” in the caves reaches a point of impassibility. That the reader cannot safely decide if 
Adela has falsified her allegations against Aziz—despite her claim that “‘I’m afraid I have 
made a mistake. […] Dr Aziz never followed me into the cave’” (215)—empties the 
experience of epistemological meaning. To be clear: something does happen to Adela inside 
the cave, but no one in the novel (including the narrator) seems to know what or by whom. 
It thus does not seem a coincidence that the novel intimates sexual assault as the 
event which takes place in the extraordinary Marabar Hills. For Forster appears to suggest 
that the only way “passage” can be ever made is by unsolicited violation. Put another way, 
reading practices that emphasize interpretation in the form of imposition—such as filling in 
narrative blanks—engage in a metaphorical act of rape. The irony of this situation occurs in 
novel when the British impose their interpretation of Adela’s “attack” as sexual assault. She 
may not have been raped by Aziz, but she “is” by her fellow countrymen when they attempt 
 
13 Ross rightly suggests that the etymological link between hyena and “savage pig” can only be understood from 




to foist a false narrative on event. To prevent this unwanted, violent entry the reader must 
cultivate practices that maintain “a dwelling in between questionableness and answerability, 
between the uncertain and the ‘ought’” (Cuddy-Keane 217). In other words, textual 
aporias—like political and social impasses—cannot and should be resolved by force. To read 
responsibly, then, means to accept and even uphold interpretive impasses rather than cross 
them. For, as Derrida reminds us, “[t]here is no decision nor responsibility without the test 








In this dissertation, I examined three British modernist novels and argued that 
modernism was an ethical “project” engaged in problems of responsibility. The underlying 
premise of my analysis—that modernists consciously disrupted the conventions of 
nineteenth-century realism—initiated a discussion about modernist practices particularly 
concerned with ethical modes of narrative representation. I additionally argued that 
modernist writers developed an innovative array of techniques and styles that responded to 
the myriad moral dilemmas and social transformations of early twentieth-century life. In 
particular, I asserted that modernists designed multiple strategies of narrative disruption in 
order to avoid “representational violence” as it pertains to appropriating “the world’s 
surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and imperfect beauty” 
(Nussbaum 3). In other words, modernist practitioners not only sought out to “invent” new 
methods of representation. They did so with a view to defer as much as possible the violent, 
appropriative effects of narration. My analysis showed that modernists actively cultivated 
ethical writing practices which put them at odds with realist narrative techniques—
techniques that reduced and assimilated the unknown other to the intelligible world of 
knowledge and perception. In this way, I claimed, modernist responsibility—insofar as it 
relates to ethical representation—involves a deeply irresponsible “break” with many familiar 
aspects of fiction that had dominated since at least the eighteenth century.1 This “break,” 
however, resulted in a number of critical problems germane to the concept of responsibility 
 
1 Peter Childs lists some of these aspects: “narrative authority and reliability, a contemporary setting, 






One of the central problems concerning modernist fiction, especially the novel, 
involves the act of “taking” responsibility. Modernist writers often deflected their authority 
by deploying narrators to assume control of and give shape to their stories. Unlike narrators 
of past novels, these narrators almost always have a limited or partial understanding of the 
worlds they attempt to depict and the characters they strive to represent. Thus, many 
modernist narrators can be regarded as unreliable despite their responsibility to provide 
accurate and comprehensive accounts of the events and characters constituting their stories. 
This unreliability, I claimed, undermines the omniscience and “master-voice” of authors 
“whose accents […] [unify] the world in a single interpretive center” (D. A. Miller 25). This 
particular issue especially preoccupies Jacob’s Room, as Woolf all but absconds from her story 
and leaves her narrator to complete the task of representing Jacob Flanders. Of course, the 
narrator can neither exist nor perform her duties without the control or design of Woolf (the 
novel’s Author-God). However, Woolf’s narrative strategy seems to involve “loosening” the 
power of the author as such. In other words, she effectively removes her own authorial 
presence as the source of the novel’s meaning. In doing so, Woolf disrupts the possibility of 
assigning responsibility for the text, that is, she limits the means by which readers can locate 
a moral or theological “ground” upon which meaning can be determined. In turn, as the 
“benefactor” of authority, Woolf’s narrator endures the burden of responsibility as she 
attempts to structure and delimit the parameters of Jacob’s life. Her newfound agency results 
in anxiety and reticence as she attends to the ethical obligation of representing the life of an 
other who, she reveals at the end of the novel, has died in the Great War. The narrator’s 




the porous, crepuscular form of her narrative. The novel’s fragmentary form, in other words, 
can be attributed to her uncertainty about how to respectfully represent Jacob’s singularity. 
By contrast, the narrator in A Passage to India evades responsibility altogether. Forster, 
I endeavored to show, exacerbates the problem of responsibility by utilizing a narrator 
whose conspicuous absence only fuels the critical search for a moral center to secure, verify, 
and complete the text. In this way, Forster’s narrator displaces responsibility onto the reader, 
whose “birth” comes at the expense of author’s “death”—if not by the narrator’s own 
evasiveness.2 The narrative voice that Forster elects to take command of the story 
intermittently presents itself, only to fade or blend into the background. The resulting 
narrative gaps, blanks, impasses, lacunae comprising A Passage to India thus point to the 
narrator’s irresponsibility inasmuch as they call the reader to action, for the reader “cannot 
help but try to and supply the missing links that will bring the schemata together in an 
integrated gestalt” (Iser 186). However, like Woolf’s narrator, the reader faces the terrible 
burden of choice. With neither an author nor a narrator on which to guarantee interpretive 
certainty, the reader is condemned to freedom, as it were, and enjoined to the maddening 
task of decision-making. She alone must assume responsibility for the meaning of the 
novel—a novel destabilized at the expense of the narrator’s detachment. The ethical import 
of shifting this responsibility from the narrator to the reader thus involves the interminable 
experience of undecidability. It might be said that the multiple aporias in the novel, “as they 
withhold their references […] help to dislocate the reader’s normal expectations of language, 
and [the reader] finds that [s]he must reformulate a formulated text if [s]he is to be able to 
absorb it” (185). Yet this “absorption” never occurs—and the reader remains “dislocated,” 
 
2 At the end of “Death of the Author” (1968), Roland Barthes remarks that “the birth of the reader must be at 




as she never fully possesses mastery over the text as such.  
This experience of dislocation resonates with similar problems of the “self” that 
preoccupy and overwhelm characters in many modernist novels. Their search for 
unmediated experiences—perhaps best exemplified by Adela Quested’s desire to see the 
“real” India—culminate in failure in the sense that they cannot escape the trappings of the 
world at-large, the world of otherness. Modernist characters such as those featured in 
Lawrence’s fiction seek total solitude from the demands of everyday life only to discover 
themselves reinscribed in the company of others. Whether Birkin in Women in Love or Lou 
Witt in St. Mawr, Lawrence’s protagonists express a naïve desire to retreat from their familial 
and social responsibilities in order to realize their unfettered, authentic selves. Yet however 
much these characters prize autonomy, they continually discover that they cannot do 
without the help of, friendship with, or hospitality by others. Their dislocation thus becomes 
a literal state of being (they often run away from home) as well as a metaphor for their failed 
struggle to achieve complete autonomy. In this way, as Levinas argues, “[t]o be an I then 
signifies not to be able to slip away from responsibility” (“Trace of the Other” 353). The 
encounter with any other always already establishes an ethical relation from which the “I” 
cannot escape.3 In other words, from a Levinasian perspective, no retreat can wholly sever 
the subject from the other. For the subject must respond to the demand demanded of it. 
Thus, it might be said that the very basis of subjectivity can only be established by a “call” to 
responsibility—a “call” that incessantly haunts and burdens the subject.  
This experience, as I explored in Aaron’s Rod, ultimately subverts the subject’s desire 
 
3 Levinas claims that “escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably 





for self-sufficiency: it disrupts the “ideal of peace and equilibrium presupposed by the 
sufficiency of being” (Levinas, On Escape 51).4 Aaron’s restlessness throughout the novel, as 
Steven Vine has suggested, “refutes the idea that the self is a fixed or a given entity” (Vine 
xxvi). But what animates Aaron’s uneasiness has less to do with his self’s “blossoming” than 
it does with his multiple encounters with others—despite his desire to attain solitude (xxvi). 
Aaron fails to cut himself off from others and comes to accept that his responsibility 
originates in a “dark, living, fructifying power” that displaces “the old leaves, [and welcomes] 
the inception of the new” (AR 29 – 98). In other words, he learns that he cannot be alone, 
that he must let go of past conceptions of autonomous selfhood because they ultimately 
deny the circumambience and plenitude of life. As he explains to Lilly at the end of the 
novel: “‘[b]ut you talk […] as if we were like trees, alone by ourselves in the world. We 
aren’t. If we love, it needs another person than ourselves. And if we hate, and even if we 
talk’” (297). Lilly urges Aaron “to submit to the greater soul of man,” yet Aaron hesitates 
and, in the final lines of the novel, wonders “[…] whom shall I submit to?” (299). Lilly’s 
response—“‘[y]our soul will tell you’”—only frustrates the decidability of Lawrence’s 
conclusion (299). Aaron remains unconvinced that he ought to submit to anyone or 
anything. Aaron has neither been consciously embraced his “call” to responsibility nor 
decided to return home. Thus, the uncertainty of Aaron’s fate parallels the ambiguity of the 
novel’s conclusion—the lack of resolution frustrates the promise of “taking” responsibility, 
either by the reader or by the novel’s protagonist. 
 
4 In “Trace of the Other,” Levinas reformulates this disruption: “The putting into question of the self is 





In the final analysis, the clash between modernists’ fidelity to new modes of 
representation and their commitment to self-critique can be glimpsed in the fragmentation 
of their narratives.5 For modernist practitioners of the novel, narrative representation had to 
become almost anti-representational in order to responsibly respond to the demands of the 
other. Such a response, in other words, endeavored to give voice and expression to the 
unknown, uncanny other who—despite having been silenced or misrepresented by past (pre-
modernist) narrative strategies—always already patrols the margins of representation. In 
Modernism, Narrative, and the Novel, Peter Sheehan claims that “[m]odernist narrative suggests 
that literature can pass beyond the limits of what is representable” (16). And he wonders 
why modernists, who engaged in a critique of humanist thought, did not totally abandon 
narrative form. He argues that “anthropological self-importance is more effectively 
undermined by being taken apart from within” (16), that is, that modernist representational 
strategies “strike at the human where it is most vulnerable, most prone to damage—in the 
forms and ways of understanding that are exclusive to narrative” (17). In short, the self can 
be best put into question not only by exposing its limitations and contingencies but also by 
revealing the self’s relation to the superabundant world. In this reading, the “crisis” of 
literary modernism ultimately results from “a loss of narrativity”— a loss that, for Sheehan, 





5 Similarly, Peter Gay claims in Modernism: The Lure of Heresy, modernist writers made “a commitment to a 
principled self-scrutiny” (2) despite their general “conviction that the untried is markedly superior to the 
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